Baird/Williams Construction was the general contractor on a school renovation for Hutto ISD at four campuses and hired Amos Electric Supply as its electrical subcontractor under Subcontract No. 587-3.¹ Baird/Williams says the subcontract, in at least four provisions, gave Amos sole responsibility for supervision, equipment, safety and the means and methods of the work, backed by an anti-waiver clause, and that Amos furnished Martinez's ladder and equipment and assigned his work.² One provision also says all work "shall be done under the direction of and to the satisfaction of" Baird/Williams, and the contract reserved a right, but not an obligation, to correct unsafe work.³ Amos employee Jacinto Martinez fell from a 12-foot A-frame stepladder while changing light fixtures in a school cafeteria.⁴ Martinez says Baird/Williams failed to enforce its policy requiring fall protection above six feet despite knowing Amos employees were working without it that day.⁵

Martinez sued Baird/Williams, which moved for summary judgment on the ground that it owed no duty because it had neither contractual nor actual control, and the 169th District Court of Bell County granted it.¹ The Third Court of Appeals (Austin), in an opinion by Justice Ellis dated October 31, 2025, reversed, narrowly holding that Baird/Williams had contractual control over Martinez's work, and remanded.² The Supreme Court granted review on June 19, 2026.

Petition for review from the Third Court of Appeals (Austin); granted June 19, 2026. Oral argument: November 5, 2026.

• Baird/Williams:¹ whether the court of appeals created a new duty by construing the word "direction" in isolation to establish contractual control as a matter of law, and whether Baird/Williams lacked actual control.
• Martinez:² (1) whether the court of appeals correctly concluded Baird/Williams retained contractual control where the subcontract required all work to be done "under the direction of and to the satisfaction of" it and other provisions reinforce that reading; and (2) whether Baird/Williams conclusively established a lack of actual control.

The case comes up on summary judgment that the general contractor owed no duty, and the essential question is whether it had contractual or actual control over Martinez's work.¹

Whether the subcontract gave Baird/Williams contractual control.

Baird/Williams (Petitioner): A general contractor is liable only when the contract "explicitly assigns" it the right to control the means, methods, or details of the injury-causing work; here four provisions assign control to Amos, and the court of appeals found control instead in a boilerplate "Interpretation" paragraph about direction and a reserved right to correct unsafe work, which would turn routine boilerplate into duties.¹ In reply, it says the "under the direction of" clause conveys authority over what work is done, not how, and that the opinion below erases that line.²

Martinez (Respondent): Baird/Williams isolates the word "direction" from its context and established meaning; because all of Amos's work was to be done under its direction, and it could provide fall protection and take corrective action and backcharge Amos, it retained some control over the manner of the work, consistent with a sister court's reading of identical language.³

Whether Baird/Williams exercised actual control.

Baird/Williams (Petitioner): The undisputed record shows Amos selected the worker, the task, the stepladder and the decision to forgo fall protection, and no Baird/Williams employee instructed Martinez, so the Court should review this ground the court of appeals did not decide and render a take-nothing judgment.⁴

Martinez (Respondent): He raised a fact issue that Baird/Williams's job superintendents exercised actual control over the injury-causing work, making summary judgment inappropriate on this alternative ground.⁵

Baird/Williams argued that the court of appeals fashioned a new legal duty that undermines this Court's precedent by construing "direction" in isolation to establish contractual control as a matter of law.¹ Martinez argued that the court of appeals properly construed the clause in context and that a fact issue exists on actual control.²

• An amicus curiae brief was filed; it is not summarized here.