Elgin's City Council declined, by 8 to 1, to adopt a citizen-initiative ordinance ending citations and arrests for misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and so, as the City Charter required, called an election on it, and on November 8, 2022 about 74% of voters approved it.¹ Courtenay Paris, one of the five electors named on the initiative petition and chair of Decriminalize Elgin, collected signatures, signed the petition and voted for the measure.² After the election the City said it would not implement the ordinance because it viewed it as illegal, and on January 31, 2024 the Attorney General sued the City and city officials in their official capacities in the 21st District Court of Bastrop County, alleging the ordinance was ultra vires and violated Local Government Code section 370.003 and Article XI, section 5 of the Constitution.³ The City defendants did not answer and instead joined the Attorney General in a motion for a consent decree and final judgment.⁴

Paris filed a petition in intervention on May 6, 2024 to defend the ordinance, together with a plea to the jurisdiction challenging the Attorney General's standing and authority, the Attorney General moved to strike the intervention, and at a May 29 hearing the court heard only the motion to strike.¹ On June 18, 2024 it struck the intervention and entered the consent decree and final judgment without ruling on her plea to the jurisdiction.² The Fifteenth Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed on September 16, 2025, holding she lacked a justiciable interest beyond placing the initiative on the ballot and that the trial court acted within its discretion in ruling on the motion to strike before her plea.³ Paris petitioned for review on October 31, 2025.⁴ After she filed a merits brief the parties jointly moved to grant review, dismiss as moot and vacate. On September 18, 2026 the Court granted review, vacated the court of appeals' judgment and dismissed the case as moot, but did not vacate the court of appeals' opinion.

Petition for review under Tex. R. App. P. 53.1; on the parties' joint motions the Court granted review, vacated the court of appeals' judgment and dismissed the case as moot, without oral argument and without considering the merits, and declined to vacate the court of appeals' opinion.

• Paris:¹ whether the district court erred in striking her petition in intervention, whether it erred in striking it without first determining its own jurisdiction over the Attorney General's petition, and whether it erred in entering the consent decree and final judgment without first determining jurisdiction.
• The State:² whether Paris has a justiciable interest to intervene and whether the trial court had to rule on her plea to the jurisdiction before striking her intervention.
• The City of Elgin:³ whether the court of appeals correctly affirmed the discretionary decision to strike the intervention and to enter a consent decree resolving the claims between the remaining parties.

Whether Paris had a justiciable interest to intervene.

Paris (Petitioner): She satisfied Rule 60 under Guaranty Federal Savings Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co. because the Council opposed the initiative and no named defendant would defend it, so the City and Attorney General were effectively colluding to nullify it, and three state high courts have held that initiative proponents have a justiciable interest.¹

The State (Respondent): Paris lacks a justiciable interest in inserting herself into the suit between the City and the State after her favored initiative was adopted, the Court should not recognize one for the first time, and even if she had one the trial court acted within its discretion in denying intervention.²

The City of Elgin (Respondent): The City took no position on the merits of the motion to strike and says that once the intervention was struck the remaining parties were entitled to settle.³

Whether the court had to determine jurisdiction first.

Paris (Petitioner): Texas courts must determine jurisdiction at the earliest opportunity, and the district court could not strike her intervention or enter the consent decree without first deciding whether the Attorney General had standing and authority to sue.⁴ In her merits brief she adds that the Constitution deprives the Attorney General of authority to sue for the State in this case under Article IV, section 22 and Article II, section 1.⁵

The State (Respondent): Once the trial court struck the petition in intervention it did not need to rule on her plea to the jurisdiction, and the plea was implicitly denied in any event.⁶

The City of Elgin (Respondent): Consent judgments are a normal means of settling disputes, no party to the settlement challenged its consent or fairness, and because the intervenor was no longer a party she had no basis to object to it.⁷

Paris argued that the case raises an unresolved question whether an initiative's proponent may intervene to defend a voter-approved initiative, that the trial and intermediate appellate courts need guidance, and that the courts departed from the usual course of proceedings by not determining jurisdiction first.¹ The City responded that the petition presents only case-specific procedural rulings that do not warrant review.²

None noted

Holding

None on the merits, because the Court did not decide the intervention or jurisdiction questions.

Disposition

Petition for review granted, the court of appeals' judgment vacated and the case dismissed as moot, with the request to also vacate the court of appeals' opinion denied.

No dissent is noted, and Justice Sullivan did not participate.