Olga Tamez de Suday filed for divorce from Jesus Lozano Suday in Val Verde County in 2017, the couple finalized a divorce in Mexico, and in August 2019 the Texas trial court signed a decree recognizing the Mexican divorce and dividing their Texas property.¹ Olga died in October 2019, her daughter Maryvel became independent executor of her estate, and, represented by counsel, litigated extensively until the court of appeals affirmed the decree in 2020.² Between 2021 and 2023 Maryvel filed multiple motions in the divorce case, which the trial court denied in a June 27, 2023 "final order" that her counsel appealed.³ Mr. Suday says the Mexican decree divided no property, which is why the parties signed a Rule 11 agreement dividing their U.S. assets the same day as a June 2019 hearing; Maryvel says the Mexican court divided the Texas property and that Mr. Suday admitted so in a memorandum.⁴

This is a petition for review of a court of appeals' dismissal. While the appeal was pending in the Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio), Maryvel's counsel withdrew at her request; the court notified her that she could not represent her mother's estate pro se and extended her briefing deadline to hire counsel, and when she did not, it dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution on September 25, 2024.¹ Maryvel and the estate petitioned for review.² The Court granted the petition and, without oral argument, reversed and remanded per curiam on June 27, 2025.³

Petition for review from the Fourth Court of Appeals after dismissal of an appeal for want of prosecution; granted and decided per curiam without oral argument under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 59.1 and 60.2(d) on June 27, 2025.⁴

Petitioners present two issues: whether an executor who is the estate's sole beneficiary may represent the estate pro se, and whether a memorandum to the trial court recognizing a Mexican court's property division is a judicial admission that deprived the trial court of jurisdiction.¹ The Court addressed only the first.²

The Court construed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 7, which provides that a party may appear and prosecute or defend his rights "either in person or by an attorney of the court," and the courts of appeals' rule that an executor may not represent an estate pro se.¹

Whether an executor and sole beneficiary may represent the estate pro se.

Petitioners (Maryvel and the estate): The courts of appeals' bright-line rule that an executor may not appear pro se traces to a Waco decision, Steele v. McDonald, that relied on conflicting out-of-state cases and on precedent not analogous here, and it ignores this Court's decision in Ex parte Shaffer, which indirectly supports pro se representation; the Court's guidance is needed.¹

Respondent (Mr. Suday): The Fourth Court of Appeals followed the express language of Rule 7 and the uncontradicted authority of every intermediate appellate court to address the question, and it told Maryvel before her brief was due that she could not proceed pro se.²

Whether the appeal would fail anyway, and the second issue.

Respondent (Mr. Suday): Even with pro se representation the result would be the same, because her motion to vacate the divorce decree was time-barred and the decree was an agreed consent judgment attackable only by bill of review, and the trial court had jurisdiction to render it.³ On the second issue, he says the petition misstates the record and that the Mexican decree divided no property.⁴

Petitioners (Maryvel and the estate), in reply: Procedural bars do not defeat a jurisdictional challenge, because an exception exists when the rendering court had no jurisdictional power.⁵

Petitioners argued that courts of appeals are applying an unworkable bright-line rule built on a single Waco decision and that this Court's guidance would clear up confusion about when an executor may proceed pro se.¹ Mr. Suday argued the decision below presents nothing new or inconsistent with Texas precedent.²

None

Holding

An executor may represent the estate pro se when she is also the sole beneficiary of the estate; the holding is narrow, and the Court reserved whether an executor of a single-beneficiary estate that has creditors may do so, and the general rule for estates with other beneficiaries.¹

Reasoning

The Court had held that an executor may proceed pro se in litigation involving his own interests, but had not squarely addressed estates' interests, and several courts of appeals follow Steele v. McDonald and an absolute rule that an attorney is required.² The rule rests on the executor's representative capacity and on Rule 7, and the Court assumed without deciding that it applies to estates, but its rationale of protecting non-party beneficiaries does not fit a sole beneficiary, who is harmed rather than protected when her claims are dismissed without regard to the merits.³ Such an executor is "for all intents and purposes" representing only her own rights under Rule 7, as the Fifth Circuit and other federal courts have held.⁴

When only the executor's own interests are affected, she alone bears the consequences; denying her the right to proceed pro se is paternalistic and harmful, especially if she cannot hire counsel or doing so would drain the estate, and allowing it avoids serious due process and access-to-courts questions under the federal and Texas Constitutions.⁵ The Court's decision in Ex parte Shaffer, which let an executor sued for breach of fiduciary duty proceed without a lawyer, is consistent with this rule.⁶ There are no creditors here, so the Court expressly reserved whether a sole-beneficiary executor may proceed pro se when the estate has creditors.⁷ It expressed no view on the merits of the appeal or of the second issue.⁸

Disposition

Petition granted, the court of appeals' judgment reversed, and the case remanded to that court to address the remaining issues on the merits.⁹

Vote Breakdown

Per Curiam Opinion

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Boyd, Busby, Devine, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.