Chiffon Brown worked as a social worker for Child Advocates, Inc. (CAI), a nonprofit that advocates for children in the child-welfare system. She says CAI fired her after she refused to give false testimony recommending that two children be removed from their foster parents and returned to their biological mother; she sued CAI under Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).¹ CAI produced an arbitration agreement that bears Brown's electronic signature and moved to compel arbitration. Brown says she never intended to be bound and could not confirm that she had ever seen the agreement, much less signed it electronically.²

CAI moved to compel arbitration in the 127th District Court of Harris County, supported by its CEO's declaration that the agreement could only be signed by an employee personally accessing a website or mobile app with unique identifying information. Brown objected, arguing there was no valid agreement and that mediation, a condition precedent to arbitration, had not occurred. The trial court (Judge Ravi K. Sandill) granted the motion on February 23, 2022 without an evidentiary hearing or findings; after an arbitration hearing the arbitrator issued a take-nothing award, and the trial court confirmed it in a final judgment on December 13, 2023.¹ The Fourteenth Court of Appeals (McLaughlin, J., joined by Bridges, J.; Boatman, J., dissenting) held the trial court abused its discretion by compelling arbitration without an evidentiary hearing and remanded. Brown v. Child Advocates, Inc., No. 14-24-00012-CV, 2025 WL 1107095 (Tex. App.⁠—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 15, 2025, pet. filed). En banc rehearing was denied September 23, 2025. CAI petitioned for review on November 7, 2025; Brown responded March 11, 2026 and CAI replied March 26. The Court requested briefs on the merits on June 19, 2026, and CAI filed its brief on August 19, 2026. On August 24, 2026 the Court granted Brown's motion for extension of time to file her brief in part (Docket).

Petition for review from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, which reversed an order compelling arbitration and a judgment confirming the resulting award and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The Court requested merits briefing; the petitioner's brief is on file, the respondent's brief is not yet filed, and the Court has not yet granted the petition.

CAI presents three issues.:

1. Whether the trial court appropriately granted the motion to compel without an evidentiary hearing where CAI offered its CEO's declaration about the security procedure along with Brown's electronically signed agreement, and Brown responded only that she was "unable to confirm" her signature
2. Whether Brown's claims that she "did not intend to enter into an agreement," could "not confirm" her signature and had "no recollection of" accessing the agreement were sufficient to rebut CAI's evidence of contract formation and require a hearing
3. Whether the court of appeals applied an unnecessarily rigid reading of Aerotek and section 322.009(a) by requiring CAI to enumerate every security procedure attendant to Brown's signing¹

At the petition stage, Brown framed the issues as whether this Court lacks jurisdiction because the court of appeals' factual-sufficiency determination is conclusive under Texas Constitution article V, section 6, and whether the opinion committed an error of law of such importance that it must be corrected.² Her merits brief is not yet on file.

Petitioner (Child Advocates, Inc.): Under Aerotek, a showing of a security procedure that attributes an electronic signature to the signer shifts the burden to the opponent, and a bare denial or non-recollection is not enough. CAI's evidence did that, and Brown's inability to confirm her signature is weaker than the denial Aerotek rejected. The court of appeals set an "impossibly rigid" standard that conflicts with section 322.009(a)'s "in any manner" language, conflated the formation inquiry with the evidentiary-hearing requirement of Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1992), which applies only when material facts are genuinely controverted, and conflicts with decisions of other courts of appeals, thereby undermining the reliability of electronic commerce. CAI also argued in its petition that Brown waived her complaint about the lack of a hearing.¹

Respondent (Chiffon Brown): The court of appeals' conclusion rests on its review of both sides' evidence and is a factual determination the Texas Constitution makes conclusive, so the Court lacks jurisdiction. Even on the merits, CAI did not conclusively establish a valid agreement: its CEO ultimately admitted she lacked personal knowledge of the document's authenticity, and Brown's evidence that she could not confirm receiving or signing it and never intended to be bound raised a fact dispute that required a hearing. The court applied settled precedent, and she did not waive the trial court's obligation to hold the hearing. She also argues the arbitrator exceeded his powers because the mediation condition precedent was unmet.² Her merits brief is not yet on file.

CAI argues the justices of the court of appeals disagree on an important question of law, the interpretation of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act; that the majority's opinion significantly narrows the Act and affects the viability of electronically signed documents statewide; and that it potentially expands Tipps to require an evidentiary hearing on essentially every motion to compel arbitration.¹ Brown responds that the case raises no novel issue or issue of importance to Texas jurisprudence, identifies no conflict among the courts of appeals, and turns on fact review that is outside this Court's jurisdiction.²

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