On October 18, 2024, eight-year-old H.D.E. attended a free after-school ballet class hosted by LVTRise, Inc., a Fort Worth neighborhood nonprofit, and run by Above the Clouds, Inc., a nonprofit, and allegedly taught by Courtney Prince. H.D.E. says a table she was moving fell on her toe.¹ Her father, Eric Ellis, who is not a licensed attorney and works in "tech," sued the three defendants ten days later as her next friend, signing, and filing the pleadings himself.²

Above the Clouds and LVTRise answered; Prince never appeared. LVTRise moved in February 2025 to show authority, strike and dismiss under Rule 12 on the ground that Ellis was an unlicensed person representing a minor, and the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County (Judge Josh Burgess) granted the motion on March 14, 2025, striking the pleadings and dismissing with prejudice; Ellis neither responded nor appeared at the hearing, according to respondents. After the court of appeals abated for clarification of finality, the court signed an amended order on April 23, 2025 dismissing all claims against all defendants.¹ The Second Court of Appeals (Birdwell, Bassel and Womack, JJ.) modified the dismissal to be without prejudice and otherwise affirmed. Ellis as Next Friend to H.D.E. v. Prince, No. 02-25-00162-CV, 2025 WL 2370582 (Tex. App.⁠—Fort Worth Aug. 14, 2025, pet. filed) (mem. op.). Ellis petitioned for review on October 22, 2025; the respondents say the petition and his en banc motion were untimely, which he disputes. The Court requested merits briefing, filed May 26, July 15 and August 28, 2026.²

Petition for review from the Second Court of Appeals, which affirmed, as modified to dismiss without prejudice, the striking of a non-lawyer father's pleadings and dismissal of his pro se personal-injury suit on behalf of his minor child. The Court requested and received merits briefing, including a reply, granted the petition on October 2, 2026 and set oral argument for December 1, 2026.

Ellis presents whether the court of appeals erred in affirming, specifically by:

1. disregarding section 151.001(a)(7) of the Family Code
2. holding he could not represent his child without engaging in the unauthorized practice of law
3. holding he could not appear pro se as his daughter's next friend under Rule 44
4. holding the trial court's summary dismissal under Rule 12 was proper¹

Above the Clouds presents whether the court correctly affirmed dismissal without prejudice because the plain language and context of section 151.001(a)(7) do not authorize a parent to represent a child as an attorney, noting Ellis has been twice declared a vexatious litigant.² LVTRise presents whether the trial court abused its discretion in striking the pleadings and dismissing because a pro se, unlicensed next friend cannot act as counsel for his child.³

Petitioner (Eric L. Ellis): The text of section 151.001(a)(7) unambiguously gives a parent the right to "represent the child in legal action," meaning to act in the child's place like a lawyer for a client, as dictionary definitions and the Legislature's use of "represent" in other statutes show. It does not conflict with Government Code section 81.102's general ban on unauthorized practice, because it is a narrow exception, the Legislature needs no magic words, and its safeguards include Rule 173 and the Family Code. Rule 44's next-friend procedure dovetails with the statute, and Rule 12 dismissal was improper. Precluding pro se parental representation also infringes his constitutional rights to the care, custody and control of his child and H.D.E.'s right of access to Texas courts. He argues the petition was timely and his arguments preserved.¹

Respondents (Above the Clouds, Inc. and LVTRise, Inc.): Section 151.001(a)(7) is a Family Code provision about parental decision-making in suits affecting the parent-child relationship and does not authorize a non-lawyer parent to practice law, and neither the text nor context supports Ellis's reading; Texas courts read it to authorize parental representation in legal decision-making, not pro se filings. Government Code section 81.102 prohibits the unauthorized practice, Rule 44 does not authorize it, and unlicensed parental representation is bad policy because it can imperil a minor's personal-injury recovery. They say Ellis waived his constitutional arguments by raising them first in this Court, that the constitutional arguments lack merit, that dismissal under Rule 12 was proper, and that Ellis's en banc motion and petition for review were untimely.²

Ellis argues the case presents questions of statutory construction and constitutional law important to Texas jurisprudence that this Court has not resolved, including the meaning of the parental "right to represent the child in legal action" and its relation to the unauthorized-practice statute.¹

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