In the 1950s Pete and Virginia Long created an irrevocable trust for each of their four sons; each trust gave income and principal to the named son until he turned 30, when the trust terminated automatically under its own terms.¹ The brothers Larry and Allan say they later extended their trusts by oral and written agreements and, through those trusts, ran the family business for decades, while Barbara Zazulak says the post-termination agreements created new arrangements rather than continuing the originals.² Charles Long died in 2020; his will left the residue of his estate in equal shares to four named trusts, including those of Larry and Allan, and left only life-insurance proceeds to his estranged daughter Zazulak, his only child.³

Zazulak sought a declaration that the residuary devises to Larry's and Allan's trusts lapsed because those trusts had terminated, which would make her Charles's sole heir; the Longs opposed, relying on affidavits and deposition excerpts about decades-old conversations.¹ The trial court granted her summary-judgment motion and denied the Trustees', reasoning that the trusts ended on the beneficiaries' 30th birthdays and the later agreements did not extend the trusts named in the will.² The Texarkana Court of Appeals first dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the order had not declared heirship; after remand the trial court declared Zazulak the sole heir, and the court of appeals affirmed.³ The court held the will unambiguous and identifying the residuary takers by the original 1950s trusts, which had terminated before Charles died, so the devises lapsed and the residue passed by intestacy; it refused to consider competing evidence of continuation.⁴ The Supreme Court granted review on May 29, 2026.

Petition for review from the Texarkana Court of Appeals (Sixth); granted May 29, 2026. Oral argument: October 7, 2026.

• The Trustees:¹ (1) what evidence is admissible to resolve whether the court can carry out a testator's clear intent after his death; and (2) whether the court of appeals erred in failing to consider evidence that would avoid intestacy, given the presumption against intestacy and the will's residuary clause.
• Zazulak:² when a will unambiguously devises property to a specifically named trust that terminated under its own terms before the testator's death, whether the devise lapses as a matter of law under Estates Code § 254.001(d), regardless of later agreements or extrinsic evidence suggesting continued administration of trust assets.

The case comes up on cross-motions for summary judgment in a will-construction dispute, and a court construing a will first ascertains the testator's intent and then effectuates it.¹

Whether extrinsic evidence of trust continuation must be considered.

The Trustees (Petitioner): The court of appeals' central error was evidentiary: it relied on the brothers' original trust indentures to find the trusts had terminated but disregarded all competing evidence of continuation, an arbitrary line the law does not support, and courts must consider evidence of the circumstances at the testator's death whether or not the will is ambiguous.¹ The result is also absurd, because Charles's own trust, continued the same way, would be treated as extant while his brothers' are not, and it would upset decades of settled business expectations.² In reply they say Zazulak urges a hypertechnical program of will construction and does not meaningfully defend the court of appeals' evidentiary line.³

Zazulak (Respondent): This is not a will contest; the question is whether the devises to two named, irrevocable trusts lapsed because the trusts terminated before Charles died, and when a will is unambiguous courts may not revise its terms to avoid hardship or match a presumed intent.⁴ The Longs' continuation agreements are private side deals that cannot override termination.⁵

Whether the Estates Code resolves the case.

Zazulak (Respondent): Section 254.001(d) provides that a devise to a trust that terminated before the testator's death lapses, section 255.152 sends the failed share to the remaining residuary takers and, if none exist, by intestacy, and section 255.153 protects gifts to certain individuals, not entities such as trusts.⁶

The Trustees (Petitioner): The presumption against intestacy applies with special strength where a will has a residuary clause, and Zazulak's Estates Code argument assumes the trusts terminated without considering whether they did, while the Trust Code says nothing about trust continuation, a longstanding practice.⁷

The Trustees argued the Court should clarify when and how far courts may look beyond a will's four corners to carry out the testator's intent and how the presumption against intestacy applies.¹ Zazulak argued the case is not a vehicle for developing trusts-and-estates law and that the Legislature has already answered the question in Estates Code § 254.001(d).²

None noted