Demaree Reed, a switchman for Rail Link, Inc., fell from a moving railcar and had his leg amputated, and he sued Rail Link for negligence and gross negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), alleging inadequate safety policies, training, and workplace safety.¹ Rail Link says it is an in-plant switching company that moves railcars on private property under private contracts, never held itself out as a common carrier, and so is not a "common carrier by railroad" subject to FELA.²

Rail Link moved for summary judgment on the ground that FELA does not apply to it; the trial court denied the motion but on reconsideration referred the question of Rail Link's common-carrier status to the Surface Transportation Board and ordered Rail Link to petition the Board.¹ Rail Link's petition asked instead whether it is a common carrier under a different statute, the ICC Termination Act of 1995, which is not at issue in Reed's suit, and the Board accepted the petition and opened a declaratory-order proceeding that it stayed at Reed's request.² The vehicle in this Court is an original proceeding for writ of mandamus, brought after a divided First Court of Appeals (Houston) denied relief; the dissenting justice said the Board is a rate-setting body that cannot decide common-carrier status for tort liability under FELA.³ The Court heard argument on February 12, 2026, and decided the case on June 19, 2026.⁴

Original proceeding for writ of mandamus after the First Court of Appeals (Houston) denied relief; argued February 12, 2026, and decided June 19, 2026.⁵

Reed presents two issues:¹ 1. Whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion in referring a garden-variety legal issue to the Board under the primary-jurisdiction doctrine, because (A) the doctrine should be abrogated after Loper Bright, (B) at minimum it should be narrowed so that it does not apply here, or (C) even as it stands, neither of its requirements is satisfied. 2. Whether Reed lacks an adequate remedy by appeal because the order sends the case to the wrong authority, has indefinitely abated the case, and raises an important but elusive question of first impression.

Mandamus relief requires a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate appellate remedy, and an error of law is an abuse of discretion.¹ Whether the primary-jurisdiction doctrine applies is reviewed de novo.²

Whether the primary-jurisdiction doctrine survives Loper Bright.

Reed (Relator): The doctrine rests on agency subject-matter expertise and the benefits of uniform interpretation, the two grounds Loper Bright rejected as bases for deferring to agencies, so the Court should abrogate it or at least narrow it by directing courts to scrutinize an agency's authorizing statutes, defer only to factual findings, and discount the uniformity benefit of legal conclusions.¹ In reply, Reed adds that Rail Link cannot separate Chevron from the doctrine because the doctrine's foundations crumble under Loper Bright.²

Rail Link (Real Party in Interest): Loper Bright does not abrogate or narrow primary jurisdiction under Texas law, because it did not foreclose reliance on agency expertise as a persuasive input in a court's own inquiry.³

Whether this referral was proper.

Reed (Relator): The Board, a rate-setting body, has no concurrent jurisdiction over common-carrier status for tort liability, and in any event whether Rail Link is a common carrier under FELA is a garden-variety legal question that is not technically complex and offers no uniformity benefit.⁴

Rail Link (Real Party in Interest): The trial court properly applied the doctrine so the Board could make an initial determination whether Rail Link is a common carrier or a private contract operator, and the Board accepted the referral and found the question within its jurisdiction.⁵

Whether Reed lacks an adequate remedy by appeal.

Reed (Relator): The referral sends the case to the wrong adjudicator, indefinitely abates it, and raises an important issue of first impression that would elude appeal.⁶

Rail Link (Real Party in Interest): Mandamus issues only to correct a clear abuse of discretion where no other adequate remedy at law exists.⁷

Reed argued that the issue is of critical importance to Texans and presents a question of first impression, because no Texas court had ever referred a question to a federal agency in this way.¹

