Kimberley Richards was Director of Operations at Houston Classical Charter School, an open-enrollment charter school in Houston run by Houston Classical, Inc., and reported to its founder and CEO, Deyvis Salazar.¹ In October 2022 she learned that Salazar had grabbed a first-grade student roughly by the arm, believed she had to report it, and reported it to Child Protective Services (CPS) without telling him; CPS closed its investigation on December 5, 2022.² Richards says Salazar was angry and felt "betrayed" that she had reported him, and fired her on February 13, 2023, giving as his reason that she had been insubordinate in a meeting the week before.³ She sued for retaliation under Family Code Section 261.110(b).⁴

This is a petition for review of a court of appeals judgment in a suit against a governmental unit. The trial court denied Houston Classical's plea to the jurisdiction, and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed and rendered judgment dismissing Richards's claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on October 28, 2025, holding that she was not a "professional" under Section 261.101(b) because an open-enrollment charter school is not a facility "operated by the state," so immunity was not waived.¹ The court of appeals did not reach whether she had direct contact with children.² Richards petitioned for review, Houston Classical responded on February 16, 2026, and Richards replied on March 11, 2026.³ The Court denied review on September 25, 2026, and Justice Lehrmann concurred in the denial.⁴

Petition for review from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, denied September 25, 2026, with a concurring opinion by Justice Lehrmann.⁵

Richards presents two issues:¹ 1. Whether an open-enrollment charter school is "operated by the state" within the meaning of a "professional" in Family Code Section 261.101(b). 2. If so, whether her evidence created a fact issue that, in the normal course of her official duties, she had direct contact with children, an issue the court of appeals did not reach.

The concurrence says the narrow issue presented is whether an open-enrollment charter-school employee is a "professional" as the statute defines the term.²

The court of appeals treated Houston Classical's plea as an evidentiary challenge to jurisdictional facts, in which the court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true and considers the evidence.¹ The Court did not apply a standard because it denied review.²

Whether a charter school is a facility "operated by the state."

Petitioner (Richards): Houston Classical concedes, Richards says, that open-enrollment charter schools are "arms of the state," and this Court held in Amex Properties that they "act as an arm of the State government," so they necessarily operate as such; the court of appeals also read "operated" to require day-to-day state control by choosing the dictionary's third meaning over "bring about" and "cause to function," although the State delegates day-to-day operation of all public schools and so operates none directly.¹ The Legislature and the Texas Education Agency treat "professional" in Section 261.101(b) as covering all school employees, and the court of appeals' reading would exclude tens of thousands of uncertified teachers even though the statute says the term "includes teachers".²

Respondent (Houston Classical): The statute reaches only individuals licensed or certified by the state or employees of facilities licensed, certified, or operated by the state; the Education Code makes a charter school's governing body responsible for its "operation," and Amex Properties shows that charter holders operate their schools even though they are arms of the state.³ Richards's reading would make a privately run birthing center "operated by the state" because the state licenses it.⁴

Petitioner (Richards), in reply: Houston Classical never addressed her argument that the court of appeals used a hyperliteral construction this Court rejected in In re Dallas County and Kelley v. Homminga.⁵

Whether Richards had direct contact with children.

Petitioner (Richards): Her job description and declaration show she regularly interacted with students in the normal course of her official duties, enough to create a fact issue that defeats the plea.⁶

Respondent (Houston Classical): The court of appeals did not reach this issue, and the response does not address it; Houston Classical argues only that Richards does not allege she holds any state license or certification, so she cannot qualify as a licensed or certified individual.⁷

Alternative ground: Government Code Chapter 554.

Respondent (Houston Classical): Even if Richards is not a "professional," a public employee's retaliation claim must be brought under the Whistleblower Act in Government Code Chapter 554, and Section 261.110(l) bars the Chapter 261 claim.⁸

Petitioner (Richards), in reply: She was not a public employee of a public entity, the report went to CPS rather than a law enforcement agency, and Houston Classical never raised the theory in the trial court.⁹

Richards argued the court of appeals' reading is an error of law so important to the state's jurisprudence that it should be corrected, because tens of thousands of uncertified public and charter-school teachers would be excluded from the reporting duty and retaliation protection.¹ Houston Classical argued there is nothing at risk because Chapter 554 still protects public employees.²

None

Reasoning

The Court gave no reasons for denying review; the only writing is Justice Lehrmann's concurrence, which is one Justice's view, not a holding.¹ She concurred "without further comment on the merits of this employee's claim or the specific issue presented," and wrote to highlight a mismatch: the Family Code obligates every person to report suspected child abuse and makes a knowing failure a Class A misdemeanor, yet Section 261.110 protects only a "professional" from retaliation for reporting.² Because the Legislature may choose the class a statutory cause of action covers, she did not call the choice improper, but she urged it to give a remedy to all employees, not just professionals, who are retaliated against for reporting child abuse in compliance with their legal duty.³

She also considered common-law remedies. The Sabine Pilot exception to at-will employment covers firing for refusing to perform an illegal act, and when failing to report a crime is itself a crime, it can protect an employee who refuses to keep silent.⁴ Richards did not plead a Sabine Pilot claim, and the Court has not decided whether it covers an employee fired for complying with a reporting duty when the employer never directed her to break the law, so she expressed no definitive view but left open its potential applicability, noting that Richards's report named her own boss.⁵ She added that Richards also did not assert a Whistleblower Act claim and that she expressed no opinion on one.⁶

Disposition

Petition for review denied.⁷

Vote Breakdown

Justice Lehrmann concurred in the denial of the petition for review; no other Justice is shown joining the concurrence.⁸