Jose Torres severely injured his right index finger in a bandsaw accident and was treated by plastic surgeon Leo Lapuerta, who described the tip of the finger as "hanging by a thread" and ultimately performed a "ray amputation" removing the entire index finger and the metacarpal bone.¹ Torres sued Lapuerta, claiming his negligent treatment of the wound caused the infection that necessitated the amputation, and Lapuerta defended that the saw injury itself precluded any possibility of saving the finger, with testimony that there was less than a 10% chance of saving it, and that Torres's own poor care contributed.²

At trial the charge, at Lapuerta's request, included a "loss of chance" instruction that Torres's finger must have had a greater than fifty percent chance of survival if reasonable care had been provided for Lapuerta's negligence to be a proximate cause, and Torres objected, and the jury returned an 11-1 verdict for Lapuerta after asking whether the instruction related to the whole finger or a partial finger, a question the court declined to answer.¹ Torres moved for a new trial and attached a letter from the lone dissenting juror describing the jury's deliberations; the district court signed a one-sentence order granting the motion and, after Lapuerta sought mandamus, an amended order giving seven reasons.² The Court of Appeals for the First District (Houston) denied mandamus relief without analysis.³ The vehicle in this Court is an original proceeding for writ of mandamus, argued December 4, 2025, and decided April 10, 2026.⁴

Original proceeding for writ of mandamus after the First Court of Appeals (Houston) denied relief; argued December 4, 2025, and decided April 10, 2026.⁵

Lapuerta presents whether the district court clearly abused its discretion in granting a new trial and invalidating the jury's verdict based on alleged error in a jury instruction, in giving legally invalid reasons, and in failing to give reasons the record supports, including whether Torres preserved the objections in the order.¹ Torres responds that mandamus is not available because the order gives specific reasons for which a new trial is legally appropriate.²

A writ of mandamus is available to correct a clear abuse of discretion, and a trial court abuses its discretion in granting a new trial when its stated reason is predicated on legal error or lacks record support, since disregarding a jury's verdict is "an unusually serious act".¹

Whether the new-trial order rests on valid, preserved reasons.

Lapuerta (Relators): The amended order is not based on valid legal reasons, on the trial record, or on Texas law, and it lacks the required explanation of why no rational jury could have reached this verdict, and Torres failed to preserve by timely objection several of the seven reasons.¹

Torres (Real Party in Interest): Mandamus is unavailable because the order states reasons for which a new trial is legally appropriate and is specific enough to show the court did not repeat a pro forma template; relators overread In re Athans, and Torres objected at the charge conference to the loss-of-chance instruction and submitted a charge without it.²

Lapuerta argued that granting a new trial to overturn an 11-1 defense verdict on invalid grounds clearly abused the court's discretion and left him without an adequate remedy by appeal.¹

• No correct answer. Asked what the correct answer to the jury's question would have been, relators' counsel said none, because testimony conflicted on whether he would lose part or all of the finger. (Oral Argument, 0:01:37; 0:02:22)
• Why mandamus. Asked why mandamus, relators' counsel said the jury trial was taken away for reasons unsupported by Texas law or the record, and the order does not even mention confusion. (Oral Argument, 0:04:26; 0:05:22)
• Death cases only. Asked whether the loss-of-chance instruction is categorically limited, the real party's counsel said it is available only in death cases. (Oral Argument, 0:18:28)
• No case on confusion. Asked for a case holding confusion is irrelevant when no one objected, relators' counsel said she found none; the judge failed to explain why the instruction confused jurors. (Oral Argument, 0:09:20)
• Why harmful. Asked why the instruction was harmful in a non-death case, the real party's counsel said jurors asked for clarification and were denied, so confusion cannot be assumed resolved. (Oral Argument, 0:21:31)
• Only a plaintiff's verdict? Asked if only a plaintiff's verdict was possible, relators' counsel said no, not under the evidence. (Oral Argument, 0:11:36; 0:12:37)
• Foregone conclusion. The real party's counsel agreed the top of the finger was a foregone conclusion, but said evidence showed the injury extended to the next digit. (Oral Argument, 0:25:44)

None

Holding

A trial court abuses its discretion by ordering a new trial for reasons that misperceive the law governing liability for medical negligence, so the district court clearly abused its discretion in granting a new trial after the 11-1 defense verdict, and the dissenting juror's letter, which violates the secrecy of jury deliberations, played no legitimate role.¹

Reasoning

The juror's letter. The deliberations of the jury must remain private and secret, and Texas Rule of Evidence 606(b) bars a juror from testifying about statements or the effect of anything on the jury's deliberations, so attaching the dissenting juror's letter to the new-trial motion squarely violated those rules; the order did not rely on it, but Torres's juror-confusion theory closely tracks the letter's allegations, and the Court will not ignore that it may have influenced the outcome.²

The seven grounds. The district court's first, second, third, and fifth grounds reflected a mistaken view that Texas law does not recognize loss of chance of survival, but it is settled that if a pre-existing condition gave the plaintiff less than a 50% chance of survival, recovery is barred, and Hawley held that failing to give such an instruction when the evidence is contested may be reversible error, so giving it is not grounds for a new trial.³ The sixth ground, that the instruction is available only in death cases, was wrong, because the reasoning of Kramer, Milo, and Hawley applies equally to "loss of chance of survival" of a finger as of a person.⁴

Jury confusion. The jury's question whether the charge related to the whole or a partial finger was the record's only indication of confusion apart from the improper letter, a question alone cannot support a new trial, Torres's counsel said at the time that the whole finger was what the charge asked for, and the record does not compel the conclusion that the jury probably would have answered differently with an instruction on a partial finger, since none of the other doctors vouched for Torres's expert's view that a partial amputation was ever viable.⁵

"A" versus "the" proximate cause. The seventh ground was error because the loss-of-chance instruction does not imply there can be only one proximate cause of an injury.⁶ Torres was entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one, and none of the reasons, singly or together, justifies a new trial.⁷

Disposition

Mandamus conditionally granted; the district court is directed to vacate its order granting a new trial and render judgment on the jury's verdict, with the writ to issue only if it does not.⁸

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Chief Justice Blacklock

Joined by Bland, Busby, Devine, Hawkins, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.