Mother has four children, and Father is the father of the three youngest; the eldest, Karen, is the focus of the Department of Family and Protective Services' case against Mother.¹ In February 2020 a school nurse reported that nine-year-old Karen had bruises and belt marks, which Karen said came from Mother gripping her arm and beating her with a belt, and further school reports in 2021 and 2022 alleged a shoulder injury, hours-long wall sits, restricted food, kneeling on rice, and Mother dragging Karen by the hair.² The parents refused to cooperate with the Department or take part in family-based services, Mother twice threatened the teacher who made a report and was indicted for it, and in September 2022 the parents took the children to Louisiana instead of turning them over to the Department.³ Mother was arrested in Louisiana, and the children were returned to Texas and placed with their maternal grandparents.⁴

In August 2022 the Department invoked the trial court's temporary emergency jurisdiction and sought conservatorship and termination.¹ After a five-day jury trial in December 2023, the jury found termination grounds as to both parents under Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O), found termination in the best interest of all three children as to Father, and found termination in Karen's best interest but not in the three younger children's as to Mother.² The Seventh Court of Appeals (Amarillo) affirmed, holding the evidence sufficient that Mother endangered Karen and as to Father's endangerment findings and best interest, and that the trial court acted within its discretion in appointing the Department managing conservator of the younger children.³ The vehicle in this Court is petitions for review filed by Mother and Father; after the voters adopted Article I, Section 37 of the Texas Constitution, the Court asked for supplemental briefing on its effect.⁴ The Court decided the case on June 5, 2026, the second of two opinions that day on sufficiency in parental-termination cases.⁵

Petitions for review from the Seventh Court of Appeals (Amarillo) in a parental-termination case; decided June 5, 2026.⁶

The Department's brief frames three issues:¹ 1. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to decide the suit. 2. Whether a failure to satisfy the UCCJEA's requirements may be presented for the first time on appeal. 3. Whether legally sufficient evidence supported termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights.

Mother also challenges the appointment of the Department as managing conservator of the three younger children, and Father argues his rights were terminated because he knew of Mother's conduct and declined to cooperate, not because of abuse or neglect by him.²

Subject-matter jurisdiction is decided first, and a statutory requirement that is not jurisdictional can be raised on appeal only if preserved.¹ Termination requires clear and convincing evidence, and on legal-sufficiency review the Court looks at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding.² A finding that appointing a parent as managing conservator would significantly impair the child is reviewed for abuse of discretion.³

Whether the UCCJEA deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Mother and Father (Petitioners): UCCJEA compliance is a prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction that may be raised for the first time on appeal, the Department filed suit after the children had relocated to Louisiana, it failed to establish home-state or emergency jurisdiction, and no Louisiana court relinquished jurisdiction, so the termination order is void.¹

Department (Respondent): Texas was the children's home state because any presence in Louisiana was a temporary absence, there are significant connections to Texas in the alternative, and the challenge is not jurisdictional and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.²

Whether the evidence supported endangerment findings.

Mother (Petitioner): Her refusal to cooperate with the Department is not endangering conduct that justifies termination under subsections (D) and (E) or appointing the Department managing conservator of the other children.³

Father (Petitioner): His rights cannot be terminated on the basis that he knew of Mother's conduct and declined to cooperate, as he was not found to have committed abuse or neglect himself.⁴

Department (Respondent): The parents did not challenge the court of appeals' affirmance of the (N), (O), and best-interest findings, so their conservatorship arguments are subsumed, and the evidence of direct physical abuse, failure to remove the children from an abusive environment, criminal conduct, drug abuse, instability, and medical and educational neglect supports termination.⁵

Mother and Father argued that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA because the children lived in Louisiana when the proceeding began, and that the endangerment findings rested on their refusal to cooperate.¹ The Department responded that Texas was the children's home state for the six months before filing and that the parents fled to Louisiana to avoid its involvement.²

