The Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) sued on January 30, 2024, to terminate Mother's rights to her son, called "Max" in the court of appeals' opinion; he was born in September 2023, when six of Mother's other children were already in DFPS's care, and DFPS received a report that Mother was neglecting him, refused to disclose his location, and denied DFPS access to assess his living conditions.¹ Mother tested positive for cocaine in December 2023, January 2024, and June 2025; she was jailed for about a year on an indecency-with-a-child charge involving her other children (later dismissed) and was released in April 2025.² The DFPS caseworker testified that Mother did not begin her family service plan after her release, had no verified stable housing or employment, and planned to live with Max at a shelter or with a boyfriend who was himself recently jailed on a similar charge, while Max was thriving in a foster home that wished to adopt him.³

This is a petition for review of a court of appeals' judgment in a parental-termination case. The trial court (314th District Court, Harris County) signed a decree on August 7, 2025, terminating Mother's rights under Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O) and finding termination in the child's best interest, and appointed DFPS sole managing conservator.¹ The First Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion on February 19, 2026, addressing only subsections (D) and (E) and best interest, and holding Mother lacked standing to challenge the conservatorship appointment.² The Court denied review on June 5, 2026, together with four other petitions (25-1084, 25-1103, 25-1159, and 26-0287), and Justice Sullivan, joined by Justice Young, concurred in the denial of all five.³

Petition for review from the First Court of Appeals, denied June 5, 2026, with a concurring opinion by Justice Sullivan, joined by Justice Young.⁴

Mother presents two issues:¹ 1. Whether the court of appeals failed to apply the correct standards in reviewing the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) endangerment finding. 2. Whether the evidence was factually insufficient to support termination under Section 161.001(b)(2) (best interest), so that her fundamental right to raise her child was constitutionally violated.

The concurrence addresses a different question that no party raised: whether the termination order contained the findings Section 161.001(f) and (g) require, namely reasonable-efforts findings made by clear and convincing evidence and described with specificity in a separate section of the order.²

Mother says termination requires clear and convincing evidence and that termination statutes are strictly construed in the parent's favor, and she contends the court of appeals did not apply that standard.¹ The concurrence applies no standard of review because the Court did not review the case on the merits.²

Issue One: sufficiency of the endangerment findings.

Petitioner (Mother): Termination implicates fundamental constitutional interests, so the clear-and-convincing standard has to be meaningfully enforced, and the court of appeals lowered it by affirming on inferences and speculation.¹ DFPS's evidence was conclusory, no positive drug test was introduced at trial, and Mother completed several court-ordered services, wrote Max three letters, and asked for photos and visits, so no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief that she engaged in a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of endangering conduct or knowingly left Max in endangering surroundings.²

Respondent (DFPS): No response to the petition is on file, so its position appears only through the court of appeals' opinion, which found that Mother's pattern of drug use, unemployment and housing instability, criminal history, and failure to start services supported the findings.³

Issue Two: best interest.

Petitioner (Mother): There is a strong presumption that keeping the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interest, DFPS failed to rebut it with specific evidence or account for her completed services and bond with her son, and neither court meaningfully analyzed the Holley factors.⁴

Respondent (DFPS): No response on file; the court of appeals concluded that the evidence supported the best-interest finding.⁵

The Section 161.001(f)-(g) findings (raised only in the concurrence).

Justice Sullivan: None of the five parents spotted or preserved the error, but the courts did not make the required findings: the Bexar County order said nothing about reasonable efforts, probably from an outdated form, and the Harris County orders (including this one) copied the legal standard instead of describing the efforts with specificity in a separate section.⁶

Mother argued that the case presents an important question about applying legal and factual sufficiency review in termination cases under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and asked the Court to grant review to clarify it and ensure uniform adherence to the constitutional protections for parental rights.¹

None

Reasoning

The Court gave no reasons for denying review; the only writing is the concurrence, which is one Justice's view and not a holding of the Court.¹ Justice Sullivan wrote that the Bexar County order said nothing about reasonable efforts, while the Harris County orders recited the correct finding but merely copied the legal standard rather than describing the efforts with specificity in a separate section, and none stated that the findings were made by clear and convincing evidence.² Had the error been preserved, he would likely reverse and remand for a new trial, or at least vacate in part and remand for an amended order, because the statute requires the findings in the order itself, unlike ordinary findings of fact, which are filed separately from the judgment.³ He concurred in the denial because the error was not preserved, and wrote to remind family courts "to pay careful attention to statutes⁠—especially the ones that tell them how to do their jobs".⁴

Disposition

Petition for review denied.⁵

Vote Breakdown

Justice Sullivan concurred in the denial of the petitions, joined by Justice Young.⁶