S.H. faced both felony charges in Harris County and a Department of Family and Protective Services suit filed June 11, 2025 to terminate her parental rights.¹ The Harris County Public Defender's Office was appointed in her criminal case, and Christine Umeh of its holistic services division agreed on S.H.'s behalf to represent her in the termination case too, while the termination court, which had found her indigent, had appointed attorney Margaret Lombardo as attorney ad litem.² Umeh entered an appearance and filed an answer and a motion to substitute, and at the July 29, 2025 adversary hearing the associate judge doubted what authority he would have to prevent a mother from choosing her own counsel.³ The children's attorney ad litem says the Office improperly solicited a represented parent and delayed services for the children.⁴

On July 31, 2025 the 314th District Court of Harris County denied Umeh's motion to substitute and, in a separate order, removed her as counsel, reasoning that the Office is authorized under article 26.044 to serve only indigent criminal and juvenile defendants and had usurped the court's role in appointing counsel.¹ The First Court of Appeals summarily denied mandamus on December 31, 2025, and S.H. petitioned this Court on January 9, 2026, when the Court issued an administrative stay.² On June 5, 2026, without oral argument, the Court conditionally granted mandamus in a per curiam opinion.³

Original proceeding for writ of mandamus after the First Court of Appeals denied relief; disposed of by per curiam opinion without oral argument under Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(c) on June 5, 2026.⁴

• S.H.:¹ whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying her counsel of choice without notice, a hearing and a proper legal basis.
• The children's attorney ad litem:² whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion in disqualifying the Public Defender's Office counsel who sought to impose its representation over the court's appointment of counsel for an indigent parent.
• The Department:³ takes no position on the issues, but urges the Court to consider the harm to the children of prolonged stays.

Mandamus is appropriate to correct an erroneous order disqualifying counsel because there is no adequate remedy by appeal.¹

Whether the trial court could remove S.H.'s chosen counsel.

S.H. (Relator): The trial court disqualified her counsel of choice without notice, an opportunity to be heard or adequate legal cause, ending an established attorney-client relationship in a proceeding that threatens her fundamental interest in her children.¹ She adds that no hearing was conducted on disqualification before Judge Moore signed the July 31 order.²

The children's attorney ad litem (Real Party in Interest): The Office is authorized only to represent indigent parents in criminal and juvenile cases, nothing in article 26.044 allows it to circumvent the ad litem wheel, and an indigent parent does not choose her representation.³

Whether article 26.044 bars the Office from the representation.

S.H. (Relator): In reply, she says "accused of a crime or juvenile offense" modifies "defendants" and defines who qualifies for the Office's services, not the services it may provide, and that the statute contains no bar on representation in Department proceedings.⁴

S.H. argued that the removal order deprived her of counsel of her choice in a termination case where Chief Justice Blacklock has described termination as the "civil death penalty".¹

None noted

Holding

The trial court's order removing the Public Defender's Office lawyer was a clear abuse of discretion, because the Office appeared as S.H.'s chosen counsel and not as court-appointed counsel, article 26.044 does not bar it from providing such services, and the court's appointment authority was not displaced.¹

Reasoning

Parents facing termination have a right to appointed counsel, and parties generally have a right to choose counsel, deprivation of which can justify mandamus, as in the criminal context where a defendant who does not need appointed counsel may retain any qualified attorney.² Article 26.044 is silent about civil services and directs the commissioners court to specify the Office's duties, and the undisputed record is that Harris County expanded the Office to provide "holistic services" such as family-law advocacy.³ Umeh made clear she was not court-appointed counsel but S.H.'s chosen counsel, providing services at no cost, like a nonprofit or a lawyer hired by a relative, so nothing about the representation made a judicial determination of indigence or supplanted the court's authority.⁴ Although S.H. challenged only the removal order, the order denying substitution was linked to it, so the district court must let her proceed with Umeh as lead counsel.⁵

Disposition

Mandamus conditionally granted, directing the trial court to vacate its order removing Umeh as S.H.'s counsel, with the writ to issue only if it does not comply.⁶

Vote Breakdown

Per Curiam Opinion

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Busby, Devine, Hawkins, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.

Mandamus lies because disqualification of counsel is a severe remedy for which there is no adequate remedy by appeal.¹

Per curiam opinion.¹