The Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) hired Chris Callaway as a Trooper in 2004, promoted him to Special Agent in 2010 and made him a Texas Ranger in 2012, and he took medical leave in 2017 and late 2019 for treatment of alcoholism and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).¹ On January 15, 2020, still on leave, he rushed to his daughter's high school after counselors said she might be detained for a mental-health crisis, taking his DPS badge, handcuffs and personal sidearm, loudly confronted a counselor, ordered school-district police officers out of the office, displayed his badge and threatened to put them "in jail for interfering with [his] rights as a parent".² A counselor said she "felt trapped and feared for [her] safety," and Callaway told DPS investigators that his PTSD sometimes "takes over" and ends with "less than optimal outcomes".³ DPS Director Steve McCraw decided to fire him, explaining that an officer must control his emotions and cannot use his badge to interfere with another agency's officers.⁴

Callaway sued DPS under Chapter 21 of the Labor Code for disability discrimination and retaliation, and the trial court denied DPS's plea to the jurisdiction and its traditional and no-evidence summary-judgment motions.¹ The Thirteenth Court of Appeals (Corpus Christi-Edinburg) affirmed as to the claim that his termination was motivated by discrimination based on PTSD and rendered judgment dismissing the remaining claims for want of jurisdiction.² The Supreme Court heard argument on January 15, 2026.³ On April 10, 2026 it reversed in part and rendered judgment for DPS.⁴

Petition for review from the Thirteenth Court of Appeals (Corpus Christi-Edinburg) on an interlocutory appeal of the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction; argued January 15, 2026; opinion by Justice Sullivan issued April 10, 2026.⁵

• DPS:¹ whether an employer can fire an employee who commits egregious misconduct and threatens others because of his disability without violating the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, whether the court of appeals erred in finding a jury could link the termination to his PTSD, and whether the "cat's paw" theory applies where the final decisionmaker independently reviewed the matter.
• Callaway:² whether the court of appeals correctly affirmed the denial of DPS's plea and motions, whether DPS's new theory of "disability-caused misconduct" applies, whether comparators create a triable issue, and whether the cat's paw theory was correctly applied.

The Court reviewed the denial of DPS's plea to the jurisdiction and summary-judgment motions on the Chapter 21 claim as a question of law about the statute's text.¹

Whether DPS could lawfully fire Callaway because of his PTSD.

DPS (Petitioner): Employees whose handicaps impair their ability to perform their jobs cannot sue for disability discrimination under Labor Code section 21.105, Callaway admitted his PTSD sometimes takes over his conduct, and his misconduct at the school showed he could not handle stressful situations as a DPS officer, so DPS acted within its rights.¹

Robert Callaway (Respondent): He presented evidence of an actual or perceived disability and a triable issue that his termination violated Chapter 21, and DPS's theory of disability-caused misconduct is new.²

Whether the cat's paw theory applies.

DPS (Petitioner): Chief Ruocco's alleged animus cannot be imputed to Director McCraw, who independently reviewed the matter and gave his own reasons, so the cat's paw theory does not apply.³

DPS argued that the court of appeals erred in affirming the denial of its plea on the PTSD-based discrimination claim, and Callaway responded that the Court lacks jurisdiction because the issue is not novel and was correctly decided.¹

• Medical evidence. Callaway's counsel said there is zero evidence from a medical professional that he could not do his job; DPS relied on lay opinion about his condition. (Oral Argument, 0:19:07; 0:21:09)
• Honest belief. Asked if DPS supervisors were honest about their reasons, Callaway's counsel said he did not believe they were dishonest about what he might do, but they were wrong. (Oral Argument, 0:30:19; 0:31:32)
• Which framework. Asked whether DPS wants Donald extended to disability discrimination, DPS's counsel said the framework matters little, because the plain text of section 21.105 can resolve the case. (Oral Argument, 0:07:40)
• Fitness for duty. On rebuttal, DPS's counsel said deciding whether an officer is fit for duty is the supervisors' job, not a court's, and asked for deference in the law-enforcement setting. (Oral Argument, 0:40:52; 0:44:08)
• Back surgery comparison. Callaway's counsel said assuming a mental-health condition disables an officer without evaluation is like assuming someone with a lifting restriction cannot lift fifty pounds without a doctor's evaluation. (Oral Argument, 0:36:33)
• Earlier incidents. Asked whether there were other incidents before this one, DPS's counsel said the record has some evidence, and the Court can proceed assuming this incident was the reason for termination. (Oral Argument, 0:01:47; 0:03:02)

None noted

Holding

Callaway's disability-discrimination claim fails as a matter of law because under Labor Code section 21.105, the prohibition in section 21.051 applies only to discrimination because of a condition that does not impair the ability to reasonably perform a job, and his PTSD, which caused the misconduct at the school, impairs his ability to reasonably perform a DPS job under an objective standard.¹

Reasoning

Section 21.105's import is that if a claimant's disability in fact limits his ability to perform the job, Chapter 21 does not prevent the employer from terminating him because of that impairment, and the question whether a person can "reasonably perform a job" is an objective one that does not allow pretextual or idiosyncratic standards.² DPS cannot give someone a sidearm and a badge, send him to handle stressful interactions and have him snap under pressure, and by throwing his weight around with the school police Callaway created a grave risk of violence between officers, so the Court would be hard pressed to contradict the Director's determination of impairment.³ Callaway devoted less than a page of his merits brief to the issue, never cited section 21.105 and relied only on being a licensed peace officer, so his claim should have been dismissed with the others.⁴

Disposition

Court of appeals' judgment reversed in part and judgment rendered dismissing Callaway's claims against DPS.⁵

Statutory interpretation of Chapter 21, with the Court assuming for the argument that PTSD, though not alcoholism, qualifies as a disability.¹

Justice Sullivan delivered the opinion of the Court, with no separate writings.¹