Mother, a young woman who began a relationship with Father, then 24, when she was 16, had three children with him, and the marriage was strained; Father repeatedly threatened and committed self-harm, sometimes in front of the children, including a rope around his neck, slamming his head on a countertop, and threatening to shoot himself with a nail gun.¹ In May 2022 Father grabbed Mother by the throat and slammed her onto a toolbox in front of the children and then hit his own head with a hammer, after which Mother took the children and fled.² The Department of Family and Protective Services then removed the children and sued for conservatorship and termination; Mother's service plan had a primary goal of family reunification and required couples counseling with Father.³ The trial court suspended the parents' visitation about seven months before trial, and the children, who were not thriving, had sharply declined, with two sent to psychiatric hospitals.⁴

Mother moved to extend the dismissal date under Family Code Section 263.401 so she could keep working her services and resume visitation, and the trial court refused and proceeded to a jury trial in September 2023.¹ The jury found grounds to terminate both parents' rights, and the Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) affirmed, holding that Mother showed no extraordinary circumstances warranting an extension and that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient as to each parent.² The vehicle in this Court is petitions for review filed on behalf of Mother and of Father; the Court heard argument on September 9, 2025, and decided the case on June 5, 2026.³ Justice Devine did not participate.⁴

Petitions for review from the Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) in a parental-termination case; argued September 9, 2025, and decided June 5, 2026.⁵

Mother presents issues including whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support termination when she repeatedly removed the danger Father posed, whether the Department could terminate because she had not left Father when its own service plan required couples counseling and reunification, whether she substantially completed her service plan, and whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to extend the dismissal date.¹ Father presents whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the best-interest finding when it rested on Holley factors that gave him a "Hobson's choice," on his hesitation to allow psychotropic medication, and on his alleged failure to comply with a subjective service plan.² The Court decided Mother's best-interest challenge and the extension question and affirmed as to Father.³

A trial court's refusal to extend the dismissal date under Section 263.401 is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and the Court may find an abuse in either granting or refusing to find extraordinary circumstances.¹ Legal sufficiency of a finding that must be proved by clear and convincing evidence asks whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.²

Whether the evidence supported terminating Mother's rights.

Mother (Petitioner): The court of appeals affirmed as if the Department had given Mother a choice between divorcing Father and never seeing her children again, but her Department-provided counselors confirmed she would and did choose her children, and the Department's own service plan required couples counseling and reunification with Father.¹ Just because jurors could think a parent could have handled a difficult situation better does not make the evidence clear and convincing that she disregarded her obligations.²

Department (Respondent): The court of appeals properly deferred to the jury's credibility determinations given Mother's pattern of leaving with the children after Father's violent episodes and then returning, and the evidence of illegal drug use, disruptive visits, and failure to recognize that Father still posed a danger was legally sufficient.³ The Department also argues Mother's status as a domestic-violence victim was not a de facto basis for termination.⁴

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to extend the dismissal date.

Mother (Petitioner): By trial she had completed or made substantial progress on essentially all services except in-person counseling that the court ordered and the Department did not make available, and strict compliance with every aspect of a plan is not always the standard.⁵

Department (Respondent): The trial court properly denied the request to extend the deadline.⁶

Whether the best-interest standard should change (Father).

Father (Petitioner): The Court should revisit the Holley factors because courts can find termination in a child's best interest based on a single factor that puts parents in no-win positions, should hold that factors requiring Hobson's choices cannot support termination, and should recognize that parents decide what goes in their children's bodies.⁷

Department (Respondent): The family service plan is crafted with the parents' input and is neither subjective nor misleading, and the evidence of exposure to domestic violence, self-harm, untreated mental illness, and drug use was legally sufficient under subsections (D) and (E).⁸

Father argued that the petition calls for two significant changes to how Texas courts analyze parental-termination cases, reconsidering how the Holley factors are used and the weight of subjective service plans, with effects beyond this case; the Department answered that he had not shown the issues have broader significance to the jurisprudence of the State.¹

