On October 4, 2014, Hannah Tanner was thrown from a golf cart driven by Dakota Scott, who was employed by Texas State University (TXST) or the Texas State University System and was allegedly in the course and scope of his employment. Tanner sued TXST, the System and Scott on September 29, 2016. She served the System on October 4, 2016, the last day of limitations, served Scott on September 18, 2018, and served TXST on May 20, 2020.¹

Two weeks after being served, TXST answered, asserting limitations, and moved under Tort Claims Act section 101.106(e) to dismiss Scott. The trial court (207th District Court of Hays County, Judge William R. Henry) dismissed the claims against the System and Scott and granted TXST's plea to the jurisdiction on limitations because of the delay in serving TXST. The Third Court of Appeals reversed, holding diligence in service is not jurisdictional, Tanner v. Texas State University, 644 S.W.3d 747 (Tex. App.⁠—Austin 2022); this Court reversed, holding that limitations, including timely service, is jurisdictional in suits against governmental entities and rejecting Tanner's arguments based on TXST's actual notice, TXST's delay in moving to dismiss Scott, and common representation, but remanded for the court of appeals to decide whether service on Scott excused service on TXST under Bailey and, if so, whether service on Scott was timely. Texas State University v. Tanner, 689 S.W.3d 292 (Tex. 2024).¹ On remand, the court of appeals (Triana, J., joined by Theofanis, J.; Crump, J., dissenting) held that service on Scott was not service on TXST and that Bailey did not apply, so it did not reach timeliness of service on Scott. Tanner v. Texas State University, 722 S.W.3d 156 (Tex. App.⁠—Austin 2025, pet. filed).² Justice Crump reasoned that by moving under section 101.106(e), TXST confirmed it was liable for any qualifying conduct, so Tanner's failure to serve it separately did not bar her claims.³ Tanner petitioned for review on August 27, 2025, and the Court requested briefs on the merits on February 27, 2026.⁴

Petition for review from the Third Court of Appeals on remand from this Court's 2024 decision, after the court of appeals affirmed a plea to the jurisdiction dismissing a Tort Claims Act suit on limitations grounds. The Court has requested and received merits briefing but has not yet granted the petition.

1. Whether Tanner's service on Scott satisfied her obligation to serve TXST, including whether Bailey, which barred an employer from relying on limitations when the employee waited until limitations expired to move to dismiss under section 101.106(f), should apply when the employer moved to dismiss under section 101.106(e), and whether an employer with actual notice may delay such a motion until after limitations runs. 2. Whether Tanner raised a fact question that she exercised diligence in serving Scott.¹ TXST presents whether service on Scott excuses the duty to timely serve the employer when the plaintiff sued both from the start, and, regardless, whether Tanner timely served Scott.²

Petitioner (Hannah R. Tanner): The purpose of section 101.106 is to ensure quick dismissal of government employees, not to give the government a tool to avoid liability for conduct for which the Legislature waived immunity, and that purpose is the same whether dismissal is sought under subsection (e) or (f). Under Bailey, a suit against an employee for acts in the course and scope of employment is from the outset a suit against the government, and the employer cannot rely on limitations because it or the employee delayed a motion to dismiss. Tanner contends TXST was the real party in interest all along, that the System could have identified TXST as Scott's employer and Scott could have moved under subsection (f), that knowledge, substitution and control do not distinguish Bailey, and that timely service on the employee gives the employer reasonably effective notice, especially given common representation by the Attorney General. She argues that, in the alternative, she raised a fact question on diligence, because she served the University System first in case Scott was acting in the course and scope of employment.¹

Respondent (Texas State University): Each defendant must be timely served, and Bailey's narrow exception applies only where the employee moved to substitute the employer under subsection (f). Here the employee did not file such a motion and substitution was unnecessary because Tanner sued both from the start, so subsection (e), which contains no substitution mechanism, applies. TXST argues Tanner's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive and that her proposed expansion of Bailey would frustrate section 101.106's purpose and have untenable practical consequences, such as default judgments against a governmental unit never served. It argues in the alternative that Tanner served Scott two years too late and offers no explanation of her lack of diligence.²

Tanner argues the petition presents a question of law with statewide ramifications that is important to the state's jurisprudence, because the court of appeals' reading lets governmental employers manipulate section 101.106 to support a limitations defense.¹ TXST responded that the Court should deny review without further briefing.²

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