On July 22, 2024 the father took his eight-year-old daughter to Cook Children's Medical Center for digestive trouble, she was severely underweight, and the Department of Family and Protective Services, suspecting medical neglect, sought the removal of all three children.¹ The Department says the daughter weighed about as much as a six-month-old and needed multiple interventions, that the parents delayed medical care and blamed mold, a COVID-19 infection and possible genetic defects, and that the children improved greatly in foster care.² The mother's experts offered other explanations for the children's conditions, and at trial the Department presented evidence that relatives in California were being cleared to take the children if parental rights were terminated.³

After a bench trial the 322nd District Court of Tarrant County terminated both parents' rights, and the trial court restricted the children's residence to Texas and did not grant the request to place them with relatives in California.¹ The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth), in a November 13, 2025 opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth, affirmed the termination and declined to address the father's challenge to placement, reasoning that on affirmance he became a former parent with no legal relationship to the children and so lacked standing to challenge placement.² Both parents petitioned for review, and on June 26, 2026 the Supreme Court denied review, with Chief Justice Blacklock concurring in the denial.³

Petitions for review from the Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) in a parental-termination case; denied June 26, 2026, with a statement by Chief Justice Blacklock concurring in the denial.⁴

• The mother:¹ whether, under Family Code section 161.001(b)(2), the trial court could find termination in the children's best interest when she completed aspects of the Department's service plan.
• The father:² whether the court of appeals was premature in finding he was a "former parent" precluded from raising the children's placement.

Whether termination is in the children's best interest.

The mother (Petitioner): The evidence was legally insufficient under the Holley factors because her plan addressed the trial court's concerns and the evidence of genetic disorders offered other explanations for the children's conditions.¹

The Department (Respondent): The mother's petition presents no issue within this Court's jurisdiction, and in any event the evidence is legally sufficient to support the best-interest finding, since the Department was not required to prepare a service plan given the aggravating circumstances and the parents' own efforts did not mitigate the starvation of the children.²

Whether a terminated parent may challenge placement.

The father (Petitioner): The court of appeals prematurely treated him as a former parent, his right to a say in his children's lives is of constitutional dimensions and should not end until the last appeal is exhausted, and without him no one would point out that the placement ruling went against all the evidence, since the Department itself recommended relatives in California.³

The Department (Respondent): Affirming termination divests the parent and child of all legal rights and duties with respect to each other, so the father logically has no standing to challenge placement and judicial economy supports resolving the appeal as the court of appeals did.⁴

The father argued that the court of appeals decided an important question of state law that should be resolved by this Court, that it is a constitutional question of first impression, and that the lower court relied on its own precedent.¹ The mother argued that the court of appeals committed errors of law of such importance to the jurisprudence of the State that they require correction.²

None noted

Holding

The Court denied review and made no holding, and Chief Justice Blacklock wrote that he would not disturb the termination or the placement decision but that in a suitable future case the Court may need to decide whether appellate courts have jurisdiction to review a decision not to place children with extended family when a terminated parent has preserved the issue, and that he is inclined to think they do.¹

Reasoning

The Chief Justice explained that the court of appeals followed its precedent, which other courts have also followed, and that the rule has some logic because section 161.206(b) divests the parent and child of all legal rights and duties and non-parents generally lack an interest in the whereabouts of others' children.² But the father did not invoke the court's jurisdiction, was compelled as a defendant to litigate both whether he would remain a legal father and whether the children would stay with extended family, and was the only party asking the court of appeals to review the placement, so it is doubtful that the termination's consequences attach within the pending litigation to bar review of preserved objections.³ Apart from his status as a parent, a terminated parent remains a member of the extended family that the Legislature prefers for placement under section 262.114(d)(1), and that representative capacity is likely enough on its own to provide a legally cognizable interest.⁴ He added that the Legislature may wish to address the ability of a terminated parent or family member to participate in placement appeals.⁵

Disposition

Petitions for review denied.⁶

Chief Justice Blacklock concurred in the denial of the petition for review, in a statement filed June 26, 2026.¹