• Not required to leave. Asked if the Department should have told mother plainly she must leave the father, its counsel said she did not have to leave; she could separate temporarily. (Oral Argument, 0:26:13)
• Domestic violence. Asked if domestic violence in front of a child is abuse of the child, petitioners' counsel said it could fall under endangerment grounds but not abuse. (Oral Argument, 0:01:17)
• Best interest. Asked if the points go more to best interest than endangerment, petitioners' counsel said yes, especially given the subjective service plan handed to the father. (Oral Argument, 0:06:31)
• Mother's welfare check. The Department's counsel said mother's testimony that father had changed was rebutted, since she herself called a welfare check, fearing he might harm himself. (Oral Argument, 0:36:08; 0:36:58)
• Religious beliefs. Petitioners' counsel said he almost briefed the case as a religious one, because the Department disregarded mother's beliefs about her marriage. (Oral Argument, 0:15:27)
• Extension of deadline. Asked about denying an extension, the Department's counsel said an extension would not change much, because father began services only about seven weeks before trial. (Oral Argument, 0:50:27; 0:51:59)

• Family Freedom Project supports the parents: termination law should not allow subjective, arbitrary decisions, and the Family Code's service-plan ground is unconstitutional.
• Cecilia M. Wood supports the parents: denying the extension was an abuse of discretion, and a substantial-impairment test should guide best-interest findings.

Holding

The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to extend the dismissal date, an error that "snowballed" into a termination trial before Mother could show her progress, and the Department failed to present legally sufficient evidence that terminating Mother's rights was in the children's best interest, so the Court rendered judgment for her; the evidence was legally sufficient to terminate Father's rights, and the Court affirmed as to him.¹

Reasoning

Extension. Section 263.401 automatically dismisses a case not tried within a year unless the court finds extraordinary circumstances and that continuing the Department's appointment is in the child's best interest, and those circumstances are not limited to the ones the statute lists.² Here they were extraordinary: Mother was making progress despite being denied visitation for nearly seven months, the parents were on a waitlist for in-person counseling the Department had not provided, all three children had worsening behavioral issues, two had been sent to psychiatric hospitals, and no adoptive placements had been found.³ The Court did not decide whether the remedy was a new trial because the error led to another: proceeding to trial cut short a process poised to lead to reunification and left the Department without legally sufficient best-interest evidence.⁴

Best interest as to Mother. Termination requires clear and convincing evidence and is a last resort, and the Court construes termination statutes strictly in the parent's favor, so a parent whose rights are sought to be terminated based on a spouse's violence deserves particular caution.⁵ Drawing on Lewelling v. Lewelling and the dilemma of battered mothers who risk losing their children by seeking help, the Court asked not whether Mother is a victim or has left her husband, but whether she can and will protect her children.⁶ The Department's own plan required couples counseling and aimed at reunification, so Mother never understood that the real demand was to separate, and precedent forecloses demanding that a parent choose between divorce and her children.⁷ The Department offered little of the evidence expected in an endangerment case, such as medical records, criminal histories, police reports, or drug-testing results, and the best-interest requirement of Section 161.001(b)(2) has independent force, so the Court did not reach the endangerment or service-plan grounds.⁸ Mother will now be the children's sole legal parent, and the Department may seek relief based on future conduct.⁹

Father. The record supplied ample evidence that Father posed a substantial risk of harm, so the evidence was legally sufficient to support the findings that he endangered the children and that termination was in their best interest.¹⁰

Dissent in part. Justice Lehrmann, joined by Justices Bland and Huddle, agreed Father's rights were properly terminated but would hold that, under the proper standard of review, legally sufficient evidence also supports the jury's findings as to Mother and criticized the Court for disregarding evidence supporting the verdict.¹¹

Disposition

Court of appeals' judgment reversed as to Mother, and judgment rendered in her favor; judgment affirmed as to Father.¹²

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Young

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Busby, Hawkins, and Sullivan, JJ.

Dissent in Part by Justice Lehrmann

Joined by Bland and Huddle, JJ.

Did Not Participate

Devine, J.