The properties are sixty individually owned, 4,000-square-foot cold-storage condominiums in the San Antonio Wholesale Produce Market, owned by more than 30 entities, and the Bexar Appraisal District placed the same value on each.¹ The owners protested their 2018, 2019 and 2020 appraisals as unequal, and the district raised the appraised value from $250,000 in 2018 to $510,350 in 2019.² The district says several condos sold for around $500,000 in 2018, which explains the increase and also supports its expert's equal-and-uniform values of $510,350 to $559,950, while the owners say neither expert relied on sales prices of the subject properties and that comparable properties have dramatically lower values.³

After a seven-day jury trial in the 288th District Court of Bexar County, the jury found for the district on 2018, rejected the owners' expert and found lower equal-and-uniform values for 2019 and 2020, and found $61,000 in reasonable attorney's fees for each of those years; the judge rendered judgment on the verdict.¹ The trial court had excluded the district's sales evidence under then-controlling In re Catherine Tower, and while the case was on appeal this Court decided Texas Disposal Systems Landfill v. Travis Central Appraisal District, disapproving that case and holding market-value evidence relevant and admissible in equal-and-uniform cases.² The San Antonio Court of Appeals (Justice McCray) affirmed, following precedent that "may be awarded" is mandatory, holding the fee evidence sufficient, and holding the sales prices inadmissible; it denied en banc review.³ The Court granted review on June 19, 2026.

Petition for review from the Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio); granted June 19, 2026. Oral argument: November 5, 2026.

• The District:¹ (1) whether the court of appeals erred in following precedent that section 42.29's "may be awarded" is mandatory; (2) whether it erred in affirming the fee award on legally insufficient evidence; and (3) given the change in law from TDSL, whether both judgments should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
• The owners:² that the petition presents no issue warranting review, that no conflict among the courts of appeals makes fees mandatory, and that the evidence supports the award.

The briefs frame the issues as questions of statutory interpretation, legal sufficiency of fee evidence, and the admissibility and jury-instruction consequences of TDSL, with the district's post-trial motions on the fee findings having been overruled or denied.¹

Whether section 42.29 fees are discretionary.

The District (Petitioner): The plain language is discretionary: Bocquet v. Herring treats "court may award" as discretionary, the Legislature dropped "shall be entitled" for "may be awarded" over 40 years ago, and the court of appeals followed Zapata without analysis and without considering section 41.45(f) ("may award," discretionary) or section 42.225 ("shall award," mandatory).¹ In reply at the petition stage, it said "twenty-plus years" of precedent is only three cases and that this Court has never held the statute mandatory.²

The owners (Respondents): There is no conflict among the courts of appeals holding that fees are mandatory under section 42.29.³

Whether the fee evidence was legally sufficient.

The District (Petitioner): The owners' attorney testified that $185,725 was reasonable but never gave the hours worked by the two attorneys at their different rates or itemized the tasks, which this Court's cases hold legally insufficient.⁴

The owners (Respondents): There is sufficient evidence to support the jury's award of fees for the multi-year case.⁵

Whether TDSL requires a new trial.

The District (Petitioner): TDSL made market-value evidence relevant and admissible and provides jury instructions that equal-and-uniform values should approach market value, but the court of appeals created barriers to admissibility and rewrote TDSL, so the Court should reverse and remand for a new trial.⁶

The owners (Respondents): The court of appeals properly followed TDSL in affirming exclusion of sales prices for some properties that neither expert relied on, that exceeded the jury's values, and for which comparable sales were absent; the new instructions are unsupported and would comment on the case, and the District waived the request by not asking the court of appeals for it.⁷

The District asked the Court to interpret the meaning of "may be awarded" in section 42.29, hold it discretionary, and disapprove the opinions holding it mandatory, noting that this Court has not interpreted the provision.¹ The owners argued the petition does not cite or advocate the Rule 56.1(a) factors and presents nothing warranting review.²

• Three amicus curiae briefs and a letter were filed; they are not summarized here.