Annunciation House, Inc. is an El Paso charity founded in 1976, working with the Catholic Diocese of El Paso, that operates shelters and gives food and housing to migrants regardless of immigration status. On February 7, 2024, state officials delivered a "Request to Examine" its records to director Ruben Garcia, demanding immediate production on pain of forfeiture of its right to do business, and the attorney general refused to extend the deadline beyond the next day.¹

Annunciation House obtained a temporary restraining order in El Paso County district court and sought declaratory relief; the attorney general filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion for leave to file a quo warranto counterclaim, later alleging "illegal alien harboring and operation of a stash house" and seeking an injunction. The trial court granted Annunciation House summary judgment, holding the records statute facially unconstitutional and that the request was religious harassment, and denied leave to file quo warranto on grounds including abrogation by § 11.301(a)(5), no harboring under Cruz v. Abbott, preemption, vagueness, and RFRA. The attorney general appealed directly to the Court under Government Code § 22.001(c), which heard argument January 13, 2025, without Justice Sullivan.¹

Direct appeal from the 205th District Court, El Paso County, from a summary judgment and orders granting and denying injunctions on constitutional grounds; probable jurisdiction noted, argued January 13, 2025.²

Whether the trial court erred in denying the attorney general leave to file a quo warranto action, and in declaring the records-request statutes facially unconstitutional and enjoining further requests.¹

The Court reviews legal determinations de novo, and on a motion for leave to file quo warranto accepts the petition's allegations as true and asks whether they state a cause of action giving "probable ground for the proceeding".¹

Attorney General Paxton and the State (Appellants): Article IV, § 22 and chapter 66 authorize quo warranto on the alleged harboring, which is not preempted, vague or barred by RFRA, and the records statutes are constitutional.

Annunciation House (Appellee): § 11.301(a)(5) supplants quo warranto for criminal acts, merely sheltering migrants is not harboring, the Penal Code provisions are preempted and vague as applied, RFRA bars the action, and the records statutes lack precompliance review.¹

Not applicable to the Court's decision; the opinion does not recite the petition's cert-worthiness arguments.

• Impeding deportation. Asked whether it agrees it cannot impede deportation of those it houses, Annunciation House's counsel said absolutely, and that it has not impeded anyone. (Oral Argument, 0:27:35)
• Duty to report. Asked whether an ordinary citizen must report a suspected illegal entry, the State's counsel said certainly not, but described three categories of conduct that each independently support harboring. (Oral Argument, 0:11:07)
• Religious purpose. Asked whether an injunction requiring investigation of status would leave a valid religious purpose, Annunciation House's counsel said absolutely, noting most guests are brought by ICE after processing. (Oral Argument, 0:23:13)
• Allegations or evidence. Asked whether the Court should look at allegations or evidence, Annunciation House's counsel said the record, because the State relies on its alleged admissions. (Oral Argument, 0:29:11)
• RFRA burden. Asked whether shutting the facility substantially burdens religion, the State's counsel said the record lacks facts on substantiality and RFRA does not preclude any remedy. (Oral Argument, 0:02:03)
• Quo warranto hurdle. Asked about the leave-of-court requirement, Annunciation House's counsel said it is unusual in Texas, a hurdle the Legislature set, so the State should show the offense's elements. (Oral Argument, 0:24:53)

None noted

Holding

The trial court erred in denying leave to file the quo warranto action and in holding the records statutes facially unconstitutional, so the judgment is reversed, the injunction vacated, and the case remanded.¹

Reasoning

Tracing quo warranto from thirteenth-century England through Texas's adoption of the common law and Article IV, § 22, the Court held the attorney general's authority is constitutional, extends to "exercising any power not authorized by law," which includes criminal acts as other states have held, and yields only to limits "expressly directed by law." Section 11.301 is silent about quo warranto and chapter 66 authorizes rather than limits it, so neither expressly displaces the authority; the attorney general also has discretion to decide "sufficient cause." The Court agreed with Cruz v. Abbott that mere shelter is not harboring, which requires knowing efforts to hide people from detection, but the pleaded allegations of shielding illegal aliens from detection were enough, and evidentiary fights are premature. RFRA could not be used to bar filing because the relevant government action is only filing, though it may matter later; the harboring statute is neither field nor conflict preempted under Kansas v. Garcia and Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, and it is not vague as applied. The records-request dispute is not moot despite the attorney general's abandonment, but §§ 12.151-.152 are not facially invalid because "immediately" permits precompliance review such as a Rule 176.6(e) protective order, and no evidence supported the trial court's finding of anti-Catholic bias under Government Code § 2400.002; the Court also questioned the injunction's breadth and reminded the trial court to presume the attorney general's good faith.²

Disposition

Trial court's judgment reversed, injunction vacated, denial of the attorney general's injunction request reversed and remanded, and case remanded for further proceedings; the Court expressed no view on the merits of the harboring allegations, RFRA or the remedy.³

Vote Breakdown

Opinion of the Court by Justice Young; Justice Sullivan did not participate.⁴