Texas law prohibits medical treatments for children given for the purpose of transitioning a child's biological sex or affirming a perception inconsistent with it; the law, SB 14, took effect on September 1, 2023, and charges the Attorney General with enforcing it.¹ PFLAG, Inc. is a national nonprofit whose executive director, Brian Bond, submitted an affidavit in the Loe litigation challenging SB 14 saying families had been asking PFLAG chapters for "alternative avenues to maintain care in Texas" and for providers who would continue to offer care.² Since SB 14's enactment the Attorney General's office has sought to determine whether medical providers are misleading insurers and others by billing treatments outlawed by SB 14 as treatments for other conditions, and the Bond affidavit gave rise to a belief that PFLAG may have relevant documents.³

On February 5, 2024 the Attorney General's office issued a civil investigative demand (CID) to PFLAG under Section 17.61 of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), and PFLAG petitioned the Travis County district court to modify or set it aside under Section 17.61(g) and obtained a temporary restraining order.¹ On March 19 the office offered a revised, narrower CID that disclaims any desire to identify individual PFLAG members, and it counterclaimed to enforce the revised CID under Section 17.62(b), but after a hearing and later proceedings the district court ruled in PFLAG's favor, treating the revised CID as not properly before it.² This Court abated the appeal so the district court could issue a final order, which it did on March 10, 2025, setting aside most of the original CID and permanently enjoining demands beyond what the court had ordered produced.³ The Attorney General appealed directly under Section 17.62(c); the Court noted probable jurisdiction, heard argument on October 7, 2025, and decided the case on March 13, 2026, with Justice Sullivan not participating.⁴

Direct appeal under Section 17.62(c) of the DTPA from the 261st Judicial District Court, Travis County, after a final declaratory judgment and injunction; argued October 7, 2025, and decided March 13, 2026.⁵

The Attorney General presents two issues:¹ whether a petition to modify or set aside a CID under Section 17.61(g), or to enforce one under Section 17.62(b), contemplates a summary proceeding or requires a traditional lawsuit with summary judgment and trial on the merits, and what constitutes "good cause" to set aside or modify a CID. PFLAG frames the issues as whether the district court abused its discretion by following the DTPA's pre-compliance judicial review procedure, by modifying the demands to exclude overly burdensome and intrusive requests to a third party, and by finding good cause to set aside demands that would have violated its and its members' constitutional rights.²

The Court reviewed the district court's order setting aside the CID, which turned on whether the demands were relevant to a DTPA investigation and whether good cause existed to modify or set them aside, applying the civil discovery rules as guidelines.¹

Whether the district court properly set aside the CID.

Attorney General (Appellant): The district court erred in requiring a CID challenge to be adjudicated through summary-judgment briefing and a merits trial that dragged on for over a year, because the DTPA's CID provisions require swift adjudication and minimal procedural burdens; the office believes PFLAG may have documents relevant to an investigation of providers who conceal violations of SB 14 through deceptive billing.¹

PFLAG (Appellee): There is nothing left in the case to adjudicate on the substance of its compliance with the modified CID; the Attorney General's dissatisfaction with the DTPA's statutory dispute mechanism is a complaint for the Legislature, and the permanent injunction does nothing more than ensure the finality of the proceedings on these specific demands.² PFLAG also argued that the demands were unduly burdensome, intruded on its and its members' constitutional rights, and sought nothing relevant to a DTPA investigation.³

The Attorney General sought direct review under Section 17.62(c), which makes a final order entered on a petition to enforce a CID appealable to this Court.¹

• Advisory opinion. Asked if it seeks an advisory opinion, the Attorney General's counsel said no, because the trial court's procedures link to its ruling; he wants an order enforcing the revised demand. (Oral Argument, 0:02:31; 0:03:26)
• Discovery framework. The Attorney General's counsel urged the Court to hold that a petition to set aside or modify a civil investigative demand is a discovery request, handled like any other. (Oral Argument, 0:11:00)
• Conceded no example. Asked for an example of something a demand should reach that civil litigation would not, the Attorney General's counsel could not think of one off the top of his head. (Oral Argument, 0:14:39)
• Initial burden. Asked how the court could judge without seeing documents, respondent's counsel said even under the federal standard the Attorney General has the initial burden. (Oral Argument, 0:23:09; 0:25:51)
• Rules committee. Asked about the proper procedure beyond a protective-order hearing, respondent's counsel said a better path likely exists and the issue could go to the rules committee. (Oral Argument, 0:31:28)
• Time to respond. Asked how long recipients typically get to respond, the Attorney General's counsel did not know the typical time and said the statute provides a bare minimum of 20 days. (Oral Argument, 0:16:09; 0:17:09)

None

Holding

The district court erred in ruling that PFLAG need not comply with the revised CID: it analyzed the wrong version of the CID and failed to credit the Attorney General's reasonable interpretation of the Bond affidavit, and under the DTPA a CID may seek any documentary material that would be discoverable under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure when the office merely believes the recipient may have relevant documents.¹ PFLAG must produce documents responsive to the revised CID as the opinion describes.²

Reasoning

The revised CID controlled. The Attorney General's agreement to narrow the CID should have taken the original out of the picture, as in ordinary discovery disputes, where the court's concern is the parties' continued points of disagreement, not the validity of withdrawn demands.³

Privacy and privilege. PFLAG's privacy concerns were vague given the agreement to allow redactions, and there is no free-standing discovery privilege for private communications, nor do the First Amendment or related state provisions categorically shield them, though courts should take seriously claims that discovery of intimate communications is unduly burdensome or harassing, and the DTPA bars the office from disclosing CID material unless necessary to enforce the Act.⁴

Belief, not proof. The CID statute is triggered by the office's "belief," not demonstration, that a person may possess relevant documents, and a recipient's assurance that its documents will not help the investigation is not a recognized objection, so the district court should not have faulted the office for failing to produce evidence that PFLAG likely had relevant information.⁵ The Bond affidavit's references to "contingency plans" for "alternative avenues to maintain care in Texas" gave the office a reasonable basis to believe PFLAG may have documents relevant to an inquiry into deceptive billing of treatments given in violation of SB 14, and competing reasonable interpretations of the affidavit were enough.⁶

The individual requests. The Court held that the first through fifth requests, which seek documents behind the Bond affidavit, communications about "contingency plans" and "alternative avenues," provider lists and referrals, and communications about the providers named in an exhibit, are properly tailored, but did not require production of the requests about the relationship between PFLAG's Texas chapters and the national organization and its governing documents because the office did not defend them, though it may re-urge them on remand.⁷

Disposition

Judgment reversed and the matter remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion; on remand PFLAG must produce the responsive documents as described, subject to assertions of a recognized privilege supported by a privilege log under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3.⁸

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Chief Justice Blacklock

Joined by Bland, Busby, Devine, Hawkins, Huddle, Lehrmann, and Young, JJ.

Did Not Participate

Sullivan, J.