D.C. and Ralph Douglas West II met through social media in 2017 and began a dating relationship. D.C., the petitioner, says she experienced symptoms at the end of March 2018 that her doctor diagnosed as genital herpes, confirmed by laboratory tests on April 10, 2018, and that West, an assistant pastor, had told her before they had sex that he had been tested and was negative, although he was infected, knew it, and failed to disclose it.¹ West says the relationship was sporadic and intermittent with long gaps, that D.C. accused him before any medical diagnosis and he immediately and repeatedly denied responsibility, that D.C. introduced no medical records, test results or expert testimony establishing infection, transmission, timing or causation, and that his April 2018 statement that it "must have come from" the last woman he had slept with was not an admission.²

D.C. sued in March 2020 for assault or battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent concealment, and fraudulent misrepresentation. At a jury trial in October 2023 in the 269th District Court of Harris County (Judge Cory Sepolio), D.C.'s medical expert was excluded for untimely disclosure, and D.C. did not appeal that exclusion. The jury found for D.C. on battery, emotional distress and fraudulent concealment, found for West on fraudulent misrepresentation, awarded noneconomic and exemplary damages, and, after reduction to comply with Chapter 41, the trial court entered judgment for D.C. of $2,200,000, according to her brief.¹ The Fourteenth Court of Appeals (McLaughlin, J., joined by Jewell, J., and Christopher, C.J.) unanimously reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment because D.C. offered no expert testimony on causation, holding that knowledge about disease transmission, particularly STDs, is outside jurors' common experience. West v. D.C., No. 14-24-00502-CV, 2025 WL 1759380 (Tex. App.⁠—Houston [14th Dist.] June 26, 2025, pet. filed).² D.C. petitioned for review on September 5, 2025, and the Court requested merits briefing, filed March 2, April 22 and May 29, 2026 (Docket).

Petition for review from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, which reversed a jury verdict and judgment of $2,200,000 for the plaintiff and rendered a take-nothing judgment for want of expert causation evidence. The Court requested and received merits briefing but denied the petition on October 2, 2026.

The petitioner presents one issue: whether the court of appeals improperly reversed the jury's verdict because knowledge of sexually transmitted diseases is common knowledge that jurors possess and does not require expert opinion to establish causation.¹ West, in his response, framed the issues as whether the trial court erred in denying his directed-verdict motion because no legally sufficient evidence supported the claims, and whether the claims were barred by lack of expert testimony on causation and knowledge.²

Petitioner (D.C.): In 2026, jurors understand that sexually transmitted diseases are transmitted by sexual contact between an infected party and another, so lay testimony should suffice to prove causation, especially when the other party admits he had the disease and knew he could transmit it. She relies on cases in which lay testimony was legally sufficient for on-the-job injuries, chemical-fume exposure, seismic-testing property damage and transmission of STDs in divorce cases, including Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., and argues the court of appeals created a split among courts of appeals. She contends the jury was free to weigh West's denials against his admission on an audio recording, that out-of-state authority is not binding, and that if the Court reverses it should remand any remaining issues to the court of appeals.¹

Respondent (Ralph Douglas West II): This Court has held that expert testimony is necessary to establish causation for medical conditions outside the common knowledge of jurors, Guevara v. Ferrer, and that temporal relationship alone is not sufficient evidence of causation, Jelinek v. Casas, and Texas appellate courts unanimously require expert testimony in STD transmission cases, citing N.F. v. A.S. (Tex. App.⁠—Dallas 2017, pet. denied). West argues D.C. offered no proof of when she was infected, of any particular diagnosis causing her symptoms, or that he rather than another person was the source, and did not eliminate alternative causes. He says his April 2018 statement was not an admission, that Morgan and the chemical-exposure cases involved immediate, observable injuries, and that out-of-state STD cases confirm the national approach. He adds that D.C. waived any complaint about the exclusion of her medical expert and that, if the Court reverses, the proper remedy is remand, not rendition.²

D.C. argues the question of whether transmission of STDs is within jurors' common experience is important to the state's jurisprudence, involves fundamental issues of due process and the limits of a jury to process evidence without an expert, and that the decision creates a split of authority among Texas courts of appeals.¹ West responds that the question is already settled by this Court's authority and uniform appellate decisions, and that the case turns on a conceded failure of proof, not an issue of statewide importance.²

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