Following reports that Mother had neglected and inadequately supervised her seven-year-old son, the Department of Family and Protective Services identified concerns that her mental-health challenges impaired her ability to parent and sought emergency removal, and the court adopted a ten-item service plan as an order.¹ The plan required Mother, among other things, to submit to a psychological assessment, a psychiatric evaluation and a mental-health assessment from a specific center called La Mente, to "follow through with all recommendations" from those providers, and to "actively participate" in supervised visits and "utilize learned skills" from parenting classes.² Four months after the court adopted the plan a psychiatrist diagnosed bipolar I disorder with a recent manic episode with psychotic features and recommended antipsychotic medication, which Mother declined, and she did not complete an assessment at La Mente, though she had completed a psychological assessment and a psychiatric evaluation.³ The Department acknowledges that Mother consistently attended visits, though the caseworker testified that visits sometimes ended early and that Mother occasionally raised inappropriate topics.⁴

The Department tried the case to the bench and sought termination only under former Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(O), and the trial court terminated Mother's rights for noncompliance with the plan, appointing the Department permanent managing conservator.¹ The Eighth Court of Appeals (El Paso) affirmed on three grounds: Mother's refusal to take the recommended medication, her failure to complete the assessment at La Mente, and her failure to apply parenting-class skills during visits.² The Supreme Court granted review without oral argument and, in a June 26, 2026 per curiam opinion, reversed in part and rendered judgment vacating the termination.³

Petition for review from the Eighth Court of Appeals (El Paso); granted and decided without oral argument under Tex. R. App. P. 59.1, in a per curiam opinion issued June 26, 2026.⁴

• Mother:¹ whether the court of appeals erred by affirming termination on a medication directive never written into the service plan and lacking the benchmarks In re R.J.G. requires; whether it erred in finding she failed to meet the visitation requirement; whether the Department proved removal for abuse or neglect and the court of appeals wrongly found that point waived; and whether termination was in the child's best interest.
• The Department:² whether the court of appeals correctly applied the standard of review and R.J.G. in finding that her untreated mental health, visitation conduct and plan noncompliance supported termination under subsection (O), and whether Mother adequately briefed the best-interest issue.

Termination requires clear and convincing evidence, and the question on legal sufficiency is whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true, with the plan and the statutory ground strictly construed in the parent's favor.¹

Whether the plan specifically required Mother to take medication.

Mother (Petitioner): R.J.G. allows termination under subsection (O) only for violating a direct, specifically required action in the plan, and where the alleged violation concerns mental-health treatment the plan must set a benchmark, so a general directive to follow unspecified providers' recommendations cannot support termination for declining a medication that the plan never mentioned.¹

The Department (Respondent): Termination was supported by her complete failure to treat her mental health, including by taking prescribed medication, because her plan directly and specifically required her to follow through with the recommendations of her psychological and psychiatric providers, and doing so was the most material action necessary to regain the child.²

Whether Mother violated the visitation requirement.

Mother (Petitioner): She consistently attended visits and substantially complied with the visitation requirement.³

The Department (Respondent): The plan directly and specifically required her to attend and actively participate in visits as a material step to improve her parenting, and she created harmful situations and engaged in concerning behavior during them.⁴

Other grounds.

Mother (Petitioner): The Department failed to prove the removal was due to abuse or neglect, and the court of appeals wrongly treated the point as waived, and termination was not in the child's best interest under Holley.⁵

The Department (Respondent): The court of appeals relied on ample evidence for the best-interest finding, including her untreated mental illness and the child's thriving in foster care, and Mother inadequately briefed the issue.⁶

Mother's petition argued that the court of appeals' affirmance conflicted with this Court's repeated requirement in R.J.G. that a subsection (O) order clearly and specifically state the required actions.¹ The Department responded that the court of appeals correctly followed R.J.G. and that there is no divide in authority requiring review.²

None noted

Holding

The service plan did not "specifically establish" the actions that former paragraph (O) required, so legally insufficient evidence supported termination: a plan to "follow through with all recommendations" did not establish a medication requirement that arose only from a later psychiatric recommendation, the La Mente assessment requirement was too trivial and immaterial, and a plan to "utilize learned skills" that never identified any skills could not support termination based on her conduct during visits.¹

Reasoning

Termination is akin to a civil "death penalty," and paragraph (O) requires a court order that clearly and specifically delineates the actions required, as in contempt proceedings.² When the court adopted the plan no medication had been recommended, a placeholder like "follow through with all recommendations" does not satisfy the court's duty to review the reasonableness of actions later determined by a third party, and the Family Code lets plans be amended and incorporated into a court order, which was never done here.³ Failing to complete an assessment at a named clinic after completing equivalent evaluations elsewhere is a technical noncompliance that is too trivial without proof that the provider mattered, and the court of appeals' speculation is not a substitute for proof.⁴ The plan identified no specific skills Mother was to learn or conduct that would satisfy the "utilize learned skills" requirement, as section 263.102(a)(8) requires, so her behavior in visits did not violate it, although the Department could have sought termination under section 161.003 on the basis of mental illness and did not.⁵

Disposition

Petition granted, the court of appeals' judgment reversed as to the termination of Mother's parental rights, and judgment rendered vacating that portion of the trial court's order, with the conservatorship provisions otherwise left undisturbed so the Department remains permanent managing conservator.⁶

Vote Breakdown

Per Curiam Opinion

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Busby, Devine, Hawkins, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.

Legal sufficiency of the evidence to support termination under former paragraph (O), reviewed under the clear-and-convincing standard, with court-ordered service plans and the statutory ground strictly construed in the parent's favor.¹

Per curiam opinion.¹