A group of farmers claim that Helena Chemical Company damaged their crops through the aerial application of herbicide to a neighboring property.¹ The Court previously decided a similar case with different farmers, Helena Chemical Co. v. Cox, 664 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. 2023), holding that the farmers' experts failed to account for plausible alternative causes and offered no reliable way to extrapolate from a small number of positive lab tests to the rest of the vast acreage, so their testimony was no evidence of causation.² Helena says the farmers here offered the same expert testimony to prove the same claims, and notes that in Cox the parties' lawyers had agreed under a Rule 11 agreement that certain expert affidavits and depositions could be used in both cases.³

Helena moved to strike the experts and for no-evidence summary judgment, arguing that Cox controlled, and the farmers argued in part that Cox "side-stepp[ed] long-settled jurisprudence" and was incorrect.¹ The trial court did not rule on the motion to strike and denied summary judgment, but it granted Helena permission to appeal on the question whether Cox dictates that the farmers' expert testimony is unreliable as a matter of law and no evidence of causation.² The Eighth Court of Appeals (El Paso) denied permission, reasoning that settled questions of law are not proper for a permissive appeal because they present no substantial ground for difference of opinion.³ The vehicle in this Court is a petition for review filed by Helena; the Court granted it without ordering merits briefing or hearing oral argument under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 55.1 and 59.1 and decided the case on May 15, 2026.⁴ Justice Devine did not participate.⁵

Petition for review from the Eighth Court of Appeals (El Paso) denying permission for a permissive interlocutory appeal; granted and decided by per curiam opinion without oral argument on May 15, 2026.⁶

Helena asks whether an applicant for a permissive interlocutory appeal has "a substantial ground for difference of opinion" on "a controlling question of law" when this Court has a binding holding on the dispositive issue and the trial court's order contradicts it, and alternatively whether mandamus should issue.¹ The Court framed the question as whether a trial-court ruling that appears to be at odds with binding precedent is "a substantial ground for difference of opinion" under Section 51.014(d)(1).²

A trial court may permit an interlocutory appeal only if its order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, and even then the court of appeals has discretion whether to accept the appeal.¹

Whether a ruling at odds with binding precedent satisfies Section 51.014(d)(1).

Helena (Petitioner): Disagreement between courts is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and the trial court, "a rightly respected trial judge," answered "no" to a question the Court's precedent answers "yes," so the court of appeals misunderstood the statute; it also argues that either this is a proper permissive appeal or mandamus should be granted, and that denying review leaves it facing multiple trials doomed for reversal.¹

Farmers (Respondents): The trial court's denial did not depart from well-established law on accident reconstruction, aerial trespass, crop damage valuation, and expert testimony, and Cox did not ban opinions of experts who reconstructed a later drift event, in a different county, under different conditions, with cotton at a different growth stage, after more thorough investigation by local experts.²

Helena argued that the case offers the Court the chance to give guidance that could benefit litigants and courts across Texas on what a party should do when a trial court rules against binding precedent, and that the problem is not a one-off.¹

None

Holding

Section 51.014(d)(1) is satisfied when there is a substantial ground for concluding that a trial-court ruling is at odds with binding precedent, so a court of appeals should accept a permissive appeal in which the trial court indicates its ruling may be contrary to controlling precedent.¹

Reasoning

The Court noted that Section 51.014(a) provides interlocutory appeals as of right while Section 51.014(d) authorizes only permissive appeals, which require the trial court's permission and the court of appeals' acceptance.² The trial court's answer to the controlling question should be treated as the product of a fair-minded jurist and used as the baseline, so when it reaches a conclusion that it believes might be wrong under the Court's precedent, "we should take the court at its word," and the daylight between the two courts establishes the required difference of opinion.³ The trial court did not detail any grievances with Cox, but the statute is a mechanism for the early, efficient resolution of determinative legal issues, and the second prong is also met because an appeal from a ruling that may be contrary to precedent on an issue that would end the litigation would efficiently correct error.⁴ Instead of asking whether the law on admissibility of scientific evidence is already settled, the court of appeals should have accepted the appeal and made short work of the case.⁵

Disposition

Petition for review granted, and the court of appeals directed to accept the appeal under Section 51.014(h).⁶

Vote Breakdown

Per Curiam Opinion

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Busby, Hawkins, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.

Did Not Participate

Devine, J.