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Petition For Review

Bryant Law Firm v. Walker

Case No. 25-0131

Key Holdings

Factual History

In July 2017 Robert Walker hired attorney Deborah Bryant of the Bryant Law Firm to end his child-support obligations, and after more than a year of bills and assurances he discovered that her pleadings had been filed in an earlier suit the court had dismissed, fired her and demanded a "refund of all [his] monies," saying he was out over $3,000 not counting his child-support payments.1 Bryant sent a release agreement and then a $3,300 check whose memo line stated that cashing it "represents a full & final settlement and release of all claims," and Walker crossed out that language, deposited the check and never signed the release.2 He says he struck the language to preserve his right to sue for additional money she owed him.3

Sources
  1. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF p. 2 ↩
  2. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF p. 2 ↩
  3. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF p. 7 ↩

Procedural History

Walker sued Bryant for deceptive trade practices, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, seeking child support paid during her representation and exemplary damages, Bryant pleaded accord and satisfaction and release, the trial court directed a verdict against her affirmative defenses and the jury awarded Walker $6,600 and $50,000 in exemplary damages while rejecting her counterclaims.1 A divided Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence did not conclusively establish a bona fide dispute, that the check's release of "all claims" exceeded the UCC's "the claim," and that Walker's strike-through showed no mutual assent.2 The Supreme Court granted review and on May 8, 2026, without oral argument, reversed in part and rendered judgment.3

Petition for review from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals (Houston); disposed of without oral argument under Tex. R. App. P. 59.1 in a per curiam opinion issued May 8, 2026.4

Sources
  1. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF p. 3 ↩
  2. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 3-4 ↩
  3. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 10 ↩
  4. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 10 ↩

Issues Presented

  • Bryant:1 whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict against her accord-and-satisfaction defense and her other affirmative defenses, whether the majority below affirmed without explanation, whether she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and whether the majority disregarded the rule that a creditor who accepts payment tendered on the condition that it is in full satisfaction is bound even if he strikes the condition.
  • Walker:2 whether the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict on Bryant's affirmative defenses and in refusing jury instructions on them.
Sources
  1. Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 14 ↩
  2. Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF p. 11 ↩

Standard(s) of Review

A defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the evidence conclusively establishes a defense, reviewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, so Bryant had to show the evidence conclusively proves accord and satisfaction and that no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.1

Sources
  1. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF p. 4 ↩

Legal Arguments

Whether accord and satisfaction was established.

Deborah Bryant (Petitioner): Walker's negotiation of a check bearing a conspicuous notation that it was tendered in full and final settlement of all his claims formed a contract that discharged them, under more than a century of common law and Article 3 of the Business and Commerce Code, or alternatively a release or novation, and the court of appeals summarily affirmed the directed verdicts without explanation.1

Robert Walker (Respondent): The UCC is inapplicable, and the trial court properly directed a verdict on Bryant's UCC accord-and-satisfaction defense.2

Sources
  1. Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 26 ↩
  2. Brief on the Merits (Respondent), PDF p. 17 ↩

Stated Reasons the Court Should Take the Case

Bryant argued that the court of appeals disregarded the longstanding common-law and UCC rule that a claimant who accepts payment tendered on the condition that it is full satisfaction is bound by that condition even if he strikes it.1

Sources
  1. Brief on the Merits (Petitioner), PDF p. 14 ↩

Amicus Involvement

None noted

Summary of Opinion

Holding

The evidence conclusively establishes the statutory and common-law accord-and-satisfaction defense: Bryant tendered a conditional payment in good faith to settle a bona fide dispute, the check bore a conspicuous statement of release, and Walker accepted and deposited it with knowledge of the condition, so striking the language did not avoid the discharge.1

Reasoning

Accord and satisfaction covers contract and tort claims and requires a dispute and an unmistakable communication that tender of the reduced sum is conditioned on satisfying the obligation, and Business and Commerce Code section 3.311 adds a statutory defense for negotiable instruments.2 Bryant tendered the check in good faith conditioned on a release of claims "arising out of the legal representation," the singular "claim" does not confine the defense to one claim, and a bona fide dispute existed as a matter of law because Walker claimed her failure to terminate his child support caused him to pay more than a fee refund.3 The memo line was a conspicuous statement of release, Walker admitted he read it and understood that cashing the check would release Bryant, and for over a century mutual assent has been satisfied when a party accepts and negotiates an instrument with knowledge that it is offered as full payment, so his intentional strike-through did not relieve him of the consequence.4 The Court declined to render judgment on Bryant's counterclaims because she did not show she challenged the jury's rejection of them in the trial court.5

Disposition

Petition granted, court of appeals' judgment reversed in part, and judgment rendered that the parties take nothing on their respective claims, with the remainder of the court of appeals' judgment affirmed.6

Vote Breakdown

Per Curiam Opinion

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Busby, Devine, Hawkins, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.

Sources
  1. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 1, 6-9 ↩
  2. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 4-5 ↩
  3. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 6-8 ↩
  4. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 8-9 ↩
  5. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 9-10 ↩
  6. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF pp. 9-10 ↩

Standard of Review

Judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.1

Sources
  1. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF p. 4 ↩

Vote Breakdown, Authorship, and Any Concurrence/Dissent

Per curiam opinion.1

Sources
  1. Per Curiam Opinion, PDF p. 1 ↩

The Docket

The following is current as of October 9, 2026.

DateEvent
04/16/2025Petition for Review (Petitioner)
08/14/2025Response to Petition (Respondent)
09/26/2025Brief on the Merits Ordered
10/26/2025Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Petitioner)
12/18/2025Respondent's Brief on the Merits
01/12/2026Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Petitioner)
05/08/2026Opinion issued
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court affirms in part and reverses in part the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment. Per Curiam Opinion
06/18/2026Mandate issued
Full case docket for 25-0131search.txcourts.gov →