Under Texas Education Code § 11.174, an underperforming campus may contract with an operating partner, such as a charter operator, to run the campus as an alternative to the Commissioner's intervention under Chapters 39 and 39A.¹ The Commissioner adopted 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 97.1075, which sets contract requirements for these arrangements;² subparagraph (c)(1)(C), the rule at issue, gives the operating partner final authority to assign district teachers to the campus.³ The Texas State Teachers Association (TSTA), whose members work in public schools, challenged the rule.⁴

TSTA sued the Commissioner for a declaratory judgment that 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 97.1075(c)(1) and (k) are invalid.¹ The 200th District Court of Travis County granted TSTA's summary-judgment motion and declared those provisions invalid, leaving the rest of the rule intact.² The Third Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding subparagraphs (A), (B) and (E) valid and affirming the judgment that subparagraphs (C) and (D) are invalid, Morath v. Tex. State Teachers Ass'n, 717 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. App.⁠—Austin 2025).³ The Commissioner asks the Court to reverse only as to subparagraph (C).⁴ The Supreme Court granted review on June 12, 2026, and set oral argument for October 7, 2026.

Petition for review from the Third Court of Appeals (Austin); granted June 12, 2026. Oral argument: October 7, 2026.

• The Commissioner:¹ whether the court of appeals erred in invalidating the rule, which gives operating partners final authority to assign teachers to a campus, when district teachers lack any statutory right to choose their assigned campus.
• TSTA:² whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the Commissioner exceeded his statutory authority in enacting the "Staffing Authorities" rule.

An agency rule is presumed valid. A challenger shows invalidity by proving that the rule contravenes specific statutory language, runs counter to the statute's general objectives, or imposes additional burdens, conditions or restrictions in excess of or inconsistent with the statute.¹ The Administrative Procedure Act waives immunity for a declaratory-judgment challenge to a rule that interferes with or impairs a legal right or privilege of the plaintiff, Tex. Gov't Code § 2001.038(a).²

Whether the rule is valid.

Commissioner (Petitioner): the rule concerns only an operating partner's authority over the assignment of a district employee, not authority over district employees generally as the court of appeals read it.¹ No section of the Education Code gives district teachers the right to choose their campus assignment, so the rule impinges on no right.² Subparagraph (C) is narrower than the other subparts of the rule and takes away no teacher right.³ In reply, the Commissioner says the rule is silent on grievances, a teacher may grieve an assignment although the Code guarantees no remedy, and the Code lets teachers opt out of assignment to an operating-partner campus;⁴ the remedy for a rule challenge is limited to a declaration that the rule is null and void.⁵

TSTA (Respondent): the Legislature gave the Commissioner limited authority under § 11.174(m) to adopt rules to administer the section, but no authority to delegate "staffing" duties or to limit local boards' and administrators' duties over their own employees; the rule contravenes statutory language on local control of district employees and attempts to deprive teachers of their statutory and constitutional right to grieve a campus assignment.⁶ The court of appeals correctly held that TSTA met the third invalidity factor, and the rule also contravenes specific statutory language.⁷

The Commissioner argued the rule is valid because it does not stop teachers from exercising any statutory right, and asked the Court to grant review to uphold it.¹ TSTA argued the court of appeals reached the proper outcome and that resolving the case would have no effect on future Texas jurisprudence.²

• Standing. Asked about the union's standing, respondent's counsel said the evidence is one affidavit and the live petition, and no affected member or school district is named. (Oral Argument, 1:24:48; 1:25:02)
• Standing on rebuttal. Petitioner's counsel said any injury may be speculative, and when asked whether to remand for evidence, said a Court finding no standing should simply dismiss. (Oral Argument, 1:49:27; 1:50:36)
• Opt-in as a choice. Asked whether opting into the partnership is a Hobson's choice, petitioner's counsel said the alternative of closure or receivership is the choice the legislature made. (Oral Argument, 1:03:30)
• Facial challenge. Asked whether teachers are actually being pulled from campuses, respondent's counsel brought no example, but said the rule's text gives that authority and leaves districts' hands tied. (Oral Argument, 1:19:27; 1:20:19)
• Severability. Asked what to do if some applications of the rule violate a statute, petitioner's counsel cited Texas Industries on severing administrative rules and noted the APA differs from federal practice. (Oral Argument, 1:06:19; 1:07:22)
• Teacher assignment. Respondent's counsel said section 12.0521 presumes the district, not the operator, does the assigning, so the rule's grant of authority to operators does not fit the statute. (Oral Argument, 1:32:25)
• Reassigning teachers. On rebuttal, petitioner's counsel acknowledged that theoretically a superintendent or operator could move a longtime, award-winning teacher to a campus twenty miles away, responding to Justice Hawkins's concerns. (Oral Argument, 1:44:41)
• Contract disputes. Asked what happens if a district cancels its partnership contract, respondent's counsel answered "I don't know," and said the contract would control. (Oral Argument, 1:34:26)
• Pre-existing contracts. Asked whether both the statute and the rule bar violating pre-existing employment contracts, petitioner's counsel said the rule must be read in context with itself and the statute. (Oral Argument, 1:09:06)

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