Dr. Rodriguez, the superintendent of Edcouch-Elsa ISD, signed contingent-fee contracts with two consulting firms, ERI Funding Group and Comprehensive Training Center (CTC), to help the District apply for a federal 21st Century Community Learning Centers grant.¹ Under the contracts the District owed fees of 7.114% and 2.886% of the grant only if it was awarded, and the contracts allowed payment from grant funds.² The firms logged between 200 and 500 hours, the District won about $8 million, and then terminated the agreements before the firms requested payment.³ The District says its board had not delegated authority to approve such contracts: its purchasing rule required board approval for any single budgeted purchase of $25,000 or more, past grant-writing contracts went to the board, the board did not know of these contracts when they were purportedly terminated, and the fees, about $817,500, were unbudgeted.⁴

The firms sued for breach of contract, and the 357th District Court of Cameron County denied the District's plea to the jurisdiction, holding the contracts were properly executed.¹ The Thirteenth Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Justice Tijerina, reversed and rendered judgment for the District, holding the contracts unauthorized because the services were not budgeted.² The Supreme Court granted review on March 27, 2026.

Petition for review from the Thirteenth Court of Appeals (Corpus Christi-Edinburg); granted March 27, 2026. Argued September 15, 2026.

• The firms:¹ whether a school district may invoke governmental immunity to avoid payment under a fully performed contingent-fee contract, payable from grant funds, on the theory that the superintendent exceeded a monetary limit that depended on the contract's cost, when that cost was not reasonably knowable at signing.
• The District:² whether immunity bars the firms' claims because the contingent-fee contracts, which the superintendent signed without board approval, were not properly executed and the fees were unbudgeted.

The District's plea to the jurisdiction rests on evidence and on whether the contracts were "properly executed" under the Local Government Code, and the firms argue that at a minimum a fact question remains whether the contracts "cost" $25,000 or more.¹

Whether the contracts were properly executed.

The firms (Petitioners): The District's theory assumes the contracts "cost" $25,000 or more at signing, but they obligated the District to nothing unless a grant was awarded, and payment could come from grant funds, so cost was neither knowable then nor now; the Court should adopt a rebuttable presumption of authority for contingent-fee contracts whose value is not reasonably knowable.¹ Authority must be judged ex ante, the District offered no evidence of contract cost, the court of appeals shifted the ground on an inadequate record, and the District's fears of abuse are already addressed by law.²

The District (Respondent): The contingent-fee contracts were unbudgeted and so not properly executed, and even if budgeted the superintendent lacked authority to sign them because they cost more than $25,000.³ The District adds that it did not enter into the contracts, that the board never delegated authority to sign or terminate them, and that the firms, as sophisticated parties, failed to follow established procedures.⁴

The firms argued the case presents a recurring problem the Court has never squarely addressed: how courts should assess a government official's authority to bind the entity when a contract's value depends on a contingent event.¹ The District argued the court of appeals correctly applied immunity based on unobjected-to, unrebutted evidence that the $817,500 fee was not budgeted.²

• Why no board approval. Asked why petitioners skipped board approval this time, counsel said his client recalls getting it only once and, in her experience with this district, did not seek it. (Oral Argument, 0:04:42)
• Pricing at signing. Pressed on when a contingent fee should be priced, counsel said nobody knew at signing how much the contracts would cost the district. (Oral Argument, 0:06:19)
• Who bears the budget burden. Asked whether proving the budget is petitioners' burden, counsel said perhaps, but on a plea the District had to show as a matter of law the contracts were unauthorized. (Oral Argument, 0:12:40)
• Any other remedy? Both sides were asked whether the firms have another path to relief, such as takings or quantum meruit; each counsel said they knew of none. (Oral Argument, 0:18:50; 0:38:49)
• The $24,000 hypothetical. A Justice asked the District to assume the fee was only $24,000, and whether immunity would still bar payment because it was unbudgeted. (Oral Argument, 0:24:14)
• Budget missing from the record. A Justice noted the budget is not in the record and that the District's evidentiary plea is treated like summary judgment, so the gap may hurt the District. (Oral Argument, 0:25:29)
• Budgeting an unknown fee. Justices asked how a board could budget for a contingent fee of unknown size, with hypothetical fees of $24,000 or $100 million; counsel said board approval. (Oral Argument, 0:31:10; 0:32:28)
• When must it be budgeted? Asked what in the record shows which fiscal year a contingent-fee contract had to be budgeted, the District's counsel said at signing but could point to no record evidence. (Oral Argument, 0:35:30; 0:37:26)
• Grant money as public funds. Asked whether grant funds paid to a consultant remain the district's public funds, counsel said it depends on what the grant itself provides. (Oral Argument, 0:41:01)
• Is a 10% fee typical? In rebuttal, petitioners' counsel was asked whether the record shows the 10% contingent fee is comparable to what other districts pay; he did not believe it does. (Oral Argument, 0:48:35)

• An amicus curiae brief was filed, with a response; they are not summarized here.