The Seay Tennis Center is a Highland Park ISD facility, and as early as 2015 citizens raised concerns about its management and finances.¹ In 2019 the district retained attorney Bryan Neal to investigate alleged financial misconduct, and Neal commissioned the accounting firm Whitley Penn, which produced a report on the Center's financial operations.² The district says it retained a law firm to give legal advice on the Center's operations and, because the lawyer was not an accountant, needed accounting help to give that advice.³ The Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF) says a senior district official, Superintendent White, later wrote that the district took appropriate steps including obtaining "expert assistance," and testified that this meant Whitley Penn, not Neal.⁴ In 2022 TPPF requested the report under the Public Information Act, the district sought an Attorney General ruling, and the Attorney General concluded the report was a completed report under section 552.022(a)(1) but that it could be withheld as privileged on the district's assertions.⁵

TPPF sued for a writ of mandamus under Government Code section 552.321(a); the district court reviewed the report in camera, declared it privileged, and after a short bench trial found that White's email did not waive privilege, entering final judgment on April 30, 2024 with findings on May 20, 2024.¹ The Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas) affirmed, holding that Whitley Penn was an attorney's representative under Rule of Evidence 503 and the report was a communication made to facilitate legal services, and that the email did not waive privilege because it did not reveal Neal's advice or the report's contents.² Justice Lewis concurred to highlight "dangers and absurdities" of an overbroad privilege in investigations and said Supreme Court review was warranted.³ The Supreme Court granted review.

Petition for review from the Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas). Oral argument: October 8, 2026.

• TPPF:¹ (1) whether to overrule In re City of Georgetown and hold attorney-client privilege is not "other law" overriding section 552.022; (2) if it is, whether the law should strike a better balance so governments cannot use privilege as a loophole; and (3) whether the district waived privilege.
• HPISD:² (1) whether the Court should decline to overrule its holding that the Rules of Evidence, including attorney-client privilege, are "other law," given long reliance and legislative acquiescence; (2) whether it should decline to amend the Act by carving out exceptions to the privilege; and (3) whether it should decline to find waiver.

Neither side's merits brief has a separate standard-of-review section; the questions presented are legal ones about the meaning of "other law" in section 552.022, the scope of the privilege, and waiver.

Whether to overrule In re City of Georgetown.

TPPF (Petitioner): The Act promises "complete information," a purely factual investigative report on a public facility's finances is "core public information," and Georgetown contradicts the Act's text and purpose by reading a privilege exception into a statute that excludes one for core public information, which the Court may not do.¹ Legislative silence is not acquiescence, especially to a decision contrary to plain text.² In reply, TPPF says HPISD never explains why "other law" should not be read as the Act dictates and that acquiescence cannot apply to clear text.³

HPISD (Respondent): The Court should decline to overturn Georgetown, which correctly reads "other law" to include the Rules of Evidence, applies the privilege outside litigation, and has been relied on for 25 years with the Legislature's acquiescence; the privilege has "special force" for governments because public officials need candid legal advice.⁴

Whether to narrow the privilege for factual investigations.

TPPF (Petitioner): Even without overruling Georgetown, the Court could carve out a narrower exception so that core public information containing no legal advice, like the Whitley Penn report, must be disclosed.⁵

HPISD (Respondent): The Court should decline TPPF's invitation to legislate by amending the Act to add exceptions to the privilege.⁶

Whether the privilege was waived.

TPPF (Petitioner): Even if the report remains privileged, HPISD waived privilege by disclosing a significant portion of it through White's statement, and a broad privilege requires a broad reading of waiver.⁷

HPISD (Respondent): The email sent on the administration's behalf did not waive privilege, and TPPF's contrary position is a counterfactual last resort.⁸

TPPF argued that no facts are in dispute and the case is an ideal vehicle to resolve a major Public Information Act loophole created by Georgetown and to restore transparency.¹ HPISD argued the Court should leave undisturbed its holding that "other law" includes the Rules of Evidence because the Legislature has acquiesced in it.²

• Common-law privilege as "other law". Petitioner's counsel was pressed on whether common law counts as "other law" and what happens if the Rules of Evidence disappeared; counsel said Georgetown would become a dead letter. (Oral Argument, 0:10:52; 0:11:50)
• Middle path. Asked how to rule for Petitioner without overruling Georgetown, counsel proposed protecting only pure attorney advice and legal impressions, grounded in the Act's opening section. (Oral Argument, 0:13:36)
• Loophole concern. Respondent's counsel said the privilege has built-in limits: the attorney must have obtained the report to give legal advice, which counsel called undisputed, and crime-fraud applies. (Oral Argument, 0:25:57; 0:27:30)
• Section .001. A Justice asked what Respondent does with the Act's direction to construe it liberally for disclosure; counsel returned to Georgetown and the codified common-law privilege. (Oral Argument, 0:42:20; 0:43:46)
• Legislative acquiescence. A Justice asked if acquiescence could defeat the argument that privilege is not confidential; Petitioner's counsel quoted Justice Scalia that vindication by congressional inaction is a canard. (Oral Argument, 0:17:52; 0:19:08)
• Statute trumps rule. Respondent's counsel agreed that if a statute conflicted with a Texas evidence or procedure rule the statute would control, but said the two are consistent here. (Oral Argument, 0:34:16)
• Redaction process. Asked about having agencies propose redactions to the Attorney General, Respondent's counsel said that invites more litigation and runs against Huey, which treats a mixed document as wholly privileged. (Oral Argument, 0:36:14; 0:38:08)
• Underlying facts. On rebuttal, a Justice asked why Petitioner would not just request the underlying papers, documents and information, not including the report; Petitioner's counsel said that could be done. (Oral Argument, 0:45:42)

• Amicus curiae briefs were filed at the petition and merits stages; they are not summarized here.