John S. Howell III and his wife Barbara created a family trust that, after their deaths, was divided so that each of their four children (John IV, Marian, Susan, and William R. "Bill" Howell Sr.) had separate trusts, including trusts holding stock in the family company, Howell Instruments, Inc. (HII).¹ A 2014 agreed order separated the siblings' trusts into four series, let each beneficiary choose the trustee for his or her own trusts, and recorded that Susan, Marian and John did not want Bill as a co-trustee of their trusts, and a later arbitration award divided the assets into four equal parts.² Susan has since appointed substitute trustees and exercised her special power of appointment without naming Bill.³ In July 2024 Bill proposed to buy HII shares from John's trust, John declined, and in September 2024 the trustee of John's trust sold 6,000 HII shares to Susan's trusts, whose trustee is Colton Power.⁴ Bill says the sale violated the Governing Instrument, which limits principal distributions to emergency medical needs and forbids selling HII stock to fund them except in a corporate redemption, and diluted his voting power; he demanded a 12-month accounting from Power and from John's trustee, Greg Hanson, and both refused.⁵ Power says the sale simply moved shares between family trusts and that Bill's real grievance is a stock purchase he did not make.⁶

Bill sued Power and Hanson on February 21, 2025, seeking an accounting; Power and Hanson moved to dismiss for lack of standing, Bill moved for summary judgment, and the 48th District Court of Tarrant County (Judge Christopher Taylor) on November 6, 2025 ordered Power to provide the accounting by December 22, 2025.¹ The Fort Worth Court of Appeals denied mandamus without opinion and denied a stay on December 11, 2025.² Power petitioned this Court for mandamus and a stay, and the Court stayed the order on December 22, 2025. The Court requested full merits briefing on May 1, 2026 and set the case for oral argument on September 4, 2026, to be heard on December 3, 2026.

Original proceeding for writ of mandamus from the Fort Worth Court of Appeals' denial of mandamus; argument set September 4, 2026. Oral argument: December 3, 2026.

• Power:¹ whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering an accounting of Susan's separate trusts for Bill, including whether Bill is a "beneficiary" under sections 111.004(2) and 113.151(a), whether he is an "interested person" under section 113.151(b), whether the 2014 order, the arbitration award and Susan's exercise of her power of appointment defeat his contingent interest, and whether mandamus is necessary because the harm of a compelled accounting cannot be remedied on appeal.
• Bill:² whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion, including whether he is a beneficiary and an interested person under the Trust Code and the governing documents, and whether Power has an adequate remedy by appeal or will suffer irreparable harm from complying.

Mandamus issues only if the trial court clearly abused its discretion and there is no adequate appellate remedy, and a trial court has no discretion to misapply the law.¹

Whether Bill is a beneficiary or interested person entitled to an accounting.

Power (Relator): Susan's trust property is not held "for [Bill's] benefit" because the 2014 order and the arbitration award deliberately separated the siblings' trusts, and Bill's default remainder depends on Susan dying with no living descendants and no effective appointment, a remote expectancy rather than a present interest.¹ Berry v. Berry did not hold that every contingent taker may demand accountings from a separate trust line, and section 113.151 imposes its own requirement that the interest, claim, or effect of administration be sufficient.² Bill's "interested person" theory fails because his complaint about voting dilution is a shareholder grievance, not an interest in or claim against Susan's trusts, and the sale did not affect him through the administration of her trusts.³ In reply, Power adds that even a contingent beneficiary must satisfy section 113.151's independent sufficiency requirement, that Bill's shares and voting rights did not change, and that the trust-wide accounting is unjustified.⁴

Bill (Real Party in Interest): Bill is a beneficiary as a matter of law because the Governing Instrument makes him a default remainderman if Susan dies without living descendants, and the Trust Code expressly gives contingent interests rights, as Berry recognized; the probability of a distribution does not defeat the existence of the interest.⁵ He is also an interested person because, as the trial court found, the trusts remain "inextricably entangled" and the transaction dilutes his voting power, and the statute is disjunctive so he need not also have a matured claim against the trust.⁶ In re Duddlesten is distinguishable because the requester there offered no evidence of an interest and the trial court here reviewed a developed summary-judgment record.⁷

Whether the order was too broad or barred by estoppel.

Power (Relator): The order compels a 12-month accounting of all of Susan's trusts when Bill's grievance concerns one stock purchase, and Bill is estopped from calling the sale improper because he proposed a similar trust-to-trust purchase.⁸

Bill (Real Party in Interest): The trial court has discretion over the scope of an accounting, and neither his participation in the 2014 modification nor his abandoned purchase proposal supports estoppel.⁹

Whether mandamus is available.

Power (Relator): An accounting ordered for someone with no statutory right to it causes irreparable harm once the information is prepared and disclosed, which makes Duddlesten and the discovery-mandamus cases the proper analogy.¹⁰

Bill (Real Party in Interest): Accounting orders are interlocutory and reviewable after final judgment, and a statutory accounting is a routine fiduciary oversight mechanism, not privileged or trade-secret discovery, so a ruling that disclosure alone is irreparable would make nearly every contested accounting order mandamus-worthy.¹¹

Power's petition sought mandamus on the ground that the trial court ordered an accounting for a person with no statutory right to one and that no appeal could remedy the disclosure.¹ Bill opposed on the ground that the trial court correctly applied Berry and that Power has an adequate remedy by appeal.²

None noted