J.M. (called "Joseph" in the court of appeals' opinion) was born March 18, 2023, testing positive for methamphetamine and showing possible withdrawal; neither parent responded when the hospital called to have him picked up, and the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) took custody and placed him with a foster mother.¹ His mother tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana at his birth, and her rights to four other children had been terminated in 2022; she did not appeal.² Father, P.J.K., had two visits in 2023, did not submit DNA for paternity testing for a year despite reminders, avoided service, and stopped visiting; his record includes methamphetamine possession convictions in 2017, 2019, and 2021, a 2024 revocation of community supervision for failing to report that sent him to prison in August 2024, and a 2019 termination of his rights to another child.³ He completed none of the services in his 2023 plan, and the foster mother wanted to adopt Joseph, who was thriving.⁴

This is a petition for review in a parental-termination case. DFPS sued on March 24, 2023, and the 314th District Court (Harris County) held trial on September 19, 2024, December 11, 2024, and February 5, 2025, then signed a decree on March 5, 2025, terminating Father's rights under Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and finding termination in the child's best interest.¹ The First Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion on September 11, 2025, rejecting Father's challenge to the denial of his continuance and his sufficiency challenges.² The Court denied review on June 5, 2026, with Justice Sullivan, joined by Justice Young, concurring.³ The concurrence notes the record before the Court was incomplete because the parties did not provide the full clerk's record and the district court sealed the file.⁴

Petition for review from the First Court of Appeals, denied June 5, 2026, with a concurring opinion by Justice Sullivan, joined by Justice Young.⁵

Father presents two issues:¹ 1. Whether the court of appeals failed to apply the correct standards in reviewing the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) findings. 2. Whether the evidence was factually insufficient to support termination under Section 161.001(b)(2) (best interest), so that his fundamental right to raise his child was constitutionally violated.

The concurrence addresses a question no party raised: whether the trial court complied with the 90-day deadline in Section 263.4011 to complete a parental-termination trial.²

Father says termination requires clear and convincing evidence and that the court of appeals did not apply that standard.¹ The Department says the court of appeals applied this Court's legal- and factual-sufficiency standards correctly.² The concurrence applies no standard because the Court denied review.³

Issue One: sufficiency of the endangerment findings.

Petitioner (Father): The original allegations concerned Mother's drug use, not his; he reported being sober for years, no positive test by him was offered, and his probation violation was technical and did not involve drugs; incarceration alone does not support endangerment, and the Department's evidence was speculative and conclusory.¹

Respondent (DFPS): The court of appeals applied the correct standards, and the evidence supporting subsections (D) and (E) includes Father's five convictions for possessing methamphetamine, the drug Joseph tested positive for at birth; Father also waived any constitutional challenge by raising none in the trial court or court of appeals, and he does not say what is unconstitutional.²

Issue Two: best interest.

Petitioner (Father): A strong presumption favors preserving the parent-child relationship, DFPS's evidence was inadequate to overcome it, and the courts did not meaningfully weigh the Holley factors.³

Respondent (DFPS): Joseph has been with his foster mother since shortly after birth and is happy and thriving, Father visited twice in 2023 and then stopped and avoided the proceeding and services, and his fatherhood course in prison does not outweigh that; the petition asks the Court to reweigh the evidence.⁴

The 90-day trial-completion deadline (raised only in the concurrence).

Justice Sullivan: The district court "blew the 90-day deadline"; it commenced trial two days before the commencement deadline with about three minutes of Zoom testimony from a DFPS supervisor, recessed a month and a half, resumed in November only to recess immediately, and finished in February 2025 after three witnesses, without a written extension, so a four-hour trial took five months.⁵

Father invoked the Court's jurisdiction on the ground that the court of appeals committed an error of law of such importance that it requires correction.¹ DFPS answered that the petition does not present a question of law important to the jurisprudence of the State.²

None

Reasoning

The Court gave no reasons for denying review; the only writing is Justice Sullivan's concurrence, which is the view of two Justices, not a holding.¹ He agreed review should be denied but wrote to remind lower courts that they must take all their statutory duties seriously, not just those with jurisdictional consequences: the deadline in Section 263.401(a) to commence trial is jurisdictional, while the deadline in Section 263.4011 to complete it is not.² The Legislature added the 90-day shot clock in 2021 after a Harris County trial in In re J.D.G. took eighteen months with four witnesses, and he wrote that the same district court, now under a new judge, "returned to its old shenanigans".³

He found nothing showing the court granted a written extension under Section 263.4011(c), noted that it denied Father's motion for more time to finish his services and then continued the trial past the deadline it had refused to extend, and said the court admitted it began trial as a pro forma start and recess to meet the commencement deadline.⁴ The court should have commenced on time, heard real testimony from at least one witness, and recessed for fewer than 90 days, or entered a written extension; ninety days was more than enough for a three-witness trial.⁵ He concurred in the denial because the only remedy for the missed deadline was mandamus under Section 263.4011(d), which neither parent sought during trial; he hoped his "gentle reminder" would keep the Court from having to use the "big stick" of mandamus later.⁶

Disposition

Petition for review denied.⁷

Vote Breakdown

Justice Sullivan concurred in the denial of the petition, joined by Justice Young.⁸