• Premise of referral. Asked about referral if more efficient or consistent, relator's counsel said that premise conflicts with Loper Bright; a Justice asked what Loper Bright has to do with this case. (Oral Argument, 0:02:24; 0:03:43)
• Non-binding. Asked if the Board could bind the trial court, real party's counsel said no; all agree a trial court may ask the Board, but its view is not binding. (Oral Argument, 0:38:06)
• Board's only authority. On rebuttal, relator's counsel said it is now conceded that the only authority the Board has here is to determine its own jurisdiction, with no power to take official action. (Oral Argument, 0:45:02)
• Express authority. Asked whether the legislature must speak expressly, relator's counsel said it must give the agency power to grant relief or at least to make findings essential to relief. (Oral Argument, 0:07:40)
• Fact findings. Asked whether the issue is within the Board's expertise, real party's counsel said it seeks fact findings, not judicial determinations, and doubted that many facts are disputed. (Oral Argument, 0:35:40; 0:36:40)
• Federal agency. Asked if it matters that this is a FELA case, relator's counsel said he knew of no case where the Court authorized primary-jurisdiction referral to a federal agency. (Oral Argument, 0:05:51)
• Rail carrier status. Relator's counsel said the Board could decide only whether an entity is a rail carrier for ICCTA purposes, not for FELA or any official action. (Oral Argument, 0:13:32)
• Diverging answers. Asked about conflicting federal and state answers, relator's counsel said common-carrier cases are fact-bound, as the other side acknowledged. (Oral Argument, 0:42:57; 0:43:59)
• Board proceeding. Relator's counsel said the Board proceeding is stayed, after counsel moved for a stay while awaiting judicial determination and mandamus. (Oral Argument, 0:16:08)

None

Holding

A trial court abuses its discretion by referring a question to an administrative agency under the primary-jurisdiction doctrine unless the legislative body has clearly granted the agency jurisdiction over that specific question, and because no statute clearly empowered the Board to decide whether Rail Link is a common carrier under FELA, the referral was a clear abuse of discretion for which Reed lacks an adequate appellate remedy.¹

Reasoning

Agencies act only on a clear grant of power. Agencies are creatures of statute, the same is true of federal agencies, and Texas presumes that district courts, not agencies, resolve disputes unless the law clearly gives the agency jurisdiction.² The primary-jurisdiction doctrine presumes the agency has concurrent adjudicative authority, so absent a clear grant the doctrine "simply does not come into play" and a court may not refer the question.³ The Court did not revisit the doctrine's contours after Loper Bright, because it found no basis for the referral under the doctrine as it stands.⁴

The Board's statutes do not clearly cover this question. Congress gave the Board exclusive jurisdiction over rail transportation matters such as rates, but its authority to decide who is a "common carrier" cannot be inferred merely because the term appears in a statute it administers.⁵ The Board's enabling statute describes the disputes it may decide, and none is a FELA liability question.⁶ Prior referrals and Board determinations Rail Link cited involved disputes the Board was expressly authorized to resolve, and the Board's view of common-carrier status under its own statute is at most a persuasive indicator in a FELA case.⁷ FELA itself grants the Board no power, and Congress knew how to confer such power when it wanted to.⁸ Nor do the Administrative Procedure Act's declaratory-order provisions or the Board's general statutory powers supply the missing authority.⁹

No adequate remedy by appeal. The risk of wasting economic and judicial resources and the potential harm to the separation of powers if the referral order stands lead the Court to conclude Reed has no adequate appellate remedy.¹⁰

Concurrences. Justice Young, joined by Justice Hawkins, wrote that the doctrine's reach has expanded considerably since its narrow origins and may now impede the judiciary, though today's case does not require deciding its fate.¹¹ Justice Sullivan, joined by Justices Busby and Hawkins, wrote that even if Congress had empowered the Board, he would not refer this case, because the Court has never used the doctrine to refer a case to a federal agency.¹²

Disposition

Mandamus conditionally granted, and the trial court is directed to vacate its referral order.¹³

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Huddle

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Busby, Devine, Hawkins, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.

Concurrence by Justice Young

Joined by Hawkins, J.

Concurrence by Justice Sullivan

Joined by Busby and Hawkins, JJ.