K.G., a seven-year-old, was seriously injured on March 19, 2021 while using trampolines at the Beaumont, Texas facility of Beaumont Adventure Park Urban Air, LLC ("UAB"). Her mother, Chiniqua Geter, signed a Release and Indemnification Agreement on the day of the visit as the "Adult Participant"; K.G. was the "Child Participant" and never signed. The Release contains an arbitration clause covering "[a]ny dispute or claim arising out of or relating to" the agreement, the premises, activities, or personal injury, including disputes over "the scope, arbitrability, or validity" of the arbitration agreement, and a release in which the adult participant agrees not to sue UAB, UATP Management, LLC, UATP IP, LLC, UA Attractions, LLC, and their agents and employees. The individual owners, Joseph Goodly and Rachelle Nurse-Goodly, are not named in the arbitration clause.¹

Geter sued as next friend of K.G. in the 268th District Court of Fort Bend County for negligence, gross negligence, products liability and breach of warranty, naming UAB, the three UATP entities, and the Goodlys. All defendants moved to compel arbitration; the trial court denied the motion without findings, and no reporter's record of the hearing exists.¹ On interlocutory appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals (Spain, J., joined by Christopher, C.J., and Poissant, J.) reversed as to UAB, holding K.G. accepted direct benefits of the Release by entering the park, and ordered those claims arbitrated, but affirmed the denial as to the nonsignatory petitioners because Geter's tort claims arise from general legal obligations, not the Release. Beaumont Adventure Park Urban Air, LLC v. Geter, No. 14-23-00850-CV, 2024 WL 4163646 (Tex. App.⁠—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 12, 2024, pet. filed).² UAB filed no petition for review. The nonsignatory defendants petitioned for review on October 28, 2024, and the Court requested briefs on the merits on September 26, 2025. Geter's late cross-petition seeking to undo the ruling as to UAB was struck on March 20, 2026 under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53.7(c).

Petition for review from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals following an interlocutory appeal of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(17)). The Court has requested briefs on the merits but has not yet granted review.

The petition presents one issue: whether the court of appeals erred by recognizing the existence of the arbitration agreement but declining to enforce its delegation clause, which assigns disputes over scope, arbitrability and validity to the arbitrator.¹ The petitioners' merits brief frames the same question as whether the court of appeals should have sent the entire dispute against all defendants to arbitration, because (a) the delegation clause reserves to the arbitrator whether claims against other "Protected Parties" are covered, (b) agency and estoppel principles require arbitration of the intertwined claims, and (c) the nonsignatories are third-party beneficiaries.² Geter's merits brief adds issues about the sufficiency of the mandamus record, disaffirmance of the contract by a minor, direct-benefits estoppel under Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc. v. Ha, the delegation clause, and whether the nonsignatories can compel arbitration under any theory.³

Petitioners (UATP Management, LLC; UATP IP, LLC; UA Attractions, LLC; Joseph Goodly; and Rachelle Nurse-Goodly): Once the court of appeals found a valid arbitration agreement as to UAB, the only remaining question was the scope or arbitrability of the claims against the nonsignatories, which the delegation clause assigns to the arbitrator, as in Cerna v. Pearland Urban Air, LLC, 714 S.W.3d 585 (Tex. 2025), and TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC. They argue the Release identifies them as "Protected Parties" that Geter agreed not to sue, that In re Kaplan Higher Education Corp. bars a plaintiff from avoiding arbitration by suing the signatory's agents and affiliates, that intertwined-claims estoppel compels the same result because her allegations against all defendants are identical, and that they are third-party beneficiaries entitled to enforce the delegation clause themselves.¹ In reply they contend Geter cannot obtain affirmative relief on the UAB ruling because she filed no timely petition, that her mandamus-record arguments fail, and that her challenges to the Release's validity fail even if reached.²

Respondent (Chiniqua Geter, as next friend of K.G.): The court of appeals lacked a sufficient record to reverse, because the trial court's order recites that it considered evidence and argument, no reporter's record exists, and defendants withdrew the affidavit authenticating the Release, so the court of appeals had to presume the evidence supported the ruling. K.G. is a minor whose contract is voidable at her election, and her lawsuit disaffirmed the Release, which is a challenge to the existence of the contract for the court, not the arbitrator, and which prevents a delegation clause from taking effect. Direct-benefits estoppel under Taylor Morrison v. Ha does not override a minor's disaffirmance of a non-necessary contract, and a trampoline-park admission is not a necessity. Her claims arise from tort law, not the Release, so the nonsignatories cannot compel arbitration through intertwined-claims estoppel or as third-party beneficiaries.³

The petitioners argue the court of appeals resolved arbitrability and scope questions that were reserved to the arbitrator, in conflict with precedent such as TotalEnergies, and that leaving the ruling in place creates conflicting appellate authority on the enforceability of delegation clauses. They also note the release is substantially similar to two other pre-suit injury waivers with arbitration clauses before the Court, Cerna v. Pearland Urban Air, LLC (No. 24-0273) and Bite Entertainment, LLC v. Trevino (No. 24-0372), and say review would let the Court address varied fact patterns without splitting the courts of appeals.¹

• Ben Taylor of Dallas, Texas