• Reasonable juror. Asked if a reasonable jury could find the aggressive discipline crossed into abuse, the Department's counsel said no reasonable juror could conclude it did not. (Oral Argument, 0:35:27)
• Different treatment. Asked to concede the child was treated differently from the others, petitioners' counsel agreed "to an extreme." (Oral Argument, 0:05:28)
• Refusal of services. Asked what shows parents refused services rather than using judgment, petitioners' counsel said there is no direct evidence; it is implied from their actions over two or three years. (Oral Argument, 0:15:50)
• Voluntary abandonment. Asked how not seeing the children was voluntary when the court imposed it, the Department's counsel said the court acted only after parents chose not to visit. (Oral Argument, 0:29:05; 0:29:51)
• New constitutional amendment. Asked whether the new parental-rights amendment changes the tiers of scrutiny, the Department's counsel said it changes little, was unfamiliar with it, and offered supplemental briefing. (Oral Argument, 0:32:06; 0:34:21)
• Legal sufficiency. Petitioners' counsel said the Department is trying to characterize the point as factual insufficiency, which counsel disputed, calling it legal insufficiency. (Oral Argument, 0:06:42)
• Constitutional right. Asked whether parents' constitutional right to raise children protects discipline, the Department's counsel said no constitutional violation has been alleged. (Oral Argument, 0:42:04; 0:44:28)
• If father reversed. Asked what happens if the Court reverses as to the father, the Department's counsel said conservatorship could remain in place. (Oral Argument, 0:47:32)

• Texas Lawyers for Children: Article I, Section 37 confirms rather than alters Family Code Chapter 161, which is narrowly tailored.
• Texas Association of Family Defense Attorneys: since the voters adopted Section 37, statutes must operate within Section 37 rather than define the limits of parental rights.
• Texas Public Policy Foundation: in response to the Court's request, Section 37 enshrines a century of holdings protecting parental rights.
• Family Freedom Project: a nonprofit working to protect parents' constitutional rights; filed both a merits-stage and a supplemental brief.
• Institute for the Advancement of Justice & Human Rights: relies on the United States' ratification of the Convention Against Torture to inform constitutional interpretation.
• Cecilia M. Wood filed an amicus letter.

Holding

The trial court's UCCJEA "temporary emergency jurisdiction" provision does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, so the parents' challenge was forfeited; legally sufficient evidence supported the endangerment grounds under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) as to Mother and Karen; but the evidence was legally insufficient to establish those grounds as to Father.¹ The Court declined to decide the effect of Article I, Section 37.²

Reasoning

Jurisdiction. A statutory requirement is jurisdictional only if the Legislature clearly says so, and the Court applies that clear-statement rule with special force in suits affecting the parent-child relationship.³ Section 152.204(a) does not mention subject-matter jurisdiction, mandate dismissal, or limit the court's power to decide this type of dispute, and the UCCJEA's features, such as permitting agreement on which State assumes jurisdiction and allowing a court to decline when another State is more convenient, do not fit subject-matter jurisdiction.⁴

Article I, Section 37. There is almost no developed jurisprudence on the new provision, and the Court, a court of review rather than first view, declined to chart its parameters because the court of appeals had not addressed it.⁵

Mother. The jury heard evidence of physical abuse of Karen, including belt marks and hair-dragging, and of emotional abuse, including punishment imposed on Karen alone, food restriction, and isolation, much of it confirmed by Mother's own testimony, which was sufficient for the (D) and (E) grounds.⁶ The Court cautioned that reasonable reliance on traditional discipline, including corporal punishment, does not support termination, but noted that the jury returned a mixed verdict after nearly eight hours of deliberation, declining to terminate as to the younger children.⁷ The Court found no reversible error in the order not appointing Mother permanent managing conservator, but directed the lower courts to reassess the Department's appointment as to the three younger children after Father's appeal is resolved.⁸

Father. Father's alleged non-intervention in Mother's abuse of Karen did not support terminating his rights as to his own children, because the record does not show he abused Karen in the same ways, he was never named in the school reports or ordered to complete services, and mere proximity to wrongdoing is insufficient.⁹ His criminal conduct did not establish a voluntary course of conduct that endangered the children, his amphetamine test did not show drug use that created a substantial risk of harm, and abandonment and poor reunification efforts did not amount to endangerment on this record.¹⁰ The Court expressed no view on the (N) and (O) grounds or the best-interest finding.¹¹

Separate writings. Chief Justice Blacklock concurred, finding the case against Father clearly insufficient and Mother's case much more difficult because parents are constitutionally entitled to discipline their children as they see fit, but agreeing that termination of Mother's rights should be affirmed.¹² Justice Bland, joined by Justices Lehrmann and Huddle, dissented in part, stating that Father witnessed and participated in Mother's abuse, did not visit his children for over a year, and engaged in a high-speed police chase while possessing methamphetamine.¹³

Disposition

As to Mother, the court of appeals' judgment is affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part; as to Father, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings.¹⁴

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Hawkins

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Busby, Devine, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.; Bland, Huddle, and Lehrmann, JJ. (except as to Part V)

Concurrence by Chief Justice Blacklock

No other Justice joined.

Dissent in Part by Justice Bland

Joined by Huddle and Lehrmann, JJ.