Aamir Terry sued the City of Killeen's police department after a police cruiser responding to a 9-1-1 call struck his vehicle.¹ It is undisputed that the officer was responding to a 9-1-1 call when his cruiser struck Terry's vehicle.² The City describes the call as a report that a man had been stabbed by his wife, to which the officer responded by exceeding the posted speed and attempting to proceed through an intersection against a red light.³

The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the Tort Claims Act does not waive its governmental immunity, and the trial court denied it.¹ The court of appeals applied a categorical rule that a governmental entity is immune from suits over the emergency operation of an emergency vehicle unless the operator acted recklessly, found that Terry had raised a fact issue on recklessness, and affirmed.² The City petitioned for review on March 10, 2022, and Terry responded on June 9, 2022; the Court requested merits briefing on September 2, 2022, and the City filed its brief on November 2, 2022, Terry filed his on November 22, and the City replied on December 12 (Docket). On April 25, 2025, after the Court's decision in City of Austin v. Powell, the Court granted the petition and decided the case per curiam under Rules of Appellate Procedure 59.1 and 60.2(f), without oral argument.³

Petition for review from the Third Court of Appeals in an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction; granted and decided per curiam without oral argument under Rules of Appellate Procedure 59.1 and 60.2(f) on April 25, 2025.⁴

The City presents whether the court of appeals disregarded the recklessness standard required by section 101.055 of the Tort Claims Act and section 546.005 of the Transportation Code by treating evidence of ordinary negligence as enough to show reckless conduct, and thereby invited judicial second-guessing of split-second decisions by first responders.¹ Terry presents whether the court of appeals erred in finding a fact question on whether the officer acted recklessly, applying the standard of City of Amarillo v. Martin.² The Court addressed whether the court of appeals applied the correct framework under the emergency-vehicle exception and the 9-1-1 exception.³

The Court reviews a plea to the jurisdiction on the Tort Claims Act's immunity waiver, which here turns on the proper construction of sections 101.055(2) and 101.062(b) as explained in Powell.¹

Whether the Tort Claims Act waives the City's immunity.

Petitioner (the City): The court of appeals invited second-guessing of an officer's split-second decisions by treating evidence of ordinary negligence as enough to show recklessness, and the Act's purpose and section 546.005 of the Transportation Code are to preserve immunity so officers can respond promptly and decisively to emergencies.¹

Respondent (Terry): The court of appeals applied the proper recklessness standard under Martin, the City's real complaint is the conclusion that a fact question exists on the evidence, and he alleged the officer violated section 546.001 of the Transportation Code.²

The City argued that the court of appeals improperly invited judicial second-guessing of split-second decisions by first responders, contrary to this Court's precedent, and applied the wrong standard by treating evidence of mere negligence as establishing recklessness.¹ Terry responded that the court of appeals applied the standard from Martin and that the City's complaint concerns the conclusion that a fact question exists on the evidence.²

None. The docket shows no amicus filings.

Holding

Under Powell, the emergency exception in section 101.055(2) requires two inquiries in order: whether any law or ordinance applies to the emergency action and, if so, whether the officer complied, and only if none applies whether there is a fact issue on recklessness; and section 101.062, which applies to claims arising from responding to a 9-1-1 call only if the action violates an applicable statute or ordinance, is a separate exception that the court of appeals must consider.¹

Reasoning

After the court of appeals ruled, City of Austin v. Powell explained that recklessness is not always the standard: the emergency exception "contemplates two distinct inquiries to be undertaken in a particular order," first whether any laws or ordinances apply to the emergency action, in which case the inquiry is whether the officer complied, and only if none applies whether there is a fact issue about the officer's recklessness.² Because Terry alleged that the officer violated Transportation Code section 546.001, which Powell indicates is among the laws applicable to emergency action, resolving the officer's compliance should have preceded any recklessness inquiry.³

The case also implicates a second exception: section 101.062, titled "9-1-1 Emergency Service," makes the Act applicable to a claim arising from responding to a 9-1-1 emergency call only if the action violates a statute or ordinance applicable to the action, and it contains no recklessness prong.⁴ The court of appeals acknowledged that the dispute implicates section 101.062 but assumed it had no meaning distinct from section 101.055, yet the two are separate exceptions, each of which may independently remove Terry's claims from the immunity waiver.⁵ On remand, the court of appeals should specifically consider section 101.062, and if Terry has not raised a fact issue about whether the officer's action violated an applicable statute or ordinance, immunity is not waived and his claims must be dismissed.⁶

Disposition

Without hearing oral argument, the Court granted the petition for review, vacated the court of appeals' judgment, and remanded to that court for further proceedings in light of Powell.⁷

Vote Breakdown

Per Curiam Opinion

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Boyd, Busby, Devine, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.