On May 15, 2019, Spring Fults was driving in Montgomery County when Marion Lane Standley, driving while intoxicated, crossed the center line and struck her car. Standley pleaded guilty to an accident involving personal injury and, according to Fults, stipulated that his negligence proximately caused the collision; Fults suffered serious injuries and ongoing treatment.¹

Fults sued on April 6, 2021 in the 284th District Court of Montgomery County (Judge Kristin Bays) for negligence, negligence per se and gross negligence. The docket control order of April 26, 2021 provided that experts not listed in compliance would not be permitted to testify absent a Rule 193.6 exception, required challenges to experts to be set for hearing 75 days before trial, and kept deadlines calculated from the trial date in force even if the case was reset. Fults designated experts on June 4, 2021; Standley says each designation, including that of her treating chiropractor, Steven Smith, D.C., used an identical boilerplate description of topics rather than opinions.¹ At the February 2022 trial, the court excluded Dr. Smith's deposition testimony and all medical and billing records, and refused to submit questions on future pain, mental anguish, and impairment; the jury found Standley negligent and grossly negligent and awarded $500 for past pain and mental anguish, $500 for past impairment and $10,000 in exemplary damages, and the court rendered judgment for $11,000.² The Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed on July 31, 2025 (Chambers, J., joined by Wright, J.; Golemon, C.J., dissenting, who would have held the court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Smith's testimony in its entirety and the billing records). Fults v. Standley, No. 09-22-00126-CV (Tex. App.⁠—Beaumont July 31, 2025, pet. filed).³ Fults petitioned for review on September 15, 2025 and Standley responded March 2, 2026. The Court requested merits briefing; Fults filed July 13, 2026 and Standley filed September 25, 2026, and Fults's reply is not yet on file (Docket).

Petition for review from the Ninth Court of Appeals, which affirmed, over a dissent, a jury verdict and $11,000 judgment in a drunk-driving personal-injury case after the trial court excluded the plaintiff's treating-physician testimony and medical records. The Court requested and received merits briefing; the petitioner's reply brief is not yet on file, and the Court has not yet granted the petition.

Fults presents:

1. whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the wholesale exclusion of her treating physician's testimony and all medical and billing records, which she says were case-determinative discovery sanctions barred absent a finding of flagrant bad faith or callous disregard and consideration of lesser sanctions
2. whether a trial court abuses its discretion by strictly enforcing a docket control order deadline against one party's evidence while excusing the other party's noncompliance with the deadline for challenges to experts
3. whether a docket control order provision that deadlines remain in force "even if the trial date is reset and regardless of the reason" conflicts with Rule 190.5(b)
4. whether exclusion for "unfair surprise" under Rule 193.6(a)(2) can stand where the opposing party already possessed the records, agreed to depose the doctor after the cutoff and fully cross-examined him¹

Standley restates the issues as whether the court of appeals properly applied the abuse-of-discretion standard to exclusions of the expert's opinions, records, and bills to preclude "trial by ambush," and whether it properly applied the briefing standards of Appellate Rule 38.²

Petitioner (Spring Fults): The exclusions stripped her of any means to prove causation and damages, so in substance they were case-determinative sanctions that conflict with TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon and Spohn Hospital v. Mayer, which require flagrant bad faith and consideration of lesser sanctions; she says a lesser sanction was available and she accepted it. The trial court's one-sided enforcement of the docket control order was arbitrary, since the defendant never complied with the 75-day deadline for challenging experts and raised its objections first at trial. Docket control order boilerplate cannot override Rule 190.5(b), which requires additional discovery on matters that materially changed when trial is reset more than three months past the cutoff, and no unfair surprise justified exclusion under Rule 193.6(a)(2). She also contends the court of appeals should have liberally construed her brief to reach the continuance and new docket control order as subsidiary issues, and that the errors were harmful.¹

Respondent (Marion Lane Standley): The issues are mostly about the trial court's exercise of discretion, and the court of appeals applied the proper abuse-of-discretion standard. This is not a case-determinative discovery sanctions case but the mandatory consequence of defective disclosure, to prevent "trial by ambush": Fults served boilerplate designations that listed topics, not opinions, for a dozen experts, learned opinions of Dr. Smith only came out in a deposition the week before trial, and the medical-records affidavits stated the records were "not attached." Enforcement of the docket control order was not one-sided, the exclusion was proper under Rule 193.6, the evidentiary rulings were not case-determinative, Fults's Rule 190.5(b) argument was not preserved in the trial court or briefed in the court of appeals, there are no briefing concerns warranting review, and no harmful error is shown.²

Fults argues the majority ignored stare decisis and numerous Ninth Court of Appeals decisions cited in the dissent, that the division on the panel and among the courts of appeals shows confusion about docket control orders that conflict with Rules 195.5, 193.6 and 190.5, and that the decision conflicts with this Court's precedent on case-determinative discovery sanctions.¹ Standley responds that this is a fact-bound exclusion-of-evidence dispute with no true decisional conflict, and that a dissent alone does not satisfy the jurisdictional test.²

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