Breyani Holman and her minor son were in a car accident with Liberty County Mutual's insured, Memphis Perez, and were treated at Fairfield Emergency Room, where Holman signed forms including an "Irrevocable Assignment of Insurance Benefits" and an Accident Payment Agreement.¹ They then presented third-party injury claims to Liberty, whose claims administrator, ClaimTECH Solutions, negotiated the medical bills down with Fairfield, and Liberty paid the reduced amount directly and the account was closed.² Holman alleges she was never told of these contacts and did not authorize them, and that they were made outside the ordinary litigation process and reduced the value of her tort claim against Perez.³ She sued Perez for negligence in the 55th District Court, and that case remains pending.⁴ This case is consolidated for argument with 25-0880 (In re Liberty County Mutual Insurance Co.), the insurer's own mandamus petition.

Holman sued Liberty and ClaimTECH for tortious interference, invasion of privacy and related claims, and each moved to dismiss under Rule 91a; the 333rd District Court denied ClaimTECH's motion in January 2025 (and Liberty's in February 2025).¹ The First Court of Appeals denied both mandamus petitions without requesting a response, and the Supreme Court consolidated the two mandamus proceedings and requested merits briefing.² The trial-court case is stayed pending this proceeding.³

Original proceeding (petition for writ of mandamus) after the First Court of Appeals (Houston) denied relief; consolidated with 25-0880. Oral argument: November 3, 2026.

• ClaimTECH:¹ (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Rule 91a motions to dismiss; and (2) whether Liberty has an adequate remedy on appeal.
• Holman:² whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Rule 91a motions to dismiss claims arising from an insurer's undisclosed contact with a claimant's medical provider to negotiate reduced charges and thereby diminish the value of her personal-injury claims.

Mandamus is available when the trial court abuses its discretion and the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal, and mandamus may review the denial of a Rule 91a motion.¹ Holman adds that Rule 91a dismissal is proper only when a claim is foreclosed as a matter of law, not when it is difficult, unsettled, or needs factual development.²

Whether there is a justiciable claim.

ClaimTECH (Relator), joined by Liberty: Holman's theory is that settling her medical bills reduced her potential recovery against the at-fault driver, and it fails because she assigned away any justiciable interest, the no-direct-action rule precludes standing, and her claimed injury depends on hypothetical, remote, or contingent events.¹ In reply, they say she has no property interest in her personal-injury claims, is not entitled to a windfall, and her premise conflicts with Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 41.0105.²

Holman (Real Party in Interest): The Fairfield assignments transferred only the right to receive insurance benefits, not her independent tort claims; the no-direct-action rule bars suits to enforce a liability policy, not suits against an insurer for torts it committed; and her injury is present, not speculative.³

Whether the conduct was justified or states a claim.

ClaimTECH (Relator), joined by Liberty: Defendants have a legal right to mitigate their exposure by pre-paying potential damages, with or without the injured party's consent, and the facts as pleaded affirmatively show Holman is not entitled to relief on her claims for wrongful payment of interest, tortious interference, and invasion of privacy.⁴

Holman (Real Party in Interest): Her claims for tortious interference, invasion of privacy and conspiracy are cognizable under established Texas tort law, Stern does not support dismissal at the pleading stage, the Restatement does not immunize the conduct, and whether any privilege applies depends on contested facts.⁵

Whether ClaimTECH's agency position helps it, and whether mandamus is available.

Holman (Real Party in Interest): ClaimTECH's theory that it acted as the insurer's agent confirms joint conduct, not immunity.⁶ Mandamus is unavailable because reasonable jurists could disagree about whether the claims are viable, so appeal after final judgment is an adequate remedy.⁷

The relators framed the central issue as whether Holman's theory, that settling a claimant's medical bills reduced her potential recovery against the at-fault driver, is legally viable in Texas.¹ Holman argued the petition asks the Court to excuse a medical-bill negotiator that, acting for an insurer, secretly contacted a claimant's medical provider and negotiated reduced payments, conduct no Texas court has addressed or approved.²

None noted