Jose Medellin, an independent contractor with roofing experience hired by Metal Roof, which was itself retained by general contractor JMI Contractors, LLC for a roofing project at an apartment complex in San Antonio, was helping stretch a rubberized membrane over part of the roof.¹ Raul Rodriguez, a JMI employee, supervised the job site, and while pulling the roll with Reybel Rodriguez, an independent contractor, Medellin lost track of the roof's edge, stepped off, fell about 30 feet, and was seriously injured.² JMI says he drank beer and smoked marijuana hours earlier and walked backward off a flat roof despite knowing the risk, while Medellin says JMI controlled jobsite safety.³

Medellin sued JMI on several theories, and a Bexar County jury found JMI liable on both negligent activity and premises liability, the trial court entered judgment on the verdict and the court of appeals affirmed.¹ The Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio) initially ordered a new trial on an issue not before this Court, but on rehearing withdrew that opinion and affirmed, holding that the necessary-use exception applied because JMI controlled the jobsite's safety requirements.² The Supreme Court granted review and heard argument on January 15, 2026,³ and on June 26, 2026 reversed and rendered judgment for JMI in an opinion by Justice Hawkins, with a concurrence by Justice Busby.⁴

Petition for review from the Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio); argued January 15, 2026; opinion by Justice Hawkins issued June 26, 2026, with a concurrence by Justice Busby.⁵

• JMI:¹ whether the court of appeals improperly blended negligent-activity and premises-defect theories in assessing JMI's duties, whether it was appropriate to apply the necessary-use exception to impose a duty on JMI, and whether the court of appeals erred on the exclusion of evidence of Medellin's substance use, the closing argument and the punitive-damages evidence.
• Medellin:² whether a general judgment on two separately submitted theories must be affirmed if the evidence supports one, whether a general contractor that retains control of jobsite safety owes a duty to make the premises safe where the necessary-use exception applies, and whether the evidentiary, closing-argument and gross-negligence challenges show error.

Whether an injury implicates premises liability or negligent activity is a question of law reviewed de novo, and a plaintiff's pleading does not change the character of the claim.¹

Whether the claim sounds in negligent activity or premises liability.

JMI (Petitioner): The court of appeals improperly blended two distinct theories, and Medellin's injury from an open and obvious roof edge arose from a premises condition and not from contemporaneous activity.¹

Medellin (Respondent): Unlike the plaintiff in United Scaffolding v. Levine, he submitted and won separate findings on premises liability and negligent activity, so the general judgment must be affirmed if either theory is supported.²

Whether the necessary-use exception reaches independent contractors.

JMI (Petitioner): The court of appeals applied the exception to require JMI to warn Medellin of the project's risks although this Court has expressed doubt that it applies to independent contractors, and this appeal is a vehicle to decide that question.³

Medellin (Respondent): A general contractor that retains contractual and actual control over jobsite safety owes a duty to make the premises safe where the necessary-use exception applies, even if the fall risk is open and obvious.⁴

JMI argued that the court of appeals blended two theories of liability and applied the necessary-use exception to an independent contractor despite this Court's expressed doubt, and Medellin responded that the petition presents no novel legal question.¹

• Native condition. Asked where to draw the line between negligent activity and premises defects, JMI's counsel said the alleged defect is the unguarded roof edge, as it existed before any work. (Oral Argument, 0:02:43; 0:04:37)
• Warn or make safe. JMI's counsel said the premises duty to an invitee is ordinarily to warn or make the premises safe, and a flat roof edge is commonplace. (Oral Argument, 0:08:52; 0:10:53)
• Necessary use. Asked whether independent contractors can never use the necessary-use exception, JMI's counsel said it should not apply to them. (Oral Argument, 0:16:59)
• Case-by-case. Asked why the necessary-use exception should reach independent contractors, Medellin's counsel said it is fact-specific, so a bright line excluding them would be wrong. (Oral Argument, 0:40:35)
• Open and obvious. Asked how open and obviousness matters if there is negligent activity, Medellin's counsel said it is not relevant, and trial counsel submitted both theories to be safe. (Oral Argument, 0:42:00; 0:42:45)
• Impairment evidence. Asked why jurors hearing about marijuana and beer would be prejudiced, Medellin's counsel said impairment could be relevant, but treating all consumption as relevant, whenever it occurred, goes too far. (Oral Argument, 0:33:16)
• Unusual activity. On rebuttal, JMI's counsel said a skilled roofer walking backward toward the edge twice made the earlier consumption relevant, and no expert is needed to explain impairment. (Oral Argument, 0:45:21; 0:46:22)

None noted

Holding

Medellin's claim sounds only in premises liability because his injury stems from nonfeasance and not contemporaneous malfeasance, and the record does not support an independent negligent-activity claim or the retained-control framework of Lee Lewis; and an independent contractor may not invoke the necessary-use exception to the open-and-obvious doctrine, so his premises claim fails as a matter of law.¹

Reasoning

Negligent activity and premises liability are separate, non-interchangeable theories, a negligent-activity claim requires contemporaneous action, and where an injury results from an activity made dangerous only by its relation to a premises condition the claim sounds in premises liability, as in the "minefield" example.² Medellin's claim concerns the unguarded roof edge, the instruction to "pull the roll" came from another independent contractor and not from JMI, failing to provide safety measures is nonfeasance, and the jury's general finding of "some control" does not show the particularized control over his activity that Lee Lewis, as limited by Dow Chemical and Moritz, requires.³ Because he agreed the roof edge was open and obvious, his premises claim fails unless the necessary-use exception applies, and the Court held that it does not reach independent contractors, who are expected to evaluate and mitigate obvious hazards, are better positioned to do so and bring their own equipment and the authority to refuse unsafe work, as Medellin's experience and testimony show.⁴ Justice Busby, concurring, agreed that the dangerous condition was open and obvious and that the Court was not altering the separate duty of one who retains control of an independent contractor's work to exercise it with reasonable care.⁵

Disposition

Court of appeals' judgment reversed and a take-nothing judgment rendered in favor of JMI.⁶

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Hawkins

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Busby, Devine, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.

Concurrence by Justice Busby

No other Justice joined.

De novo review of the legal question whether an injury implicates premises liability or negligent activity and of whether the necessary-use exception applies.¹

Justice Hawkins delivered the opinion of the Court, and Justice Busby filed a concurring opinion.¹