Nadine Realme joined San Antonio's Turkey Trot 5K to "have fun" while enjoying the City's scenery, and while following the course through a public park she tripped over a metal pole fragment, fell, and broke her arm.¹ She had paid an entry fee, and she says the City therefore owed her the duty owed to an invitee.²

Realme sued the City for negligence and gross negligence, and the City argued that the Recreational Use Statute, Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 75, bars her ordinary-negligence claim because it gave her permission to use its park for "recreation".¹ The trial court denied the City's motion, and the Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio) affirmed, reasoning that the statute requires activities "associated with enjoying [nature or] the outdoors," that an organized footrace is a "celebration of organized human activity," not an escape into nature, and that Realme's evidence defeated the City's showing that she entered to enjoy nature.² The court of appeals declined to reach her gross-negligence claim.³ The vehicle in this Court is a petition for review filed by the City, argued November 5, 2025, and decided March 13, 2026.⁴

Petition for review from the Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio) after the denial of the City's summary-judgment motion; argued November 5, 2025, and decided March 13, 2026.⁵

The City presents whether it retains governmental immunity under the Recreational Use Statute for a runner injured on City property while participating in a 5K.¹ The Court framed the question as whether a holiday-themed community footrace is "recreation" under Section 75.002(f).²

Statutory construction is a question of law, beginning with the statute's text and its plain meaning, with canons of construction used only as aids when the text is fairly capable of multiple meanings.¹

Whether a Turkey Trot is "recreation."

City (Petitioner): The statute does not mention running, but its catch-all provision, any other activity associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors, encompasses running, jogging, and walking, especially in light of like activities in the list and because the 5K was designed around the River Walk and park setting.¹

Realme (Respondent): She was participating in a competitive race for which she paid a fee, and she says the City owed her the duty owed to an invitee.²

The Court granted review to resolve persistent confusion among the lower courts about the proper application of the Recreational Use Statute.¹

• Integral or incidental. Asked about walking to work outdoors, the City's counsel said the test is objective: an activity qualifies if integral to or closely associated with enjoying the outdoors, not merely incidental. (Oral Argument, 0:02:53; 0:03:42)
• Statute's purpose. Asked why not read the statute by its purpose, the respondent's counsel cautioned that the Legislature meant to encourage private landowners to open their land, for example to Boy Scouts. (Oral Argument, 0:20:10; 0:21:25)
• No case law. The respondent's counsel said no jurisdiction in America has a recreational use statute covering walking or running, though turkey trots date to 1896. (Oral Argument, 0:22:22)
• A shift in position. On rebuttal, the City's counsel said the respondent's position at argument contradicts the position taken in its brief. (Oral Argument, 0:39:39)
• "Such as." Asked about the canon that listing some activities excludes others, the City's counsel said no, because the statute's list says "such as." (Oral Argument, 0:10:30)
• Racing professionals. Asked about runners whose livelihood is racing, the City's counsel said it is a fact-specific inquiry and suggested factors such as professional versus amateur, outdoors, and natural features. (Oral Argument, 0:12:27; 0:13:29)
• Artful pleading. Asked whether pleading determines the burden of proof, the respondent's counsel said the danger is still the danger, and the government should not get a windfall. (Oral Argument, 0:34:16)
• Ordinary jogging. Asked whether jogging down a sidewalk is covered, the City's counsel did not agree it is excluded, but said text and policy support including this 5K. (Oral Argument, 0:41:04)

• Texas Association of Counties and Texas Conference of Urban Counties support the City: the Recreational Use Statute offers part of a solution to loneliness and obesity by encouraging landowners to open their land.
• State of Texas supports the City: the statute broadly defines "recreation" through a list and a catch-all.

Holding

A holiday-themed community footrace such as a Turkey Trot is "recreation" under the Recreational Use Statute, so the City is not liable for Realme's ordinary-negligence claim, which fails as a matter of law.¹

Reasoning

Statutory history and precedent. Texas's statute, adopted in 1965 for hunting, fishing, and camping and broadened in 1981 to "recreational purposes," now defines "recreation" by a nonexclusive list of seventeen examples, ending with a catch-all for "any other activity associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors".² The Court's earlier cases, Torres, Williams, Lawson, and Garner, produced inconsistent approaches, and lower courts have struggled with both what counts and how to analyze it.³

Interpretive principles. The Court begins with the text and uses canons such as ejusdem generis only as aids, not rigidly, and the phrase "such as" and the catch-all show the list is nonexhaustive.⁴ A statutory definition must be read in light of the ordinary meaning of the word defined, as in Creative Oil, so courts should not consider "recreation" in isolation from its common usage.⁵ In ordinary meaning, "recreation" is a mode of getting diversion or refreshment, "play" as distinct from "toil," and each listed activity is a diversion or play performed for its own enjoyment.⁶

Application. A community fun run is plainly recreational because people participate for enjoyment, frivolity, and amusement, and this event, with its costumes and family-focused spirit, is playful and bears the hallmarks of recreation; the Court reached that conclusion without shoehorning it into any enumerated activity or the catch-all.⁷ The court of appeals erred by requiring that an activity be fairly characterized as one of the enumerated activities and by asking granular questions about connection to nature, and the Court's approach does not render the statutory examples surplusage.⁸ An activity does not stop being recreational because it involves entry fees, organization, or a schedule.⁹

Gross negligence. Because the statute leaves the City liable only for intentional or grossly negligent injury, Realme can prevail only on gross negligence, which the court of appeals expressly declined to consider, and the Court left it to that court on remand.¹⁰

Disposition

Court of appeals' judgment reversed, judgment rendered for the City on Realme's ordinary-negligence claim, and the case remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.¹¹

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Hawkins

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Busby, Devine, Huddle, Lehrmann, Sullivan, and Young, JJ.