Lauren Krueger, a Florida-based engineer for Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX), was on a month-long work trip supporting the Starship project in Brownsville when she rear-ended a Ford F-150 in stop-and-go traffic on the way to the project site, pushing it into a Toyota Tundra in what all agree was a 7.5-mile-per-hour impact.¹ The Tundra's driver and three passengers were employees of Ruiz Erectors, a SpaceX subcontractor; they said they were "okay" at the scene, but their employer called his attorney and then instructed them to see a doctor and have the Tundra towed for an estimate.² A clinic examined them the same morning, found "degeneration" and "osteoarthritic changes" but "no significant acute abnormalities," and cleared them to work with lifting restrictions, yet the employer arranged for them to go to his attorney's office and a chiropractor the same day, and the crew then received treatment from doctors the attorney chose.³ Three of the men sued Krueger for negligence and SpaceX for vicarious liability and sought $3.75 million at trial, where the main dispute was whether degeneration or the crash caused their pain.⁴

Before trial, the court granted a motion in limine on letters of protection but denied it as to how the plaintiffs found their doctors, and admitted a nonparty passenger's testimony that the attorney picked the doctors.¹ In closing, SpaceX's counsel argued that there was a "lawyer-driven plan" to "manufacture an opportunity to cash in"; plaintiffs' counsel objected to an "improper attack," the judge said "Move on" without ruling, and counsel later disclaimed any intent to move for a mistrial while reserving a new-trial motion.² The jury found Krueger negligent but not acting in the course and scope of her employment, and awarded $73,500, $40,000, and $10,000; the trial court rendered judgment on the verdict, then granted a new trial, citing "incurable arguments".³ The Thirteenth Court of Appeals denied mandamus because neither relator had alerted the trial court to the alleged defect, and while the petition was pending here the trial court signed a thirteen-page amended order giving three reasons for a new trial.⁴ The Court requested merits briefing and, without oral argument, conditionally granted relief on June 27, 2025.⁵

Original petition for writ of mandamus after the court of appeals denied relief; decided per curiam without oral argument under Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(c).⁶

SpaceX and Krueger present five issues: whether a party may add grounds in an amended new-trial order long after Rule 329b's deadline; whether a new trial may rest on the judge's unexplained finding of "low damages"; whether admitting, without objection, evidence that the former lawyer selected the doctors justifies a new trial; whether the closing was improper and incurable; and whether the court of appeals erred in requiring them to ask the trial court to correct a facially insufficient order first.¹ The plaintiffs ask whether the Court should dismiss because the court of appeals has not reviewed the amended order, whether relators' record is incomplete, whether a trial court can add grounds in an amended order, and whether the order was an abuse of discretion.² The Court decided whether the amended order's stated reasons withstand scrutiny.³

A trial court may grant a new trial "for good cause," and mandamus review is for clear abuse of discretion; disregarding a verdict is an unusually serious act, so trial courts must give written reasons, and an order whose reasons are insufficiently specific or legally invalid, meritless, or unsupported by the record is an abuse of discretion.¹

Whether the new-trial order should be set aside.

Relators (SpaceX and Krueger): The order was written entirely by the plaintiffs and signed unchanged, copies large portions of their motion verbatim, and is an advocacy document with unsupported findings; review in this Court cannot be evaded by modifying orders while mandamus is pending.¹ They argue that the lawyer-referral testimony was admitted without objection and properly, that closing argument based on evidence in the record was appropriate and not incurable, and that the plaintiffs largely leave these propositions unchallenged.²

Real parties in interest (Ruiz and Humberto Garcia): The court of appeals effectively gave relators the only relief to which they were entitled, the Court should not intervene prematurely because the trial court was considering an amended order and the record is incomplete, and relators' strategy has been to attack opposing counsel and now the trial judge.³ They argue that the lengthy and prejudicial evidence and argument effectively put plaintiffs' counsel on trial and caused an improper judgment.⁴

Real party in interest (Hector Garcia, Jr.): Relators did not ask the trial court to amend the order before seeking mandamus in the court of appeals and this Court, and the new order remains largely based on incurable closing argument.⁵

Not applicable. This was an original mandamus proceeding, which the Court heard after the court of appeals denied relief and the trial court signed an amended order while the petition was pending.¹

• Texans for Lawsuit Reform filed an amicus curiae brief on January 13, 2025.

Holding

The trial court clearly abused its discretion in ordering a new trial because none of the reasons in its amended order withstands scrutiny: the closing argument was curable and the complaint was waived, the referral testimony came in without objection and was cumulative, and the finding of "manifestly low damages" was unexplained.¹

Reasoning

Incurable argument. To preserve error in jury argument, a party must object, secure a ruling, and request a retraction or curative instruction unless the argument is so egregious as to be incurable, and incurable argument is rare, as in appeals to racial prejudice or accusations of witness manipulation or evidence tampering.² Defense counsel's references to a "lawyer-driven plan" and "doctors assigned by the lawyer" were grounded in evidence admitted without objection, and the loaded rhetoric such as "shakedown" was similar to language held curable in Standard Fire v. Reese.³ The plaintiffs asserted that curability matters only for preservation, but a party generally may not lie in wait and complain of curable argument for the first time in a new-trial motion; here counsel used rebuttal to bolster the former attorney's character, disclaimed a mistrial, and moved for a new trial only after the verdict, which was "too little, too late".⁴ The Court did not condone inflammatory rhetoric and noted that trial courts should supervise argument.⁵

Referral evidence. The second reason contradicts the record: the attorney's referrals came in without objection, a motion in limine does not preserve error, and the cited testimony was cumulative of other unobjected evidence, so any error was likely harmless.⁶

Low damages. The order does not explain how or why the $123,500 award is too small, let alone manifestly so.⁷ Because the mandamus record lacks about 2,400 pages of medical exhibits relevant to Krueger's damages, the Court could not say there was no valid basis against her and directed the trial court to redraft its order as to her; but no stated reason supports a new trial against SpaceX, since the jury found Krueger outside the scope of her employment, so judgment must be rendered for SpaceX.⁸

Disposition

Without hearing oral argument, the Court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to vacate the amended new-trial order, render a take-nothing judgment in SpaceX's favor, and redraft its new-trial order as to Krueger; the writ will issue only if the trial court does not comply.⁹

Vote Breakdown

Per Curiam Opinion

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Boyd, Busby, Devine, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.