Robyn Herring sued Delta Equine Center over an injury to her breeding stallion, "Happy," while he was boarded there, and at trial she offered Exhibit 19, a series of text messages that included a question about a casualty insurance policy on the horse.¹ On the third day of trial one of Delta Equine's attorneys used the word "insurance" in a single question about Exhibit 19, the witness never answered, and Herring immediately moved for and obtained a mistrial.² Delta Equine's counsel say the parties had agreed to boilerplate limines, including one on insurance, but that the trial court never entered a limine order, in writing or orally.³ Herring says the agreed insurance limine is uncontroverted and that counsel deliberately injected insurance through a line of questions without first approaching the court.⁴

Herring moved for sanctions and asked for $126,590.78 in fees and costs for work that would have to be redone for a second trial, and on February 10, 2025 the trial court, using its inherent authority, awarded all of it against Delta Equine's law firms, Chamblee Ryan and The Deaton Law Firm, jointly and severally and payable within 30 days.¹ The law firms' motion for reconsideration was not granted, and the Twelfth Court of Appeals stayed the order and then denied mandamus on April 23, 2025, in an opinion by Chief Justice Worthen that addressed only whether an adequate remedy by appeal exists.² The Supreme Court requested merits briefing.

Original proceeding (petition for writ of mandamus) after the Twelfth Court of Appeals (Tyler) denied relief. Argued September 17, 2026.

• Delta Equine and the law firms:¹ (1) whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion by awarding $126,590.78 in sanctions for violating a limine order it never made, when not every mention of insurance is harmful error; and (2) whether the relators lack an adequate appellate remedy where the order requires counsel to fund continued litigation against their client.
• Herring:² that the relators changed position after swearing an agreed insurance limine existed, and that there is an adequate remedy by appeal for a purely monetary pre-judgment sanction on counsel.

Mandamus requires a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal, and Herring argues that under Braden and In re Casey a monetary pre-judgment sanction is reviewable by mandamus only where prepayment would significantly impair a party's willingness or ability to continue the litigation.¹

Whether the sanction was an abuse of discretion.

Delta Equine and the law firms (Relators): A trial court cannot punish someone for violating an order it never entered, Herring cannot obtain a mistrial based on evidence she offered, and a trial court generally cannot use inherent power to circumvent the American Rule, so fee-shifting as a sanction fails.¹ In reply, they say the court sanctioned them for flouting a limine it never entered and that the notion of bad-faith scheming ignores the law.²

Herring (Real Party in Interest): The existence of an agreed limine on insurance was uncontroverted and was admitted in the relators' sworn response; this Court has rejected the theory that inherent-power sanctions require a formal written order, and there is no conflict over the meaning of Mayfield.³

Whether mandamus is available.

Delta Equine and the law firms (Relators): Only mandamus can give relief because the order forces counsel to pay someone to pursue claims against their client, a procedural anomaly like those in Mayfield and In re Ford, and review would resolve a split over fee shifting as an inherent-power sanction.⁴

Herring (Real Party in Interest): The sanction is purely monetary, imposed on counsel before judgment, and can be paid now and appealed with the judgment; relators disclaim the Braden test, so the petition fails at the threshold, and a full merits trial is required regardless.⁵

The law firms argued that the case involves cascading trial-court errors and a sanction that neuters the adversarial process, and that review would let the Court set limits on inherent-power fee shifting and resolve a split in the courts of appeals.¹ Herring argued the Court should deny review of an interlocutory, purely monetary sanction so the trial can proceed.²

• An agreed limine, but no order. Asked whether both sides had agreed not to discuss insurance, the relators' counsel said yes, boilerplate agreed limines existed, but the trial court never entered an order. (Oral Argument, 2:02:28; 2:06:02)
• No curative instruction. Asked why no one asked the judge to instruct the jury to disregard the question, counsel said it was never answered and Herring immediately asked for a mistrial. (Oral Argument, 2:07:07)
• Braden and Casey. Asked why mandamus is appropriate given Braden and Casey, counsel said the Court need not overrule them and could look instead to Mayfield and Ford. (Oral Argument, 2:10:34)
• Could the number grow? Asked what stops the trial court if Herring says the amount is not $126,590, counsel said nothing prevents more fees under inherent power, which they call impermissible. (Oral Argument, 2:12:22)
• Deferring payment. Asked whether they requested deferring payment to the end of the case, counsel said no, but they moved to reconsider and sever and never got a hearing. (Oral Argument, 2:13:27)
• Remington and pretrial complaints. Asked about Remington's bar on raising pretrial grievances during trial, counsel said they filed their motion the night before trial and never got a ruling. (Oral Argument, 2:17:56)
• What the limine protects. Herring's counsel said a limine protects the judge's chance to rule, and defense counsel made a strategy decision not to tell the court before raising insurance. (Oral Argument, 2:19:19; 2:22:17)

None noted