Montellano v. Jones

In the fall of 2020 the City of San Antonio ordered Richard Montellano, a low-income and disabled resident, to vacate and demolish his longtime home at 1110 Grand Alley after a hearing before the Building Standards Board, a quasi-judicial body that hears alleged violations of the city's municipal code.¹ Montellano says he is entitled to relocation assistance under the Texas Relocation Act as a person who must move "as a direct result of code enforcement . . . or a demolition program," and that the city has no procedure by which he could apply for or challenge a denial of assistance.² The city officials say the order was a nuisance abatement under chapters 54 and 214 of the Local Government Code, not a code enforcement program, and that the Act does not reach it.³

Montellano sued the City of San Antonio's mayor, city council members, city manager, and director of development services in their official capacities, asserting ultra vires claims for failure to provide relocation assistance in violation of the Act and the Texas Constitution's due course of law guarantee. The 225th District Court of Bexar County (Judge Christine Hortick) granted the officials' plea to the jurisdiction without an opinion.¹ The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed on January 21, 2026 in an opinion by Justice Valenzuela, joined by Chief Justice Martinez and Justice Rios, and denied en banc reconsideration on April 1, 2026.² Montellano petitioned on May 18, 2026, the officials responded July 20, and Montellano replied August 4 (Docket). On October 23, 2026 the Court granted the petition and set the case for oral argument on March 4, 2027 in San Antonio (Docket).

Montellano presents two issues:¹

1. whether the Texas Relocation Act fails to comply with the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act's requirement that government entities provide relocation assistance to residents displaced outside the eminent domain context
2. whether the Act guarantees relocation assistance to residents forced to move as a direct result of municipal code enforcement or demolitions²

The officials state the issue as whether eminent domain law, specifically section 21.046, applies to nuisance abatement under chapters 214 and 54 of the Local Government Code

Whether the Act reaches code enforcement and demolition

Petitioner (Richard Montellano): The court of appeals wrongly held that assistance is required only when a person must move because the government acquired the home through eminent domain. That reading contradicts the Act's plain text, which covers a person who moves "as a direct result of code enforcement . . . or a demolition program," reads subsection (e) out of the statute, and conflicts with Alamo Heights Independent School District v. Jones, 705 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. App.⁠—El Paso 2024, no pet.), which called code enforcement and demolition "logical additions" that "none of those situations necessarily encompass condemnation".¹ He adds that the federal Uniform Relocation Act requires assistance for people displaced by demolition and code enforcement even without an acquisition, that the court of appeals relied on a Seventh Circuit decision Congress later superseded, and that the decision puts billions of dollars in federal funding at risk.²

Respondents (San Antonio officials): The Fourth Court correctly read the statute: "acquire" in section 21.046 is tied to a taking in eminent domain, applying the Act to nuisance abatement would produce conflicting results (the city would pay for new housing for a nuisance owner while also demolishing the property and assessing liens and penalties), and chapters 54 and 214 are a legal framework with procedural due process, not "code enforcement, rehabilitation, or demolition programs." They also say no federal money is involved and no funding has been lost in the roughly 45 years the status quo has existed.³

Due course of law

Petitioner: A mandatory statute that confers benefits on a specific class creates a constitutionally protected property interest, and the officials admit they have no procedures for applying for or challenging the denial of assistance, which denies due course of law under article I, section 19.⁴

Montellano argues review is warranted because the decision puts Texas out of step with federal law and threatens federal funding, conflicts with the Eighth Court's recent Alamo Heights decision, and presents a significant constitutional question about relocation procedures.¹

• Tenants of Tradewind supports the petition: the court of appeals departed from the Act's plain language and no cross-code conflict justifies it.