In 2021, N.L.S., then five years old, was living with his mother when a neighbor called the police to report that he had come to her house several mornings in a row hungry and in the same dirty clothes.¹ Police doing a welfare check found him alone, took him to the police station, and contacted the Department of Family and Protective Services; officers later found Mother, her infant daughter, and another adult, and both children were taken into the Department's custody.² Father has an extensive and escalating criminal history: since 2008 he has been convicted of twelve crimes, including at least five felonies, two family-violence offenses, two drug-possession offenses, burglary, theft of a firearm, felon in possession of a firearm, evading arrest, and credit card abuse.³ His most recent convictions, in 2021, six months before N.L.S.'s removal, resulted in a five-year sentence, and he was incarcerated when his rights were terminated.⁴ He was incarcerated when N.L.S. was born in 2015, lived with N.L.S. and Mother for two months in 2018, and last saw N.L.S. in 2019, when he was three; he did not know N.L.S.'s grade, favorite color, or favorite food, and testified he could not provide a safe and stable home.⁵

After a bench trial, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights, finding under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) that he engaged in conduct, or knowingly placed N.L.S. with persons who engaged in conduct, that endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being, and that termination was in N.L.S.'s best interest.¹ The First Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Mother's rights, which she did not appeal further, but reversed as to Father and rendered judgment denying termination, holding the evidence legally insufficient because the Department failed to establish "a causal link between [F]ather's criminal conduct and any alleged endangerment to N.L.S.".² The Department petitioned for review in November 2023; the Court requested merits briefing on September 27, 2024, and on June 13, 2025, decided the case per curiam without oral argument, with Chief Justice Blacklock dissenting.³

Petition for review from the First Court of Appeals in a parental-termination appeal; decided per curiam without oral argument under Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1 on June 13, 2025, with a dissenting opinion.⁴

The Department presents whether the court of appeals erred in requiring a "causal link" between the parent's criminal conduct and the child's endangerment, and evidence that the parent knew the child would be endangered while in someone else's care during his incarceration, contrary to J.F.-G. and R.R.A..¹ Father restates the issue as under what circumstances evidence of a conviction and the resulting incarceration is sufficient to support a finding that a parent endangered his child.² The Court decided whether legally sufficient evidence supports the endangerment finding.³

In reviewing legal sufficiency, the Court views the facts in the light favorable to the trial court's findings and reverses only if no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true; termination requires clear and convincing evidence.¹

Whether legally sufficient evidence supports the endangerment finding.

Petitioner (the Department): A parent's separation from his child for most of the child's life because of repeated, lengthy incarcerations for increasingly serious crimes is sufficient to infer endangerment, particularly when he was not caring for or protecting the child between incarcerations; the court of appeals' two added requirements, a causal link and the parent's knowledge that the child would be endangered, contradict J.F.-G. and R.R.A..¹

Respondent (Father): The court of appeals simply held the evidence legally insufficient to show he engaged in, or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in, endangering conduct; he argues that R.R.A. is limited to drug use, that imprisonment alone is not endangerment, and that he did not know N.L.S. was in danger in Mother's care.²

The Department argued that the court of appeals departed from the Court's decision in J.F.-G. by requiring a causal link and knowledge, and that its opinion should be overturned.¹ The Court observed that R.R.A., decided after the court of appeals' opinion, also conflicts with its analysis.² The dissent would have denied the petition because reinstating this termination is not important to the jurisprudence.³

None. The docket shows no amicus filings.

Holding

Endangerment under section 161.001(b)(1)(E) does not require that the parent's conduct directly harm the child; the proper inquiry is whether there is evidence of a pattern of behavior presenting a substantial risk of harm, and Father's escalating criminal history, repeated incarceration, and minimal effort to be part of the child's life are legally sufficient evidence of endangerment.¹

Reasoning

To "endanger" means to expose to loss or injury or to jeopardize, and it is not necessary that the parent's conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffer injury; in R.R.A. the Court held that endangerment under the drug-use ground does not require direct harm to the child, relying on its interpretation of "endanger" in subsection (E), and the Court rejected Father's argument that R.R.A. is limited to drug cases because the same words carry the same meaning in the same subject area.² Mere imprisonment alone is not endangerment, but under J.F.-G. a parent's criminal history, taking into account the nature of the crimes, the duration of incarceration, and any pattern of escalating, repeated convictions, can support the finding.³

Applying that standard, Father's increasingly serious convictions since 2008 support the finding, a criminal record beginning before the child's birth may be considered, and his conduct continued afterward; the trial court noted that throughout N.L.S.'s life he was either under felony indictment or in prison, and his criminal conduct kept him from seeing N.L.S. after age three.⁴ The court of appeals focused on Father's testimony that he did not know N.L.S. would be endangered in Mother's care, but that testimony was disputed by the caseworker, whom the trial court could credit, and J.F.-G. rejected a similar argument because a parent's lack of knowledge resulted from the conduct that led to his incarceration and his indifference to the child.⁵ The evidence also showed his choice not to monitor the child's safety and his minimal effort to contact the child or take part in decisions about his well-being.⁶

The Court declined to reach legal sufficiency of the best-interest finding, which the Department raised only in its merits brief, because it was not presented in the petition and a remand would be needed anyway for factual-sufficiency review, over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.⁷

Dissent (Chief Justice Blacklock, joined by Justices Devine and Sullivan). He criticized the Court's "expansive approach" to endangerment, said termination statutes were once strictly construed in favor of the parent, said he had no quarrel with the court of appeals' decision, and would have denied the petition, because the Court should have let the court of appeals' decision stand and focused its attention elsewhere.⁸

Disposition

Without hearing oral argument, the Court granted the Department's petition for review, reversed the part of the court of appeals' judgment reversing the termination as to Father, and remanded for the court of appeals to review the factual sufficiency of the endangerment finding and the legal and factual sufficiency of the best-interest finding.⁹

Vote Breakdown

Per Curiam Opinion

Joined by Bland, Boyd, Busby, Huddle, Lehrmann, and Young, JJ.

Dissent by Chief Justice Blacklock

Joined by Devine and Sullivan, JJ.