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Certified Question

Umphress v. Gary L. Steel

Case No. 25-0288

Key Holdings

Factual History

Brian Keith Umphress is a county judge in Jack County who is a Christian and does not officiate at same-sex wedding ceremonies because of his religious beliefs, while he continues to perform opposite-sex weddings.1 In November 2019 the State Commission on Judicial Conduct issued a public warning to Justice of the Peace Dianne Hensley for refusing to officiate at same-sex weddings and referring such couples to other officiants, and Umphress says that exposed him to potential discipline.2 The Commission (the appellees) later withdrew the Hensley warning after this Court's 2024 decision in Hensley v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct, but the Fifth Circuit noted it had not disclaimed any intention to discipline Umphress.3

Sources
  1. Brief on the Merits (Appellant in case), PDF p. 15 ↩
  2. Brief on the Merits (Appellant in case), PDF pp. 14-15 ↩
  3. Brief on the Merits (Appellee in case), PDF pp. 16-17 ↩

Procedural History

This is a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Umphress sued the Commissioners in federal district court claiming the First Amendment protects his right to officiate only at opposite-sex weddings; the district court dismissed for lack of standing and ripeness, and in April 2025 the Fifth Circuit reversed and, instead of abstaining, certified a question of Texas law to this Court.1 The Court solicited briefing from the parties and received amicus briefs, and on October 24, 2025, it adopted a comment to Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.2 It answered the question by per curiam opinion on January 9, 2026.3 The Commission then filed a "Motion for Clarification," which the Court construed as a motion for rehearing and denied on February 20, 2026, with Chief Justice Blacklock concurring in the denial.4

Certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit under article V, Section 3-c of the Texas Constitution and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 58.1; answered per curiam January 9, 2026.5

Sources
  1. Brief on the Merits (Appellant in case), PDF pp. 15, 25; Per Curiam Opinion, PDF p. 1 ↩
  2. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 1-2 ↩
  3. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF p. 2 ↩
  4. Blacklock, C.J., concurring, PDF pp. 1, 3 ↩
  5. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 1-2 ↩

Issues Presented

The certified question is whether Canon 4A(1) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits judges from publicly refusing, for moral or religious reasons, to perform same-sex weddings while continuing to perform opposite-sex weddings.1 Canon 4A(1) requires a judge to conduct extra-judicial activities so they do not "cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge".2

Sources
  1. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF p. 1 ↩
  2. Reply Brief (Appellant in case), PDF p. 8 ↩

Standard(s) of Review

The Court answers a certified question as a question of Texas law under article V, Section 3-c of the Texas Constitution and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 58.1.1 The Commission says the test for whether impartiality may reasonably be questioned is objective, asking how the conduct appears to a reasonable observer, not what the judge subjectively believes.2

Sources
  1. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF p. 1 ↩
  2. Brief on the Merits (Appellee in case), PDF p. 15 ↩

Legal Arguments

Whether refusing to perform same-sex weddings violates Canon 4A(1).

Appellant (Judge Umphress): The law of Texas does not allow the Commission to discipline a judge for refusing to perform same-sex weddings, whether the reason is religious or secular; a judge who does so has not cast reasonable doubt on his impartiality, because disapproving of same-sex marriage does not show animus toward individuals or that he will not apply the law impartially, just as a judge who will not perform marriages of divorcees or first cousins has not shown bias.1 In reply, he argues that same-sex marriage remains illegal under Texas law, that a judge might decline for reasons unrelated to attitudes toward homosexuality, and that disapproval of conduct does not evince bias against a person.2

Appellees (Commission): The question is solely whether a judge violates Canon 4A(1) by publicly refusing, and by pledging not to conduct same-sex ceremonies while welcoming opposite-sex couples; the test is objective, and Umphress and Hensley rely on subjective, self-serving reasons rather than how their pledges appear to a reasonable observer.3 They argue that Umphress's contention that Texas law is unchanged by Obergefell shows contempt for binding decisions, and that his "disapproval" is coupled with a pledge that treats couples differently.4

Sources
  1. Brief on the Merits (Appellant in case), PDF pp. 26-27 ↩
  2. Reply Brief (Appellant in case), PDF p. 8 ↩
  3. Brief on the Merits (Appellee in case), PDF pp. 14-15, 32 ↩
  4. Brief on the Merits (Appellee in case), PDF pp. 30-32 ↩

Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case

The Fifth Circuit certified the question because the Texas-law issue is unresolved and certification was preferable to abstention, and it asked this Court to answer it.1

Sources
  1. Brief on the Merits (Appellant in case), PDF p. 25; Per Curiam Opinion, PDF p. 1 ↩

Amicus Involvement

Summary of Opinion

Holding

The answer to the certified question is no: Canon 4A(1) does not prohibit judges from publicly refusing, for moral or religious reasons, to perform same-sex weddings while continuing to perform opposite-sex weddings.1

Reasoning

The Court's opinion consists of its answer and one reason: in an order issued October 24, 2025, it adopted a comment to Canon 4 clarifying that "[i]t is not a violation of these canons for a judge to publicly refrain from performing a wedding ceremony based upon a sincerely held religious belief," and "[a]ccordingly, the answer to the certified question is no".2 It did not otherwise explain its answer.

Concurrence in the denial of rehearing (Chief Justice Blacklock). The Commission's motion was styled a "Motion for Clarification," which the appellate rules do not authorize, and it lacked a certificate of conference, but the Court construed it as a motion for rehearing and denied it.3 He wrote that the Court understood the question, which it reproduced verbatim, and that its answer, "no," could not be clearer, and that the Commission's view that the explanation is insufficient has nothing to do with the clarity of the answer.4

Disposition

Certified question answered no; the Commission's motion for clarification, treated as a motion for rehearing, was denied on February 20, 2026.5

Vote Breakdown

Per Curiam Opinion

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Busby, Devine, Hawkins, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.

Sources
  1. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 1-2 ↩
  2. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 1-2 ↩
  3. Blacklock, C.J., concurring, PDF p. 1 ↩
  4. Blacklock, C.J., concurring, PDF pp. 2-3 ↩
  5. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF p. 2; Blacklock, C.J., concurring, PDF pp. 1, 3 ↩

The Docket

The following is current as of October 9, 2026.

DateEvent
04/04/2025Record Requested in Case
05/02/2025Brief on the Merits Ordered
06/02/2025Appellant's Brief on the Merits
06/23/2025Appeellees' Brief on the Merits
07/08/2025Reply Brief (Brian Keith Umphress)
01/09/2026Opinion issued
motion for clarification, being treated as motion for rehearing, denied Per Curiam Opinion
02/20/2026Motion for Rehearing - Disposed
02/20/2026Justice(s) concurring in the denial of rehearing
Chief Justice Blacklock filed an opinion concurring in the denial of the motion for rehearing.
Full case docket for 25-0288search.txcourts.gov →