Petitioners owned or leased homes and other property in Kingwood and Humble, in Harris County, when Hurricane Harvey struck in August 2017. They allege the San Jacinto River Authority released water from Lake Conroe at record rates during the storm and that the releases flooded, or made worse the flooding of, their property. They sued for inverse condemnation of real and personal property and of a flowage easement over their land.¹ The River Authority responds that Lake Conroe Dam reduced downstream flooding: inflow to the lake peaked between 106,000 and 129,000 cubic feet per second, the maximum release was 79,141 cfs, and by the time West Fork waters reached the area near Lake Houston, roughly 46 miles downstream, only about 12% of the combined waterways' flow came from Lake Conroe.²

The claims have a long history. In an earlier appeal, San Jacinto River Authority v. Burney, 570 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. App.⁠—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018), the First Court of Appeals held the takings claims adequately pleaded and held that district courts had jurisdiction over the statutory claims but that the constitutional claims belonged in the civil courts at law; this Court affirmed in San Jacinto River Authority v. Medina, 627 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2021). The cases were consolidated in Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 1 (Judge Audrie Lawton-Evans), which denied the River Authority's amended plea to the jurisdiction. Five other cases presenting the same issues are abated pending this appeal. The First Court of Appeals (Goodman, Landau and Hightower, JJ.) reversed and rendered judgment dismissing petitioners' claims, 2024 WL 4885853 (Tex. App.⁠—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 26, 2024), and denied rehearing and en banc rehearing.¹ Petitioners filed their petition on June 27, 2025. The Court requested briefs on the merits, and the parties have filed the petitioners' brief (February 19, 2026), the River Authority's response brief (May 18, 2026) and petitioners' reply (July 2, 2026) (Docket).

Petition for review from the First Court of Appeals, which reversed an order denying a governmental entity's amended plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed constitutional inverse-condemnation (takings) claims for want of evidence of causation. The Court requested and received merits briefing but denied the petition on October 2, 2026 (Justice Devine not participating).

1. Whether the court of appeals applied the correct causation standard for constitutional takings claims alleging the government flooded or exacerbated flooding of private property. 2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding petitioners failed to raise a material fact issue on causation. 3. Whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's order denying the River Authority's plea to the jurisdiction. 4. If the Court does not reverse on causation and remand other issues, whether it should remand in the interest of justice based on the new causation standard.¹ The River Authority adds that petitioners' claims independently fail for lack of foreseeability and intent, and that the court of appeals did not establish a new causation standard.²

Petitioners (Vicente Medina, et al.): The court of appeals imported a "substantial factor" requirement from negligence law into constitutional takings law, but no Texas case uses it in that context, Tarrant Regional Water District v. Gragg did not apply it, and the federal Addicks and Barker decisions found takings on similar reasoning. The test is especially improper for the flowage-easement claim, and the authority cannot escape liability because the flooding occurred during a 500-year storm. Under any standard, their expert Bedient addressed each petitioner's property, the authority's use of its 2010 gate-operating procedures is evidence of causation, the "no-dam" analysis is valid evidence rather than guesswork, and a comparison to the 1994 storm shows changed flooding characteristics. They also argue the court of appeals accepted a causation argument the authority first made on appeal.¹

Respondent (San Jacinto River Authority): Proximate cause is an essential element of a takings claim, and its components are but-for causation and substantial-factor causation, as this Court recently said in Werner Enterprises, Inc. v. Blake and Tenaris Bay City Inc. v. Ellisor. Petitioners' "one molecule" theory was rejected in Gragg and Tenaris and would dilute the intent requirement, since mere negligence that contributes to property damage is not a taking. The authority argues the dam reduced Harvey flooding, petitioners' expert did not opine that its actions were a but-for cause of any petitioner's damage, did not trace downstream flows, and relied on a "no-dam" scenario that is guesswork. It argues the damage to each property was not foreseeable and the authority did not intend it, its actions were necessary to forestall a greater catastrophe, and landowners may allow naturally occurring floodwaters to flow onto neighbors. At the petition stage it also argued that three other courts of appeals reached the same conclusion about its Harvey operations, so review was unnecessary.²

Petitioners say the court of appeals created a new "substantial factor" causation test the Court has never adopted for takings claims, misapplied the Court's takings precedents, and would unsettle Texas flood-takings law. They add that the issue affects hundreds of plaintiffs in this case, hundreds in other pending Harvey cases, and potentially many Texans in the future.¹

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