Valerie Sepulveda worked for Walgreens in El Paso. She reported to Robert Alvarez, the district manager, to her store manager and to Human Resources that a coworker constantly stared at her and once commented about her underwear showing in front of others. Relators say she was terminated for time theft by the store manager at a meeting Alvarez attended; Sepulveda says she was fired after reporting ongoing harassment on May 4, 2022 and that Alvarez took no corrective action after receiving her complaint.¹ Relators say her petition alleges no harassing conduct by Alvarez himself and seeks to hold him liable for knowing of a coworker's alleged harassment and failing to act.²

Sepulveda filed a charge with the EEOC, dual-filed with the Texas Workforce Commission, asked that Alvarez and others be treated as her employers, and received a right-to-sue letter; relators say the agency identified and served only Walgreens, while Sepulveda says her charge listed Alvarez.¹ She sued Walgreens and Alvarez in state court. Defendants removed, arguing Alvarez was improperly joined because Texas law imposes no individual liability; the federal district court rejected that reading of section 21.141 and remanded for lack of complete diversity. Sepulveda v. Alvarez, 782 F. Supp. 3d 470 (W.D. Tex. 2025). Back in state court, Walgreens and Alvarez moved under Rule 91a to dismiss the individual-liability claim; the 210th District Court of El Paso County (Judge Alyssa G. Perez) denied the motion. The Eighth Court of Appeals stayed proceedings and requested a response but denied mandamus relief on June 19, 2026 in a memorandum opinion by Chief Justice Salas Mendoza, joined by Justices Palafox and Soto. In re Walgreen Co., No. 08-25-00223-CV, 2026 WL 1776719 (Tex. App.⁠—El Paso June 19, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).² Relators petitioned on July 17, 2026; Sepulveda responded August 24 and relators replied August 31. On October 2, 2026 the Court granted relators' unopposed motion to stay and set the petition for oral argument on March 2, 2027.

Original proceeding for writ of mandamus from the Eighth Court of Appeals, which denied mandamus review of the trial court's denial of a Rule 91a motion. On October 2, 2026 the Court granted relators' unopposed motion to stay and set the petition for oral argument on March 2, 2027. The Court has not yet decided whether to grant mandamus relief.

Relators present one issue: whether, in extending Chapter 21's sexual-harassment protections to employees of small businesses, the Legislature also departed from the settled rule that managers and supervisors are not personally liable for failing to prevent or correct another employee's harassment.¹ Sepulveda presents two: whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Rule 91a motion and holding the statute permits individual liability under its expanded definition of "employer," and whether relators have an adequate remedy by appeal.²

Relators (Walgreen Co. and Robert Alvarez): Chapter 21's global definition of "employer" tracks Title VII, and courts have read its "agent" clause to impose respondeat-superior liability on the employing entity, not personal liability on the manager. Section 21.141(1)'s parallel two-part definition, read in context, works the same way. Its subpart (B) is circular and must take meaning from the rest of the chapter; "employee" is still defined by reference to the institutional employer; and the damages caps turn on the defendant's number of employees, which makes no sense for individuals. The history of SB 45 shows a size-threshold change for small businesses, not a silent personal-liability regime, and the federal decisions rest on a thin FLSA analogy without a Texas statutory analysis. Appeal is inadequate because the question is important and recurring, the Pattern Jury Charge (PJC 107.21) now presupposes individual liability, and the EEOC-TWC charge process excludes individual supervisors. Review is also needed to protect the federal right of removal, which an appeal after a state-court trial cannot restore. They ask the Court to conditionally grant relief, direct dismissal of the claim against Alvarez and vacate the attorney's-fee award against them for pursuing Rule 91a relief.¹

Real Party in Interest (Valerie Sepulveda): The plain text controls: Section 21.141 broadens "employer" for sexual-harassment claims to include a person who "acts directly in the interests of an employer in relation to an employee," unlike the global definition, which does not reach supervisors. Every federal decision to consider the question has so held, and the Pattern Jury Charge, secondary sources and legislative history agree, and relators' three counter-theories would erase the text or render it superfluous. She argues the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion, and that relators have an adequate remedy by appeal because the question can be reviewed after final judgment; the importance of the issue, the uniform guidance and the removal concerns do not make appeal inadequate, and relators already litigated the argument in federal court and lost.²

Relators argue the question is a consequential public-policy choice in state employment law, with only about eight states recognizing individual liability and usually by express statutory language; that no Texas appellate court has analyzed whether section 21.141 creates personal liability almost five years after SB 45; that the Pattern Jury Charge already shapes trials by treating supervisors, managers, HR professionals and coworkers as potentially liable; and that the issue is likely to evade review, since private employment cases settle and a defendant who wins at trial cannot appeal.¹ Sepulveda concedes the case presents an important question of statutory construction but argues importance does not make mandamus proper.²

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