The Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) issued a request for proposals to procure managed-care organizations (MCOs) for the State of Texas Access Reform (STAR) Medicaid program and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Eighteen bidders responded, HHSC scored written technical answers and oral presentations, and it issued notices of intent to award. Molina Healthcare of Texas received the highest score and was noticed for awards in seven service areas; Superior and Wellpoint (formerly Amerigroup) were noticed for awards in fewer service areas than they sought and not in those they preferred; Cook Children's Health Plan and Texas Children's Health Plan received none.¹ The health plans say the intended awards would force about 1.5 million Texans, mostly children and pregnant women, to change health plans, including all 525,000 members of the two children's plans and about 700,000 of Superior's, and they contend the Commissioner ignored statutory preferences for existing provider networks and quality and failed to consider past performance, different populations, and continuity of care.² The Commissioner and Molina respond that the RFP's best-value criteria were published and none of the plans objected to them, that Molina scored best, and that the plans' remedy was the bid-protest process.³

Cook Children's, Texas Children's, Superior and Wellpoint sued the HHSC Executive Commissioner in her official capacity on ultra vires theories, and the trial court consolidated the suits. After a four-day evidentiary hearing it denied the Commissioner's plea to the jurisdiction and temporarily enjoined her from awarding, signing or implementing contracts from the RFP, finding violations of at least thirteen statutory or regulatory mandates and imminent, irreparable injury.¹ The Commissioner's interlocutory appeal to the Fifteenth Court of Appeals automatically superseded the injunction. The plans and the Commissioner then signed a Rule 6.6 standstill agreement under which she would obey the injunction until the Fifteenth Court ruled on any timely Rule 29.3 motions and, if they were denied, until this Court resolved any mandamus petition filed within a week.² On November 12, 2025 the Fifteenth Court (Brister, C.J., Farris and Field, JJ.) denied the Rule 29.3 motions in a per curiam order, reasoning that, because the Commissioner would keep abiding by the injunction until this Court resolved the issue, the plans had not shown irreparable harm; it later denied rehearing, with Justice Farris concurring that she would consider a renewed motion if the agreement ended.³ The plans petitioned for mandamus on November 19, 2025; the Commissioner (now Stephanie Muth) and Molina responded on February 23, 2026, and the Court requested merits briefs on March 27, 2026. Relators filed on June 26, the Commissioner on August 17 and relators replied on September 21, 2026 (Docket). Molina's response was captioned in this and two related original proceedings, Nos. 25-1030, 25-1031 and 25-1032.⁴

Original proceeding (petition for writ of mandamus and for a writ of injunction) in the Supreme Court of Texas challenging the Fifteenth Court of Appeals' order denying Rule 29.3 temporary relief in an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction and the grant of a temporary injunction. The Court requested and received full merits briefing, including reply briefs, but has not yet granted or denied the petition.

Cook Children's, Texas Children's, and Superior present two issues: whether the Fifteenth Court abused its discretion in denying their Rule 29.3 motions, leaving them without an adequate remedy at law, and whether a writ of injunction is necessary to protect the appellate courts' jurisdiction.¹ Wellpoint asks whether the court of appeals' "irreparable harm" analysis was correct in light of the standstill agreement, and whether, to justify an injunction protecting a court's jurisdiction, irreparable harm to the parties matters at all or the sole question is whether the court might lose jurisdiction.² The Commissioner frames the issue as whether the Court should deny mandamus that would stay the State's right to automatically supersede an adverse trial-court judgment when the party seeking Rule 29.3 relief has not carried its burden on every requirement for a temporary injunction.³

Relators (Cook Children's Health Plan, Texas Children's Health Plan, Superior HealthPlan, Inc. and Wellpoint Insurance Company): The Fifteenth Court did not conduct the required inquiry, misread Rule 6.6 to defeat a showing of imminent harm and addressed none of the other aspects of the Rule 29.3 motions, which were never argued on that ground by the Commissioner. Without relief the Commissioner could execute the contracts and moot the appeal merely by perfecting it, as they say a predecessor once did in an earlier Medicaid procurement, and the Court should vacate the order and direct the court of appeals to apply the proper standard. Alternatively the plans are entitled to relief now: they have overcome sovereign immunity through ultra vires claims for prospective relief only, the record supports each claim, exhaustion, ripeness and standing do not bar them, and the equities favor continuing the injunction. Wellpoint adds that a writ of injunction to protect an appellate court's jurisdiction under Government Code section 22.221(a) turns on harm to the court, not the parties, so the irreparable-harm analysis was the wrong standard.¹

Real Party in Interest (Stephanie Muth, Executive Commissioner of HHSC) and Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc.: The question is whether the plans carried their burden for a temporary injunction against the State, not whether the Fifteenth Court's reasoning was right, and the Court may deny mandamus on any ground that supports the result. A party seeking Rule 29.3 relief against the State faces a heavy burden, which is at its strongest when a court is asked to enjoin executive action on matters of public import such as administering Medicaid and CHIP for millions of low-income Texans. The plans are unlikely to succeed: their claims are not justiciable because they did not exhaust the bid-protest process, are not ripe and lack standing; sovereign immunity bars them because the Commissioner has absolute discretion over best value and her conduct was not ultra vires; and they seek a retrospective "redo." Molina adds that the plans have no legally protectable rights in a procurement and so no rights for Rule 29.3 to preserve, citing Texas Highway Commission v. El Paso Building & Construction Trades Council. They also argue the writ of injunction is unavailable because no genuine jurisdictional peril exists, and the Commissioner notes the plans continue to receive billions in public funds while the appeal is pending.²

This is an original proceeding rather than a petition for review. The plans argue mandamus is needed to avoid a premature end to the case through execution of what they call the largest procurement in Texas history, that the Fifteenth Court's decision is novel and unexpected, would let the State avoid judicial scrutiny by perfecting an appeal, and would discourage litigants from using standstill agreements to avoid emergency motions practice.¹ Wellpoint argues the Court should clarify the standard for writs of injunction protecting appellate jurisdiction.² The Commissioner argues the petitions should be denied without further briefing, though she acknowledges questions about the merits of the underlying appeal might warrant this Court's review at a later time.³

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