A Houston police officer, Officer Flores, was driving to work in an unmarked, city-owned truck a few miles after dropping off his daughter at school when he collided with Ashley Harris, who sued the City of Houston for damages under the Texas Tort Claims Act.¹ In its initial responses to Harris's requests for admission, the City admitted that the officer was acting within the scope of his employment.² After more discovery, and with the trial court's leave, the City changed the admission to a denial.³

This is a petition for review in an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a summary-judgment motion on immunity. The City moved for summary judgment arguing that the officer acted outside the scope of employment and it was immune, and the trial court denied the motion on June 7, 2023.¹ The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed on June 4, 2024, reasoning that although superseded admissions cease to be conclusive judicial admissions, "they are still evidence" sufficient to raise a fact issue on scope of employment, contrary to the First Court of Appeals' holding in Valdez v. City of Houston.² The Court requested briefs on the merits and denied the petition on October 31, 2025, with Justice Young, joined by Justice Devine, concurring in the denial.³

Petition for review from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in an interlocutory appeal from the denial of summary judgment; denied October 31, 2025, with a concurring opinion by Justice Young, joined by Justice Devine.⁴

The City presents one issue: when the evidence establishes that the driver was not in the scope of employment and the coming-and-going rule applies, whether the City's earlier, superseded admission on scope of employment, made in error, creates a fact issue that defeats summary judgment and confers subject-matter jurisdiction that would not otherwise exist.¹ Harris frames the issue as whether the court of appeals properly affirmed the denial of summary judgment, including whether fact issues exist about scope of employment.² The concurrence frames the question as whether a superseded admission is "evidence" that can preclude summary judgment.³

The case arises from the denial of a summary-judgment motion on governmental immunity, which waives immunity for negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an employee within the scope of employment.¹

Whether a superseded admission is evidence that creates a fact issue.

Petitioner (City of Houston): The motor-vehicle waiver applies only within the scope of employment, the evidence from both sides shows the officer was commuting and so outside it under the coming-and-going rule, and the court of appeals wrongly treated the superseded admission as evidence even though the trial court granted leave to amend; the First Court's approach is correct, and the contrary rule lets non-genuine fact issues defeat summary judgment and confer jurisdiction.¹

Respondent (Harris): Superseded admissions lose their conclusive effect under Rule 198.3 but remain admissible as statements of a party-opponent under Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2), and even apart from the admission the record raises a fact issue, because City policy limits vehicle use to official business, the officer took a business call near the time of the incident, and he had significant daily business travel.²

The City argued that the First and Fourteenth Courts of Appeals are split on whether an admission superseded by court order can still be some evidence of scope of employment for summary-judgment purposes.¹ Justice Young agreed that the two Houston courts' disagreement places that region's trial courts in a bind and that the Court will need to resolve it.²

None

Reasoning

The Court gave no reasons for denying review; the only writing is Justice Young's concurrence, which is the view of two Justices, not a holding.¹ He doubted that amending an admission creates a genuine dispute of material fact, but noted that the Court will need to answer the question because the First and Fourteenth Courts of Appeals answer it differently, and that this case is not the right vehicle.² He expressed no final view, but at first blush the First Court's approach seems more logical: once a response is properly amended it replaces the old admission and the new one binds the party, and treating errant statements as evidence that automatically precludes summary judgment would raise the time and cost of requests for admission.³

The City objected to the admissibility of the superseded admissions as summary-judgment evidence only on grounds of timeliness, so the lower courts did not fully develop the issue; he anticipated that litigants will focus on it in future cases and, if the division remains, expected to vote to grant a future petition.⁴

Disposition

Petition for review denied.⁵

Vote Breakdown

Justice Young concurred in the denial, joined by Justice Devine.⁶