D.V. (Mother) has a history of violent behavior and drug use; after she reportedly assaulted her ex-boyfriend and one of her other children, the Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) took custody of her son E.D. and sued to terminate both Mother's and Father's parental rights.¹ The Department quickly changed its mind about Father, who at trial was its choice for E.D.'s sole managing conservator, but its live pleading still demanded termination as to both parents, a demand no one regarded as the Department's actual position.² At a bench trial before an associate judge held by videoconference, the Department's designated representative, a caseworker, testified that the Department was "seeking to limit and restrict [Mother]'s rights," give permanent managing conservatorship to Father, and limit Mother to parent non-conservator with no visitation, and Mother's counsel confirmed on cross-examination that the Department was "not seeking to terminate".³ The CASA volunteer recommended termination, Mother asked the court not to terminate, the Department gave no opening statement or closing argument, and E.D.'s attorney ad litem said the Department had met its burden as to termination but asked in the alternative for a non-possessory conservatorship for Mother.⁴

This is a petition for review in a parental-termination case. The associate judge terminated Mother's rights immediately after the closing statements, and after the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a de novo hearing, the district court adopted the ruling.¹ The only ground Mother preserved is that the associate judge lacked authority to terminate when the Department abandoned its termination pleading at trial.² The Third Court of Appeals affirmed, 716 S.W.3d 176, reasoning from the totality of circumstances that the representative's statements did not abandon termination.³ The Court heard argument on September 11, 2025, and reversed on October 31, 2025, in an opinion by Justice Young with Justice Hawkins not participating.⁴

Petition for review from the Third Court of Appeals in a parental-termination appeal; argued September 11, 2025, and decided October 31, 2025.⁵

Mother presents a single issue: whether the court of appeals erred in its analysis of whether the Department abandoned its request for termination, including by disregarding the Department's designated representative and misjudging the significance of the statements of Mother's counsel, the CASA volunteer, and the attorney ad litem.¹ The Department frames the issue as whether Mother showed that the court of appeals erred in applying established law to consider whether the Department abandoned its termination pleading.²

Parties may abandon claims by stipulation, and judgment may not be granted on abandoned claims.¹ In interpreting a stipulation, the court of appeals considered the language used and the surrounding circumstances, including the state of the pleadings and the parties' attitudes, and the Court held that approach inadequate for parental-termination cases.²

Whether the Department abandoned termination at trial.

Petitioner (Mother): The court of appeals erred by disregarding the Department's designated representative, who stated the Department's position when the Department's trial counsel articulated none, and by misjudging the legal significance of the statements of her counsel, the CASA volunteer, and the attorney ad litem.¹

Respondent (the Department): The court of appeals properly considered the context, including that the Department attorney did not express an intent to abandon the pleadings, the CASA volunteer recommended termination, Mother's own attorney asked the court not to terminate, and Mother does not dispute that the written pleadings unequivocally sought termination, so the representative's statements did not abandon the pleading.²

Mother argued that the court of appeals erred in its legal analysis of abandonment by disregarding the designated representative's statements.¹ The Department answered that the court of appeals applied established case law correctly.²

• Designated representative. Asked if the caseworker was the designated representative with authority to speak on the relief sought, the Department's counsel said no; she was designated only to sit and testify. (Oral Argument, 0:21:52)
• Unequivocal testimony. On rebuttal, Mother's counsel said the caseworker was not going rogue but testifying to the Department's pretrial position, and her testimony was unequivocal. (Oral Argument, 0:46:42)
• No change of heart. Asked what caused a change of heart, the Department's counsel said it had none, and every written pleading before and after trial confirms it sought termination. (Oral Argument, 0:36:25)
• Mother's requests. Mother's counsel pointed out that the mother told the court she was asking it not to terminate her rights, and her counsel repeated that in closing. (Oral Argument, 0:09:34)
• Jury trial. Asked if parents should always request a jury trial, the Department's counsel said parents are free to request one whenever they want. (Oral Argument, 0:23:18)
• Appeal. Asked if the Department would have appealed had the lesser judgment been entered, its counsel said he did not know the answer. (Oral Argument, 0:38:32)
• Rule for clarity. Asked whether a clear rule would save resources, the Department's counsel said a rule offering clarity would be very helpful. (Oral Argument, 0:41:19)

None

Holding

An unequivocal assertion by the Department, including its designated representative, that it does not seek termination constitutes withdrawal of a request for that relief unless clearly repudiated, and a court may not terminate parental rights in the face of such a statement; because the Department never repudiated it here, the termination of Mother's rights is reversed.¹

Reasoning

The Court reserved whether the court of appeals' "totality of the circumstances" approach suffices in ordinary civil cases and held it inadequate or incomplete for parental-termination cases, which stand apart because of the constitutional dimension of the parent-child relationship, the clear-and-convincing standard, appointed counsel, and heightened appellate review.² It agreed that parties can abandon claims by stipulation under Rules 165 and 301, and that courts may not order termination when the Department has stipulated it does not seek it.³ The representative's statements, elicited by the Department's own counsel and confirmed on cross-examination, bear only one meaning.⁴

None of the court of appeals' contrary circumstances overcomes that: the CASA volunteer's and attorney ad litem's views do not show what the Department sought; evidence supporting termination also supported the relief the Department said it wanted; Mother's closing request not to terminate may simply have reflected that termination was no longer legally authorized; and it was the Department's counsel who elicited the designated representative's answer and failed to correct it.⁵ The live pleading carries little weight because it also demanded termination as to Father, whom the Department undisputedly supported, and because the Court expects the Department to acknowledge when termination is no longer appropriate.⁶ If the Department's position differs from its representative's unequivocal statement, counsel must alert the court and the parent, and the Court did not decide what repudiation would suffice or how soon it must come.⁷

Disposition

The court of appeals' judgment and the portion of the trial court's judgment terminating Mother's rights are reversed; the Court rendered judgment appointing Mother parent non-conservator, as she prayed and as the representative said the Department sought, and remanded to the district court to render a judgment consistent with its decision and resolve any remaining issues.⁸

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Young

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Busby, Devine, Huddle, Lehrmann, and Sullivan, JJ.

Did Not Participate

Hawkins, J.