Case No. 24-0916
On April 23, 2020, Jessica Zuniga's vehicle collided with a City of Houston Fire Department vehicle driven by Kevan Desai at the intersection of Bagby and Gray in Houston, and Zuniga was injured.1 The City's Fire Department accident review called it a "non-preventable accident," the driver's reports say he had the right of way and a green light, and the police crash report says the officer was "[u]nable to determine fault due to conflicting statements".2 Zuniga told the officer that Desai initially said he did not run the red light but later said he may have.3 The parties agree Zuniga gave no formal written notice of her claim to the City.4
This is a petition for review in an interlocutory appeal. Zuniga sued the City for the driver's negligence, and the City moved for summary judgment and filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing she did not give timely notice under the Tort Claims Act; the trial court denied them and the First Court of Appeals affirmed on July 2, 2024, holding that the City had actual notice under Section 101.101(c).1 The City petitioned for review, and the Court denied the petition on June 13, 2025, with Justice Young, joined by Justices Lehrmann, Boyd, and Sullivan, concurring in the denial.2
Petition for review from the First Court of Appeals in an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction; denied June 13, 2025, with a concurring opinion by Justice Young, joined by Justices Lehrmann, Boyd, and Sullivan.3
The City presents two issues:1 1. Whether speculative hearsay from the plaintiff, rejected by the investigating officer in concluding fault in a collision, is sufficient to create a fact issue on the governmental unit's subjective awareness of its fault and excuse statutory notice of claim. 2. Whether the driver's uncertainty and speculation constitute actual notice that overcomes governmental immunity, where the investigators' reports show no subjective awareness of fault (briefing reserved).
Statutory waivers of immunity are strictly construed, and any ambiguity is resolved in favor of retaining immunity.1 Notice under the Act is a prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction.2
Whether the City had actual notice of Zuniga's claim.
Petitioner (City of Houston): The case turns on whether Zuniga's report of an off-the-record statement by the City's driver was enough to show the City's subjective awareness of fault; the driver's reports, the Fire Department review, and the police report show no awareness of fault, so there was no actual notice and the claim is barred by immunity.1 Letting a plaintiff supply actual notice by asserting that an employee made a statement conflicting with the investigations would undermine immunity in a way the Act does not envision.2
Respondent (Zuniga): No response is on file in the filings reviewed; the court of appeals held, over the City's contrary argument, that the City had actual notice under Section 101.101(c) even though no formal notice was given.3
Justice Young (concurring): The City likely had actual notice under any plausible standard, because Zuniga's allegation that the driver said he may have run the red light put the City on notice that she was likely to claim the employee was at fault.4
The City argued that the court of appeals' decision creates a court-made expansion of the Act's waiver of immunity, allowing subject-matter jurisdiction on an off-the-record statement.1
None
The Court gave no reasons for denying review; the only writing is Justice Young's concurrence, which is the view of four Justices, not a holding.1 He concurred because the City likely had actual notice under any plausible standard, but used the case to criticize Cathey v. Booth (1995), which held that actual notice requires knowledge of the injury, the governmental unit's alleged fault, and the identity of the parties.2 That holding is in tension with Section 101.101(c), which requires only actual notice "that death has occurred, that the claimant has received some injury, or that the claimant's property has been damaged" as an alternative to formal notice under subsection (a).3
He wrote that the Court's later decisions in Simons, Tenorio, and Worsdale changed the rule repeatedly and drew dissents, and that judges and scholars have criticized Cathey.4 Because the notice requirement is jurisdictional, clear rules matter especially, and stare decisis does not protect a precedent that continues to generate confusion, under Mitschke v. Borromeo.5 In an appropriate case he would reconsider the doctrine "perhaps starting from scratch—which is to say, the text of the statute," and he wrote that the petition "is a symptom of Cathey's disease".6 He approached the question only as a judge reading a statute and said the Legislature remains free to choose a more demanding notice rule.7
Petition for review denied.8
Justice Young concurred in the denial, joined by Justices Lehrmann, Boyd, and Sullivan.9
The following is current as of October 9, 2026.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 11/08/2024 | Petition for Review (The City of Houston) |
| 06/13/2025 | Justice(s) concurring in the denial of petition Justice Young filed an opinion concurring in the denial of the petition for review. |
| — | opinion concurring in the denial of the petition for review |
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