After the Houston Fire Department received a 9-1-1 call about a dumpster fire at an apartment complex, Fire Engine 82 was dispatched, and operator William Schmidt drove it southbound on Fondren Road at about 45 mph in a 35 mph zone with its siren, emergency lights, and Opticom transmitter (which turns oncoming traffic lights green) activated.¹ Chelsea Manning, driving three passengers westbound on Ludington Drive, stopped at a red light and entered the Fondren-Ludington intersection when it turned green, and as the fire truck entered the intersection and began changing lanes it struck her car.² The Houston Police Department's investigation concluded that Schmidt "failed to proceed with duty and care through the intersection".³ Schmidt and his captain told the investigating officer they did not see or did not recall the light's color, but the captain later testified by affidavit that the transmitter had turned the light green; Manning said she did not see the truck, while a passenger said she had warned Manning of it.⁴

Manning sued the City of Houston for negligence and negligence per se under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), basing the negligence per se claim on Transportation Code sections 545.401, 546.001, and 546.005.¹ The City's first motion for summary judgment on governmental immunity was denied, and the court of appeals affirmed as to the negligence and negligence per se claims in 2021.² The City introduced new evidence and moved again; the trial court denied the motion, and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part, holding that the TTCA waives immunity for negligence per se and that fact issues remained on official immunity and on the emergency and 9-1-1 exceptions.³ The City petitioned for review, and the Court decided the case per curiam on May 23, 2025, without oral argument.⁴

Petition for review from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in an interlocutory appeal from the denial of summary judgment on governmental immunity; decided per curiam without oral argument under Rules 59.1 and 60.2(f).⁵

The City presents four issues: whether the TTCA's motor-vehicle waiver waives immunity for negligence per se; whether a plaintiff must show a causal nexus between her claim and the employee's illegal act to defeat the 9-1-1 exception, as Maspero requires for the emergency exception; whether a governmental unit's good-faith evidence is legally sufficient to shift the summary-judgment burden for official immunity when the plaintiff only refutes its factual premise with speculative and conclusory testimony; and whether the Chambers-Wadewitz need-risk assessment applies to firefighters responding to an emergency call.¹ The petition labeled the last two issues "unbriefed".² The Court addressed the first issue and sent the others back to the court of appeals.³

The Court construes the TTCA's statutory waiver of immunity narrowly, favoring the government's retention of immunity where possible.¹

Whether the TTCA waives immunity for negligence per se.

Petitioner (City of Houston): The court of appeals reversed the burden by assuming that "negligence" includes negligence per se; the Waco court of appeals has twice held the waiver does not clearly and unequivocally cover negligence per se, and because the 9-1-1 and emergency exceptions require a statutory violation to overcome them, the absence of similar language in the motor-vehicle waiver should be read as excluding negligence per se.¹

Respondents (Manning, et al.): Negligence per se is not a separate cause of action but a method of proving duty and breach in a negligence claim, for which the TTCA expressly waives immunity; the waiver broadly covers "wrongful acts or omissions or negligence," and the City waived the issue by not raising it in its first appeal.²

Whether the 9-1-1 and emergency exceptions and official immunity bar the claims.

Petitioner (City of Houston): The 9-1-1 exception, like the emergency exception, requires a causal nexus between the claim and an illegal act, and none exists because it is not illegal for an emergency vehicle to exceed the speed limit or proceed against a red light; the City also argues it established derivative official immunity because the only evidence that the truck entered on a red light was the speculative testimony of two police officers who admitted they did not know whether it slowed or entered on green.³ In reply, it argues that Green holds no recklessness can be inferred from a failure to use due care and that Manning ignores Sauls and Green.⁴

Respondents (Manning, et al.): The record shows a causal nexus between Schmidt's violations of section 546.001, the crash, and the injuries, including the City's own officers' views, and the City has not carried its burden on good faith because its new evidence, Captain Hill's affidavit that the Opticom turned the light green, is contradicted by other testimony and amounts to fighting the facts.⁵

The City argued that the Court had never decided whether the TTCA's motor-vehicle waiver covers negligence per se, which divides the Waco court of appeals from the Houston First, Fourteenth, and Fort Worth courts, and that the 9-1-1 exception was an issue of first impression.¹ Manning argued that the City raised its issues late and had waived them, and that factual disputes made review unnecessary.²

None. The docket shows no amicus filings.

Holding

The TTCA's waiver for injury caused by an employee's "wrongful act or omission or the negligence" includes negligence per se claims of this kind, because the statutory standards at issue merely define more precisely what conduct breaches the common-law duty of care; the Court disapproved the contrary cases and remanded the remaining immunity issues for reconsideration under its recent decisions.¹

Reasoning

Beginning with the statutory text, the Court observed that the waiver covers injury proximately caused by the "wrongful act or omission or the negligence" of an employee, that it need not define "wrongful act or omission" fully because negligence per se claims will often involve one, and that negligence per se is a common-law doctrine that lets courts use a penal statute to define the standard of care.² Where the penal statute does not clearly abrogate the common-law grade of negligence, it functions merely to define more precisely what conduct breaches the common-law duty, so negligence per se is generally a species of negligence and falls within the waiver.³ Here the traffic provisions Manning invokes, which require an emergency-vehicle operator to slow "as necessary for safe operation" and to operate with "appropriate regard for the safety of all persons," are simply more precise articulations of the reasonable-care standard, so the court of appeals correctly rejected the City's argument.⁴ The Court disapproved the Waco court of appeals' contrary cases.⁵

On the City's other issues, the Court noted that it had recently clarified the approach to official immunity and the emergency and 9-1-1 exceptions in Rodriguez, Powell, and Terry, so the court of appeals should reconsider them.⁶ The Court also observed that if Manning pursues section 545.401(a) (reckless driving) as a predicate, that section adopts a recklessness standard that she would have to meet.⁷

Disposition

Without hearing oral argument, the Court granted the petition for review, vacated the court of appeals' judgment in part, and remanded for the court to reconsider official immunity and the emergency and 9-1-1 exceptions in light of the Court's recent decisions; it did not disturb the portion of the judgment concerning medical expenses.⁸

Vote Breakdown

Per Curiam Opinion

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Boyd, Busby, Devine, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.