Family Dollar Stores of Texas built a store on ARCP's property in Fort Worth between 2014 and 2016, and after construction the neighboring property owned by JLMH Investments flooded every time it rained, depositing silt and trash and affecting its building and parking lot.¹ JLMH's president noticed the water from the time the store was completed, spent two years trying to get the City to respond, and in 2019 and 2020 engineering reports concluded that the store's drainage was directing runoff onto the property.²

In 2020 JLMH sued Family Dollar, ARCP and others for nuisance, trespass, negligent and intentional diversion of water and violation of Water Code section 11.086(a), seeking damages and, by amendment, a permanent injunction, and two groups of defendants moved for summary judgment on the two-year statute of limitations.¹ The trial court granted the motions in April 2023, the second order stating that it "is final, disposes of all parties and all claims, and is appealable," and on May 8, 2023 it signed an "Order Clarifying Summary Judgment Orders and Allowing Permissive Interlocutory Appeal".² JLMH filed an ordinary notice of appeal, and the Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) took jurisdiction, held the damages claims time-barred but reversed on the injunction because limitations is not a defense to abating a nuisance.³ The Court heard argument on November 4, 2025 and on June 26, 2026 reversed and reinstated the trial court's judgment.⁴

Petition for review from the Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth); argued November 4, 2025; opinion by Justice Busby issued June 26, 2026.⁵

• Family Dollar:¹ whether limitations bars a request for an injunction, whether all remedies require a cause of action, and whether a mandatory injunction compelling new works to abate a passive nuisance is in effect a request for money damages.
• JLMH:² whether this Court should affirm the long-standing rule that limitations does not bar an injunction to abate a nuisance, that a nuisance cannot be obtained by prescription so no underlying cause of action is required, and that abatement costs are not money damages.

The Court first examined its own appellate jurisdiction, which requires a final judgment, and applied its finality precedents to the trial court's orders.¹

Whether limitations bars the injunction.

Family Dollar (Petitioners): All remedies, including injunctions, require a cause of action through which to establish liability, so once all of JLMH's claims are time-barred the request for an injunction fails.¹

JLMH (Respondent): The law is well settled that limitations is not a defense to an injunction abating a nuisance, as courts have consistently held since 1895, and changing it would weaken private property rights.²

Whether the Court has jurisdiction.

The parties (supplemental briefing): At the Court's request they submitted supplemental briefs on appellate jurisdiction, and both argue that it is secure.³

Family Dollar argued that the court of appeals' holdings on limitations and on injunctions without a cause of action fundamentally conflict with how the legal system treats remedies, and JLMH responded that the law is settled and the petitioners are not asking to clarify an open question.¹

• Conceded the rule. Asked whether they lose if the petitioner's rule is the law, respondent's counsel said "If that was the law, then I would agree," but disputed that it is. (Oral Argument, 0:30:26)
• Stuck with flooding. Asked if the neighbor is stuck with flooding forever, petitioner's counsel said courts routinely dismiss claims where future damages are possible but the plaintiff waited too long. (Oral Argument, 0:04:58)
• Laches or limitations. Asked why not treat this as laches, petitioner's counsel said the Court held in 1943 that limitations applies equally to equitable and legal claims. (Oral Argument, 0:12:15)
• Permanent nuisance. Asked whether it accepts that this is a permanent nuisance, respondent's counsel said it challenged that below, but not in this Court. (Oral Argument, 0:25:08)
• Affirmative defense. Asked why this is not a wrongful act, petitioner's counsel said limitations is an affirmative defense, not an element, and cited Schneider on temporary and permanent nuisances. (Oral Argument, 0:14:51; 0:16:10)
• Stale evidence. On rebuttal, asked about stale evidence in injunction cases, petitioner's counsel said the same concerns apply to ten-year adverse possession, and the Legislature set that period. (Oral Argument, 0:42:04)

None noted

Holding

The April 17 summary-judgment order was final because it contained unequivocal finality language, and the later May 8 order did not undo that finality because it did not expressly and specifically vacate, modify or amend it, so the Court has appellate jurisdiction.¹ On the merits, there is no stand-alone right to an injunction abating a nuisance, an injunction requires a cause of action, and the two-year limitations period that bars the damages claims also bars the requests for an injunction on the trespass, negligence and Water Code claims.²

Reasoning

An order becomes final without trial if it disposes of all remaining claims and parties or includes unequivocal finality language, and an appellate court must take such language at face value, so the April 17 order was final when signed.³ A court exercising plenary power must undo a final order "by written order that is express and specific," and the May 8 order did not say it replaced the earlier orders, did not alter their disposition and did not revive any claim, so a trial court cannot eliminate express finality language by implication.⁴ On the merits, remedies are available only if liability is established under a cause of action, a nuisance is a type of legal injury and not a cause of action, statutes of limitations apply to equitable actions as to legal ones, and the claim itself determines the limitations period, so adding an injunction request to time-barred trespass, negligence and Water Code claims does not avoid it.⁵

Disposition

Court of appeals' judgment reversed and the trial court's judgment reinstated.⁶

Vote Breakdown

Majority Opinion by Justice Busby

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Bland, Devine, Huddle, Lehrmann, and Young, JJ.

Concurrence by Justice Busby

Joined by Devine and Lehrmann, JJ.

Dissent by Justice Sullivan

Joined by Blacklock, C.J., and Hawkins, J.

Appellate jurisdiction was decided as a threshold question under the Court's finality precedents, and the limitations question was decided on the summary-judgment record.¹

Justice Busby delivered the opinion of the Court as to Part II, joined by Chief Justice Blacklock and Justices Lehrmann, Devine, Bland, Huddle and Young, with Part I joined only by Justices Lehrmann and Devine.¹ Justice Busby, joined by Justices Lehrmann and Devine, concurred to note that the case does not implicate public nuisances or the ten-year statute.² Justice Young, joined by Justices Bland and Huddle and in part by Chief Justice Blacklock, concurred in part and in the judgment, reaching jurisdiction on narrower grounds.³ Justice Sullivan, joined by Chief Justice Blacklock and Justice Hawkins, dissented, arguing that the May 8 order modified the final order and that the case should be dismissed for want of appellate jurisdiction.⁴