Philip Mohrman's husband, Robert Borst, was hospitalized at University Medical Center in November and December 2017 and treated by physicians employed by Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center-El Paso (TTUHSC); according to Mohrman, he reacted badly to an antibiotic, was given more of it, and died of complications on December 21, 2017.¹ Mohrman says his former counsel mailed formal written notice of the claim, dated April 5, 2018, to TTUHSC and the hospital.² TTUHSC says it received no notice until February 15, 2019, more than a year after the death, when it learned of the claim in an email exchange with Mohrman's counsel.³

Mohrman sued TTUHSC and the hospital for negligence in November 2019, and TTUHSC filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss, arguing that its sovereign immunity was not waived because it did not receive notice within six months of the incident.¹ The 34th District Court of El Paso County denied both.² The Eighth Court of Appeals affirmed without oral argument in an opinion by Justice Soto, Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr.-El Paso v. Mohrman, 736 S.W.3d 583; TTUHSC says the court adopted the common-law mailbox rule on its own initiative, holding that evidence of timely mailing created a fact dispute about timely receipt.³ The court did not decide TTUHSC's alternative argument that it lacked actual notice under section 101.101(c).⁴ The Supreme Court granted review on June 19, 2026, and set oral argument for January 11, 2027.

Petition for review from the Eighth Court of Appeals (El Paso); granted June 19, 2026. Oral argument: January 11, 2027.

TTUHSC presents one issue:¹ whether the court of appeals erred when it sua sponte adopted and applied the common-law mailbox rule to the Tort Claims Act's formal-notice provision, which makes a claim timely only if the state defendant "receive[s] notice of a claim against it . . . not later than six months after" the incident (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.101(a)).

Whether notice was timely is a jurisdictional question of law reviewed de novo. A plea to the jurisdiction asks whether the pleadings affirmatively show jurisdiction; the court also considers evidence negating jurisdictional facts when needed, and a fact question about jurisdiction prevents granting the plea.¹

Whether the mailbox rule applies to formal notice.

TTUHSC (Petitioner): the statute entitles the government to "receive notice" within six months, so the date of receipt controls and the mailbox rule is incompatible with the text; by specifying the period in which notice must be received the Legislature precluded the rule, and it knows how to codify the rule when it wants to; a majority of Texas and federal courts agree, and waivers of sovereign immunity are narrowly construed.¹

Mohrman (Respondent): the Eighth Court held only that competent evidence of proper mailing, together with TTUHSC's denial of receipt, created a fact issue on receipt; for a century Texas law has treated proper mailing as raising a rebuttable presumption of receipt, and a denial does not erase the evidence of mailing; the court applied that principle where TTUHSC bore the burden to conclusively establish its defense.²

The split among the courts of appeals.

TTUHSC (Petitioner): the Eighth Court acknowledged its disagreement with at least three other courts of appeals about whether the mailbox rule applies to formal notice.³ In reply, TTUHSC argues that Mohrman acknowledges the split.⁴

Mohrman (Respondent): the conflict is narrower than TTUHSC suggests; the Eighth Court distinguished cases applying Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 5 and 21a, which govern filings and service, because Mohrman relied on the common-law rule, and explained why Balderas and Rocha do not control.⁵

Vehicle and remedy.

TTUHSC (Petitioner): the narrowness of the ruling below offers a clean question: the mailbox rule was the sole basis for the decision, and the issue is preserved and important.⁶ If TTUHSC prevails it asks for reversal and remand, noting that the Court's practice is to remand for the court of appeals to rule on an unaddressed issue.⁷

Mohrman (Respondent): the petition is a poor vehicle because actual notice under section 101.101(c) is an independent, preserved ground the court of appeals never reached, so rendition would be improper and the most that could follow is a remand.⁸

Mohrman's brief on the merits, filed after the petition-stage briefing, is not summarized here; his positions above come from his response to the petition.

TTUHSC argued the Court should grant review because the courts of appeals are split on an important question of statutory interpretation that bears on sovereign immunity and trial-court jurisdiction, the ruling below is incorrect on an important question the Court has not resolved, and the case is an ideal vehicle.¹ Mohrman argued review should be denied because the ruling is fact-bound, rests on settled common law, and the claimed conflict is overstated.²

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