Karl Drusch is the CEO and super-majority owner of TrueAero Group, which is the sole member of TrueAero, LLC, an aircraft and parts business, and Stratton Borchers is a former employee terminated in October 2024 who also owned a 32.5% membership interest in the group.¹ The litigation began as a business divorce, and Borchers says that before October 2025 he owned 975 Class A units in the group, whose members signed company agreements.² An earlier case between the parties in the Business Court's First Division was compelled to arbitration, and while that arbitration was pending Borchers brought this case in the Eighth Division, alleging improper foreclosure and transfer of his membership units, and TrueAero sought to dismiss it and compel arbitration.³

The Texas Business Court (Eighth Division, Judge Stagner) denied TrueAero's motion to compel arbitration, its motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and its plea in abatement, and granted Borchers a temporary injunction.¹ TrueAero filed an interlocutory appeal in the Fifteenth Court of Appeals and moved three times for a stay of the trial-court proceedings pending appeal; the court of appeals denied each request without seeking a response.² TrueAero then filed this mandamus proceeding, and the Supreme Court granted temporary relief on February 11, 2026 staying the trial court proceedings.³ The Fifteenth Court scheduled the appeal for submission on August 26, 2026 and denied oral argument.⁴

Original proceeding (petition for writ of mandamus) after the Fifteenth Court of Appeals denied a stay pending interlocutory appeal. Oral argument: December 1, 2026.

• TrueAero and Drusch:¹ (1) whether Texas requires a mandatory stay of trial-court proceedings pending interlocutory appeal of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, as Coinbase articulated; and (2) if the court of appeals had discretion, whether it abused it in denying the stay and the motion to reconsider.
• Borchers:² whether the court of appeals abused its discretion in refusing an automatic stay, given that the Texas Arbitration Act's only appeals provision (section 171.098) provides no automatic stay and its only stay provision applies to a trial court.

Mandamus issues only when a court clearly abuses its discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal exists, and a court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or misreads or misapplies the law.¹

Whether a stay pending appeal is automatic.

TrueAero and Drusch (Relators): Coinbase announced an unambiguous rule that federal courts have no discretion to deny a stay pending an interlocutory appeal from denial of arbitration, and the same result follows in Texas from the appellate rules barring trial courts from impairing the court of appeals' jurisdiction, from Merrill Lynch, and from the Texas Arbitration Act, since otherwise the benefits of arbitration are lost and the right to appeal rendered meaningless.¹ In reply, they say the Act supports the automatic stay, that Borchers concedes a right to a stay absent a frivolousness certification, and that no court has certified the appeal frivolous.²

Borchers (Real Party in Interest): Neither section 171.098 nor any other Arbitration Act provision gives a right to a stay pending appeal; section 51.016 may import a stay if federal courts would require one under section 16 of the FAA, but federal law has a narrow exception for frivolous appeals, and this appeal is obviously without arguable merit.³ The Court should decline to make the federal Griggs principle a rule of Texas appellate procedure, because the Legislature has chosen which interlocutory appeals carry automatic stays.⁴

Whether the denial was an abuse of discretion.

TrueAero and Drusch (Relators): Even if the court of appeals had discretion, Coinbase establishes that refusing a temporary stay pending the appeal was an abuse of it.⁵

Borchers (Real Party in Interest): The court of appeals correctly read and applied the law, even if summarily, and was justified in refusing a stay where Borchers stood poised to obtain a judgment reclaiming his shares.⁶

TrueAero and Drusch framed the issue as whether they are entitled to a stay of the trial-court proceedings pending the interlocutory appeal of the denial of arbitration.¹ Borchers argued the court of appeals' refusal was justified under state and federal law and that the Court should leave for another day any invitation to adopt the Griggs principle.²

None noted