Angela Hilton, individually and as representative of the estate of Barbara Jackson, brought a health care liability claim under Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (the Texas Medical Liability Act) against several physicians, a hospital system, and related entities, alleging their management of Jackson's post-operative care fell below the applicable standard of care.¹ Hilton served the expert report of Dr. Vineet Choudhry; the defendants objected to the report as deficient and moved to dismiss under § 74.351.²

The trial court (6th District Court, Lamar County) granted the motions to dismiss, awarded the defendants attorney's fees and costs (amount to be determined later), and denied Hilton a 30-day extension to cure any deficiency in the report.¹ On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the extension given how inadequate the report was, and denied rehearing on February 10, 2026.² After the opinion issued, Hilton and the defendants negotiated a settlement resolving the dispute, and jointly filed an Agreed Petition for Review asking the Supreme Court⁠—without deciding whether the court of appeals was right⁠—to give effect to that settlement under Tex.³ R. App. P. 56.3.

Petition for Review, filed as an Agreed Petition under Tex. R. App. P. 56.3 after the parties settled;⁴ granted without oral argument or consideration of the merits.

Whether the Court should grant the parties' Agreed Petition for Review and, under Rule 56.3, without considering the merits, render judgment effectuating their settlement by setting aside the judgments of the court of appeals and the trial court and remanding to the trial court for rendition of judgment consistent with the parties' agreement.¹ The petition separately asked the Court to exercise its Rule 56.3 discretion to also vacate the court of appeals' memorandum opinion itself (not just the judgments)⁠—a step Rule 56.3 does not grant automatically and that the parties argued was justified because the opinion was fact-bound, broke no new legal ground, and vacating it would not unsettle Texas law.²

Both sides jointly requested the same relief; there is no adversary briefing to summarize.¹ The parties argued Rule 56.3 exists precisely for this circumstance⁠—to let the Court effectuate a post-appeal settlement without reaching the merits⁠—and that setting aside the judgments below is the routine, well-established disposition for a settled case.² On the additional request to vacate the underlying opinion, the parties acknowledged Rule 56.3's default presumption against doing so, but argued exceptional circumstances favored it here: the opinion applies settled Chapter 74 standards to one expert report's adequacy, doesn't break new legal ground, and the settlement itself was reached in reliance on the opinion being set aside.³

Not applicable in the ordinary sense⁠—Rule 56.3 gives the Court authority to act on an agreed, settled petition without the usual cert-worthiness showing.¹

None.

A note on this entry: this case does not fit the usual "pending" or "decided" mold. The parties settled, and the Court's order grants the petition for review, vacates the judgments of the court of appeals and the trial court, and remands the case to the trial court for rendition of judgment in accordance with the parties' settlement agreement, which fully and finally resolves the matter in this Court under Rule 56.3, without any opinion on the merits (no Chapter 74 holding was issued or disturbed on the merits). Nothing further is expected here; the trial court now enters judgment per the parties' own agreement. Because no opinion issued, categories 9-13 (holding, standard of review, reasoning, disposition detail, and vote breakdown) don't apply the way they would for a merits decision⁠—the case simply ends with the order described above.